EUの内と外における共生の模索

2013年3月

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目次

はしがき .................................................................................................................................................. iii
坂井一成（神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科准教授）
岩本和子（神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科教授）

I. 論文
Muslims in Japan with the comparison of those in Europe ................................................................. 2
Samir A. Nouh（同志社大学神学部教授）
From Confrontation to Global Partnership : Europe and Japan .......................................................... 13
Dimitri Vanoverbeke（ルーヴァン・カトリック大学教授）
ドイツ大学教育制度改革と日本語教育—ハンブルク大学の場合— ........................................ 21
杉原早紀（ハンブルク大学アジア・アフリカ研究所専任講師）
Homeland Tourism, Long-Distance Nationalism and Production of a New Diasporic Identity:
Armenian case .................................................................................................................................... 28
Tsypylma Darieva（フンボルト大学社会秩序表象センター客員研究員／筑波大学特任准教授）

II. 講演概要
CEFR（ヨーロッパ言語共通参照枠）から見たフランス母語学習者の言語運用能力
ーグルノーブル大学の場合ー ........................................................................................................ 42
東伴子（グルノーブル第3-スタンダール大学准教授）
移民を受け入れ、なんとか円満に共存し、国力の源泉にするシステムをつくりあげている
オーストリア ..................................................................................................................................... 53
高坂哲郎（日本経済新聞編集委員）
Understanding Growth Strategies in Retailing:
From Internationalization to the Development of New Retail Formats ........................................... 58
Karine Picot-Coupey（レンヌ第1大学准教授）

III. 講演会実施記録
研究部 .................................................................................................................................................. 62
国際部 .................................................................................................................................................. 64

IV. 国際ワークショップ
(1) 2013年2月6日「政治・経済・社会の劇変とEUにおけるアイデンティティ形成」(ブリュッセル自由大学(VUB))
プログラム ......................................................................................................................................... 70
From Crisis to Integration?:
European Diversity and Identity, Transnationalism, and Institutional Change ............................... 72
Kolja Raube（ルーヴァン・カトリック大学講師）
Reflections on Political Change in North Africa and Its Influence on the European Union ............. 81
齋藤剛（神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科准教授）
Evaluating the City Characteristics through Geo-Tagged Tweets .................................................... 92
村尾元（神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科准教授）
What crisis? Japan, EU and Political Change in Middle East and North Africa ................................. 96

Noemi Lanna（ナポリ東洋大学准教授）

Concluding remarks ..................................................................................................................... 107

坂井一成（神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科准教授）

(2) 2013年2月7日「IReC共催 ベルギー研究会」

第1部（神戸大学ブリュッセルオフィス）

プログラム..................................................................................................................................... 109

ベルギーのアルメニア人コミュニティ ......................................................................................... 110

松井真之介（神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科メディア文化研究センター学術推進研究員）

見出されたフランドル

—ユルスナール『黒の過程』(1968)における絵画をめぐって— ...................................................... 113

村中由美子（東京大学大学院仏文研究室博士課程）

炭鉱からみる近代

—マニフェスタ9と‘文化’資源としての<炭鉱>展を中心に— .......................................................... 114

角本摩衣子（神戸大学人文学研究科博士課程／ブリュッセル自由大学客員研究員）


Freek Adriaens（ヘント大学講師）

第2部（ブリュッセル王立音楽院）

講演 Belgian Francophone Literature at the End of the 19th Century ............................................. 116

三田順（学術振興会特別研究員／神戸大学）
はしがき

本報告書は、神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科異文化研究交流センター（Intercultural Research Center、通称IReC〔アイレック〕）の2012年度研究部プロジェクト「EUの内と外における共生の模索」、及び国際部の活動をもとに編集した。

1. 研究部プロジェクトについて
プロジェクト名：EUの内と外における共生の模索
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村尾元（情報コミュニケーション論講座）
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本プロジェクトは、2008年度から4年間わたりてIReCで蓄積してきたヨーロッパ研究プロジェクト（「多言語・多民族共存と文化的多様性の維持に関する国際的・歴史的比較研究」「ヨーロッパにおける多民族共存とEU—多民族共存への多視点的・メタ視点的アプローチ」「ヨーロッパにおける多民族共存とEU—その理念、現実、表象」「ヨーロッパにおける多民族共存とEU—言語、文化、ジェンダーをめぐって」）の延長線上に位置付けられるものである。

本プロジェクトの目的と活動は以下のとおりである。
[目的]
本プロジェクトでは、EUを取り巻く国際環境の大きな変動に着目した。一つに、地中海の対岸での「アラブの春」とその余波での大量の難民の押し寄せである。ソーシャルメディア（SNS）を用いた社会動員を背景に突き進んだ「アラブの春」を受けて、EUとしての移民政策や域内移動の自由についての見直しが迫られ、またノルウェーやフランスではイスラム原理主義者による深刻なテロ事件も起こった。もう一つは、ユーロ危機と欧州信用不安であり、これによりイタリアやギリシャやスペインなど多額の政府債務に苦しむ多くの国で、さらにドイツと共にその危機からの脱却を主導してきたフランスでも政権交代が起こったことである。
こうしたEU内外の大きな変動を受け、注目されるのがEU各国はこれまで通りEU自体を重視するのか、それともむしろナショナルな枠組みに関じこもるのかである。そしてこうしたプロセスのなかで、EU市民のアイデンティティにはどのような変化が生じているのかについて、特に近年の地中海地域の変動、ソーシャルメディアの役割、EU関係の動向に焦点を当てて、これまでの異文化研究交流センターとしてのEU研究の延長線上で多角的に考察することとした。
講演会は以下のとおりである。

1) 2012年6月22日 “Japan-EU's Relationship: Limits and Hopes in the New Century” Lluc López Vidal（カタロニア放送大学准教授）
2) 2012年10月31日 「日本におけるムスリム−ヨーロッパのムスリムと比較の観点から」 Samir A. Nouh（同志社大学教授）
3) 2012年11月12日 「移民を受け入れ、なんとか円満に共存し、国力の源泉にするシステムをつくりあげているオーストリア」 高坂哲郎（日本経済新聞編集委員）
4) 2013年1月11日 「アラブの春とトルコのEU加盟の新たな課題」 八谷まち子（九州大学教授）

そして、神戸大学「平成24年度ブリュッセルオフィスを拠点とするワークショップ等助成事業」及び国際文化学研究科「平成24年度研究教育プロジェクト」の助成を得て実施した、日欧国際ワークショップ「政治・経済・社会の劇変とEUにおけるアイデンティティ形成」（2013年2月6日、ブリュッセル自由大学（オランダ語系））も、本プロジェクトの一環に位置付けられる。

本ワークショップでは、以下の報告がなされた。プロジェクトメンバーからは、坂井が司会・総括を務め、岩本和子、西田健志、松井真之介の3名が討論者として参加した。

1) “From Crisis to Integration? – European Diversity and Identity, Transnationalism, and Institutional Change” Kolja Raube（ルーヴァンカトリック大学講師）
2) “Political Change in North Africa and Its Influence on the EU” 齋藤剛（神戸大学准教授）
3) “Evaluating the City Characteristics through Geo-Tagged Tweets” 村尾元（神戸大学准教授）
4) “What crisis? Japan, EU and Political Change in Middle East and North Africa” Noemi Lanna（ナポリ東洋大学准教授）

2. 国際部の活動について
国際部では、協定校から招いた講師を中心として講演会等を行った。今年度はEU諸国が対象で、ヨーロッパの政治、言語、文化状況や日欧関係をテーマとした。学術交流の推進とともに、交換留学やダブルディグリープログラム留学への意識を高めることも目的とする。講演は以下のものであった。

1) 2012年5月11日 「CEFR（ヨーロッパ言語共通参照枠）から見たフランス母語学習者の言語運用能力ーグルノーブル大学の場合」 東伴子（グルノーブル第3-スタンダール大学准教授）
2) 2012年7月19日 “From Confrontation to Global Partnership: Europe and Japan” （対立から協力へ：ヨーロッパと日本） Dimitri Vanoverbeke（ルーヴァン・カトリック大学教授）
3) 2012年9月24日 「ドイツ大学制度改革と日本語教育ーハンブルク大学の場合ー」 杉原早紀（ハンブルク大学アジア・アフリカ研究所専任講師）
4) 2012年11月28日 “Between Long-distance Nationalism, Homeland Tourism and Production of a New Diasporic Identity” （遠距離ナショナリズムと祖国ツーリズムと新しいディアスポラ・アイデンティティの形成のはざまで～アルメニアを例に～）Tsypylma Darieva（フンボルト大学社会秩序表象センター客員研究員／筑波大学特任准教授）
5) 2013年2月22日 “Understanding Growth Strategies in Retailing —From Internationalization to..."
the Development of New Retail Formats” 　Karine Picot-Coupey（レンヌ第1大学准教授）
また、ブリュッセルにおいて、IReC およびブリュッセル王立音楽院の共催により国際研究会（ベルギー研究会、代表岩本）を開催し、本研究科教員およびグローバル人材育成事業の一環として EU 文化研修で渡欧中の本研究科学生と、在欧のベルギー研究者や音楽院の教員、学生との学術交流活動を行った。研究会第 1 部は神戸大学ブリュッセルオフィスを会場とし研究発表と討論、第 2 部はブリュッセル王立音楽院を会場とし講演と演奏会を行った。EU の中心であり多言語・多文化状況のベルギーをめぐる芸術文化の諸相に多様な視点からアプローチし、考察した。
第 1 部
研究発表
1）ベルギーのアルメニア人コミュニティ
　松井真之介（神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科メディア文化研究センター）
2）見出されたフランドルーユルスナール『黒の過程』(1968)における絵画をめぐって—
　村中由美子（東京大学大学院仏文研究室博士課程）
3）炭鉱からみる近代—マニフェスタ 9 と‘文化’資源としての＜炭鉱＞展を中心に
　角本摩衣子（神戸大学人文学研究科博士課程／ブリュッセル自由大学客員研究員）
　Freek Adriaens（ヘント大学講師）
第 2 部
講演 “Belgian Francophone Literature at the End of the 19th Century”
　三田順（学術振興会特別研究員／神戸大学）
演奏会　“Belgian Art Songs”
　ブリュッセル王立音楽院声楽科学学生（講師 正木裕子）

以上のように、EU をめぐって政治・社会・文化から多面的な研究活動が進められ、次年度以降への展望も開けてきた年であった。関係各位に深くお礼申し上げたい。
坂井一成（国際文化学研究科准教授、異文化研究交流センター研究部長）
岩本和子（国際文化学研究科教授、異文化研究交流センター国際部長）
I. 論文
Muslims in Japan with the comparison of those in Europe

Samir A. Nouh

Introduction

A discussion of Islam in Japan needs first to identify the dates of earlier contacts between Japan and Muslim world. There were some direct encounters between Japanese and Muslims before Ottoman Turks sent a naval vessel Ertugrul to Japan in 1890.

First group consisted of 36 men led by Takeuchi Yasunori arrived in Suez on March 1862 for the overland journey by steam train to Alexandria. The Second group of Japanese travelers was 34 men led by Ikeda Nagaoki, bound to France, they arrived Egypt in 1864; they travelled to Giza to see the Pyramids! Also, it should be mentioned that the first merchant ship under a Muslim flag to reach Japan in modern times was the SADQIA of the BEY of Tunis in 1872. (That time the Bey of Tunisia was Muhammad III assadiq, born Feb.1813 and ruled from Sept. 1859 till his death Oct. 1882, the beys of Tunis were the Monarchs of Tunisia from 1705 until 1957.)

In 1880 Japan sent a mission to Persian Gulf, the descriptions Ienori Honjuku (1852-1891) provided in his report of the voyage were the first eyewitness report of the Persian Gulf Region in Japan.

Muslims began arriving in Modern Japan from the beginning of the OPENING of the country. Most of them were Malay and Yemeni sailors serving aboard British or Dutch ships. Few Arab, Turk and Indian Muslims have been living in Japan since 1865; some of them were import-export merchants. In 1883 Abu Bakar, Sultan of Johor was the first Muslim head of state to visit Japan and meet The Meiji Emperor and Japanese political officials and European diplomats. By the early 20 century few foreign Muslims lived in Japan started to introducing Islam to Japanese and a handful of ethnic Japanese began to convert to Islam.

1. Muslims in Japan

Contacts between Islam and Japan

Contacts between Islam and Japan were not constant over the years. There were periods of interruption, because these contacts depended on political circumstances and economic interests that varied from period to period, and this affected the position of the Muslims in Japan. The presence of Islam in Japan depended on

1- the very few non-Japanese who came to Japan for various reasons,
2- Several Japanese who converted to Islam to serve the objectives of Japanese policy,
3- And a small number of Japanese who encountered Islam while traveling outside Japan and meeting Muslims.

The first Japanese Muslim is said to be Abdul Halim Shotaro Noda (1868-1904) followed by the second Japanese Muslim, Torajiro Yamada who met Noda when he arrived at Istanbul on April 4, 1892. The lifestyle of Noda was not praised as a Muslim one, that is why he was forgotten, and the people thought that Yamada was the First Muslim, Bunpachiro Ariga(Ahmad) who became Muslim in Bombay, India in 1900, did all his best to explain Islam to the people around him, he published
Islamic booklets and translating the meaning of The Holly Quran.

Sheikh Ahmed Ali Al Jirjawi arrived in Japan in 1906 to participate in the interfaith dialogue conference in Tokyo, he claimed that 12000 Japanese converted to Islam and the Indian Ulama also estimated the number of converted Japanese Muslims by 12000, but Sheikh Muhammed Barakatullah (1854-1927) who arrived in Japan in 1909 denied such information. On July 16, 1912 Japan Weekly Mail wrote: The propagation of Islam has recently commenced both in Tokyo and Yokohama, the principal preacher of this faith is Mr. Barakatullah. At present there is only one Japanese convert, but there are 2 Chinese and 24 converts belonging to other nations, they meet at Barakatullah’s house every Friday. (Japanese converted is Mr. Hatano who wrote a small book entitled “Asia in Danger” that was sent all over the world, this booklet was translated into Ottoman Turkish by Abdurrashid Ibrahim. Japanese newspaper wrote nothing about Omar Yamaoka the first Japanese who performed Hajj, and wrote nothing about Ohara Takeyoshi, a military intelligence officer who converted to Islam on the advice of Abdurrashid Ibrahim, Ohara was named Abu Bakr, the same as the first Khalifa’s name, while Yamaoka was given the name Omar, the same as the second Khalifa’s name. In the year Sheikh Barakatulla arrived at Tokyo 1909, Omar Kotaro Yamaoka who became Muslim in Bombay started his Journey to Makah but that was not completely for the sake of Islam.

First Muslim Community in Japan

Although there were already some Muslims in Japan, it could be argued that Japan’s first Muslim communities were formed when most of the Turkish immigrants based themselves in Tokyo and Kobe, and a number of Muslim traders from India and elsewhere reached Kobe to form a Muslim community there. This group established the Kobe mosque with the support of Indian traders in 1935, a few years before the Muslim community in Tokyo founded the Tokyo mosque in 1938. It is clear that the Muslim communities both in Kobe and in Tokyo, which included mostly non-Japanese Muslims, were not large, but the establishment of the Kobe mosque and the Tokyo mosque became a symbol of the presence of Islam and of Muslims in Japan.

It was expected that the Muslim community would grow year after year, but facts and evidence indicate that this did not happen. Perhaps the failure to grow was due to;

1- A split between Turk-Tatar members of the community.
2- The destruction of the Ottoman Empire.
3- And Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, which destroyed the dream of establishing the Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere. This led to the displacement of the leaders of the Muslim community or forced them to escape from Japan, and there has been no one to take any part in any kind of religious activities.

New Start for Japanese Muslims

The first Muslim association consisting only of Japanese nationals was established in 1952, the total number of members was about seventy-four, Japanese Muslims began contacting the Islamic world, welcoming Muslims coming from outside Japan, and cooperating with Muslim businessmen and
Muslim students coming to study in Japan. Japanese Muslims formed a joint committee with non-Japanese Muslim residents in Japan and decided to establish the Islamic Center of Tokyo and a Muslim cemetery. It is noted that Muslims living in Japan were not a single Muslim community but formed independent associations according to their countries of origin, or nationalities. In 1968 the JMA began to open up to Japanese society through the establishment of social service activities and by explaining Islam in the Japanese media. Moreover, Japanese non-Muslim companies were invited to join the association as associate members. While strengthening relations with the Muslim world by representing Japan at conferences and other events, the JMA also received kings and other national leaders from the Arab and Islamic worlds. With the increase in the number of Muslims living in Japan, various Islamic associations have been founded by both Japanese and non-Japanese Muslim residents.

Relation between Japan and Muslim Countries and its impact on Muslims in Japan

After the 1973 oil crisis, Japan’s interest in the Gulf Arab countries and the Muslim world increased, and in turn Arab and Islamic countries started seeking to consolidate their relations with Japan. They competed with each other in this area. Some Arab and Islamic embassies opened cultural offices, and others established schools.

It is noted that Muslims in Japan have depended mostly on aid from the Muslim world, and their activities have depended more or less on the amount of that aid. Without such aid, these activities might come to an end. But some associations and other groups, which have been mainly self-sufficient and depended on voluntary contributions from their members, have continued to engage in activities and provide services to the community of Muslims in Japan and abroad. This can be seen by examining the activities of the JMA; the Islamic Center; and the Indonesian, Indian, and Pakistani communities. The Indian and Pakistani community is a good example of self-sufficiency. They fund themselves from within and have contributed many projects out of their own pockets and have succeeded in drawing Japanese into their charity activities. Their activities during the tragedy of Fukushima were covered by Japanese TV and newspapers and were appreciated by the Japanese public.

Number of Muslims in Japan and roll of Mosques

The existence of a religious community applying the teachings of its religion is not only important but also essential. Japanese people came to know about Islam when they saw Muslim immigrants in Japan practicing their religion. It was necessary from the very beginning to establish mosques in Japan because a mosque is more than a place of prayer or worship. It plays a central role in the life of Muslim communities everywhere. Before the 1980s the number of Muslims in Japan was small, and there were only two mosques, in Kobe and Tokyo. But in the mid-1980s, the number of Muslims in Japan grew rapidly. Most young Muslims have families, and their children go to Japanese schools, but their parents also send them to the mosque to learn the Qur’an and the Arabic language.

Scholars say that the number of mosques in Japan has increased more rapidly than the number of Muslims, which has not increased as much as expected despite the passage of many years. The
establishment of mosques, associations, unions, and Islamic cultural centers in Japan does not reflect the number of Japanese and non-Japanese Muslims living in Japan. In other words, these organizations do not reflect the size of the Muslim community in Japan. There is no accurate record of the number of Muslim residents in Japan, but scholars estimate the number of non-Japanese Muslims at eighty thousand to one hundred thousand and Japanese Muslims at eight thousand to ten thousand.

Is there a Muslim Community in Japan? The Situation of Muslims nowadays. Can Muslims establish their own community in Japan?

We must shed light on the reasons why the number of Muslims in Japan is not increasing and why the lack of growth may affect the survival of the Japanese Muslim community. A decreasing number of Muslims in Japan would affect the stability of the Muslim community itself. The Muslim community faces divisions among its members, and there are divisions or disputes between Muslims even of the same nationality. A few examples can be noted from the beginning of the Muslim presence in Japan.

Although the number of Muslims in Japan seemed to increase, they were unable to establish a real Muslim community in Japan because the Muslim students coming to study or receive training went back to their home countries soon after finishing their study or training. In addition, many Japanese Muslims were deployed by Japanese corporations to work outside Japan for long periods, and some of them did not return home. This had a negative impact on the Muslim community, which needed their help. The number of female Japanese Muslims far exceeded the number of males, which created a problem for Japanese Muslim women who wanted to marry and have children and have stability in their lives as Muslims, and they had difficulty finding suitable work.

Add to this the religious freedom of Japan, which allows family members to belong to different religions. A son and daughter may belong to a religion different from that of their parents and vice versa. Hence it is not easy to form a united Japanese Muslim family within Japanese society. The father may be a Muslim while the mother is a Christian, or a son may be a Muslim while his parents are non-Muslims, and so on. Islam in Japan is not a matter of birth but of faith, and no one is compelled to embrace its doctrines.

Muslims who come to work or do business in Japan face difficulties for reasons that need not be mentioned here. They cannot necessarily continue to live or settle in Japan, but some Muslim men have married Japanese women and found refuge with their wives and their wives’ families and struggled to settle in Japan.

Marriages between young male Muslim immigrants in Japan and Japanese women is considered the real beginning of groups of Muslim families that live near each other in areas close to the workplace of the head of the family or of the wife or her family. This phenomenon is evident in Tokyo and its suburbs, and here we can say clearly that the Muslim community really exists in Japan. This fact has drawn the attention of Japanese officials, who have begun to study this situation in areas where there are many Muslims. They have polled local people on their attitudes toward their Muslim neighbors, and the polls show favorable attitudes.
Issues and problems

With the increasing number of Muslim families and the expansion of areas where Muslims are gathering, Muslims have begun to think about building more mosques and schools as well as holding religious ceremonies and reviving Islamic events throughout the year. The number of mosques in Japan has grown rapidly every year. The Muslim community supports the building of mosques with the help of Islamic organizations outside Japan as well as people who give donations for the building of mosques.

Since mosques in Japan offer Qur’an and Arabic classes, a few mosques plan to register themselves as educational corporations and establish Islamic schools. Some offer day care centers with no legal status for Muslim children. With the presence of small children in Muslim families, there is a need to establish schools suitable for this new generation of Muslims. Members of the community are eager to establish such schools, which are also keenly committed to the curriculum of the Japanese schools, since they do not want to split the young from their society.

With the emergence of what can be called a Muslim community in Japan, Muslims have faced some internal and external problems. The internal problems are related to the community itself, which consists of both Japanese Muslims and non-Japanese Muslims living in Japan, Muslims who want to work in Japan, and Muslims who come for a period of study or training.

The Muslim community also includes Muslims from many different countries, such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Arab countries. The Muslim community also includes Muslims of various sects and embracing various doctrines, Japanese Muslims are few in number, even though they are distributed among the various sects and schools of Islamic thinking. There are Japanese Sunnis and Japanese Shiites, and there are Salafis and Asharis and so on. However, they never engage in sectarian conflict, because the nature of Japanese culture allows differences while maintaining friendliness and respect. This has impacted the members of the Muslim community as a whole. Japanese and non-Japanese seek to integrate into the community by taking advantage of all that is well and good. The members of the Indian, Pakistani, Bengali communities are a good model, since they are the most actively devoted to their religion, and they are appreciated by Japanese society.

The Muslim community in Japan is still trying to solve the problem of educating its children, since Japanese recognition of Islam is extremely low in the education ministry and local governments, which is basically because they have had little experience of direct communication with Muslims. Therefore most religious education of Muslim children in Japan is supported by individual efforts, without official assistance. That is because Muslims are a small minority, and small minorities do not receive special attention. Private international schools may give more attention to a child’s religious background, but a public school is the only choice for Muslim parents with limited means. Muslim parents have objections about Japanese school uniforms, school lunches, and mixed-sex physical education activities, such as swimming. The textbooks used in Japanese schools lack correct information about Islam and Muslim life. Some kind of more organized approach is necessary to address the specific education needs of Muslims in Japan.

The key issues and problems faced by the Muslim community include the difficult circumstances that arose after the events of September 11, 2001, when the U.S. government stereotyped all Muslims as terrorists and pressured many countries to tighten control on all Muslims,
without consideration, and Japan was not an exception.

In that situation, the Japanese people faced difficult questions: What is Islam? Is Islam really responsible for what happened on September 11, it was not only the Muslim community that attempted to answer these questions; a number of Japanese researchers tried to explain Islam and its principles as well. They concluded that what happened on September 11 was not related to the religion of Islam, but U.S. pressure made Japanese officials take extra security precautions and monitor Muslims living in Japan. As a result, the Japanese media launched an attack on the counterterrorism unit of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department’s Public Security Bureau. The media said it exceeded its jurisdiction by listing as terror suspects many Muslims who had lived and worked in Japan for decades. Apparently the Japanese police, under pressure from U.S. authorities, adopted this attitude toward Muslims in the aftermath of 9/11 in search of intelligence data among the city’s tiny Muslim community. The Public Security Bureau was set up during the Junichiro Koizumi government after 9/11 to coordinate and gather antiterrorism intelligence.

Conclusion

I myself feel that non-Japanese Muslims in Japan have widely retained their sense of religious and cultural identity and have generally become established as members of Japanese society. However, the Japanese police and the Japanese public must continue to accept these religious and cultural differences in order to maintain a functional society in which the rights of all people are protected.

Though the Muslim community is very small, the Japanese public of today has generally accepted it as part of Japanese society. For the most part, Japanese people accept cultural differences as colorful aspects of the world and understand that other cultures are actually not very different from their own. There are currently between thirty and forty single-story mosques in Japan, plus another hundred or more apartments used as *musalla*. The pious activities of the JMA members have made the JMA a core organization among religious organizations in Japan. JMA members are doing their best with the combined efforts of all Muslim groups in Japan to contribute to world peace and the social peace of individual members. Islamic circle of Japan (ICOJ) is playing a great roll in explaining Islam and Islamic culture to Japanese people.

Last year, after the tragedy of the earthquake and tsunami in Fukushima, the Muslim community proved that Muslims in Japan genuinely share the joys and sorrows of Japanese society. Members of the Muslim community contributed immensely to the relief efforts, and they continue to help the affected communities in the Tohoku region. Islam teaches its followers to generously offer humanitarian aid wherever the need may arise. Muslims have gone on supporting relief efforts in Japan along with Japanese and foreign relief agencies. One notable Muslim organization is Japan Islamic Trust, which has been supplying food and other necessities since the disaster took place. Other organizations were also visiting the affected areas and victims, helping the residents resettle in areas of their choice.
2. Muslims in Europe

Presence of Muslims in Europe

It is well known that the presence of Muslims in Europe is old. It dates back to the Middle Ages, there have been Muslims living in Europe for many centuries and as Tariq Ramadan asserts, it is and it was a reality, within many fields, the legal field, the philosophical field and the scientific fields. Ramadan added, we very often forget that Islam and Muslims, the Islamic tradition, and Muslim philosophers, scientists and thinkers were and are a part of the structure of European Identity. Muslims have been part of European society contributing to its economic, social and political development. For some European countries former colonial ties played a significant role, in France migration was largely from Morocco, Algeria and other north African countries, in Netherlands Muslim Emigrants came from Indonesia, in the U K Muslim migrants came manly from subcontinent India and Pakistan and after 1980 Muslim refugee arrived Europe from Iran, Iraq and Turkey, and after 1990 from Balkan, and North Africa. Muslims also arrived as students, professionals and investors (Turkey 2.3 million, Morocco 1.7 million, Albania 0.8 and Algeria 0.6) There are estimated to be 15-20 million Muslims living in EU, and it is expected to double by 2025, (The OSI (Open Society Institute, At Home in Europe project; A Report on 11 EU Cities 2010 Printed in Hungary) some Muslims in Europe are recent immigrants, others are second or third generation Europeans, there are five European countries with significant Muslim population: France 4,704,000 next Germany 4,119,000 then United Kingdom 2,869,000 followed by Spain 1,021,000 and Netherlands 900,000 (January 2011 CRS Congressional Research Services Report prepared for the Congress title is Muslims in Europe: Promoting Integration and countering Extremism – This report examines policies aimed at promoting integration, combating terrorism and countering violent extremism in France, Germany, the Netherlands and United Kingdom)

Most of Muslims live in Capital cities and large industrial towns and they are suspicious. (The OSI “Open Society Institute”, At Home in Europe project, A Report on 11 EU Cities 2010 Printed in Hungary)

Clash with Islam in Europe:

Nowadays distorted image of Islam is spreading in Europe, especially in France, the country which has taught the world liberty, fraternity and equality. Thousands of books, articles and statements of officials reveal hatred towards Islam explicitly or implicitly.

Clash with Islam began very early, but it appeared evidently in the modern era after European countries occupied Muslim countries, in case of France, after France occupied Algeria, and clash with Islam began in Egypt when Egyptian started resistance to British occupation,

Clashes, conflicts and violence in a country like France are in fact political not religious, and they, I mean clashes and violence, were the only way to express anger at the attacks on the rights and the dignity and independence of Muslims in their country and Jihad was only a liberation movement. I take France as an example, anti-Semitism is a crime under French law, but anti-Islam is not a crime, it is a legitimate exercise of freedom of opinion, the tragedy of French thinker Jaroudi is a model for both who dare to say a word against Zionism or would say a word of truth about Islam,
according to Garoudi, Islam is an obstacle to the West’s policy of economic and cultural domination on Islamic world. Garoudi says: Islam does not deny Christianity, the Quran mentioned Jesus and Mary with great respect, while Western intellectuals think all the time that Islam is an enemy to them. Salman Rushdie who continued insulting Islam, Quran and prophet of Islam is favored and welcomed and honored by western countries.

Islam as a second religion in Europe:

In recent years, France officially recognized Islam. Islam became the second religion in France where the number of Muslims who have French citizenship is estimated by four millions, so intolerance has been increased among the French officials. The French newspaper Le Figaro published articles raised concerns and fears among the French about Islam such as the article titled “Europeans are wondering about how to coexist with Islam” Le Figaro wrote that the Europeans do not understand the reality of the threat of Islam. So the European officials started focusing on such threat and want to control immigration from Islamic countries to Europe especially after Muslims arrived in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden.

European Islam

Scholars are interested in discussing issues and perceptions of the west to Islam and its role with European countries, European Islam and its role and trends, and why interest in Islamic phenomenon increased in Europe after the rise of so called war on terrorism.

Scholars are also interested in discussing Muslim presence in Europe, and why the increasing of the number of Muslim immigrants is considered a danger to European identity? Because Islam is a religion and values, and the people who believe in it, are seeking their rights as a separated religion group, so there is a conflict of identity and integration resulting from the construction of Islamic (community) in Europe. There are fears and suspicious about the integration of Muslims in the existing national groupings in European countries.

In France the Islamic presence is shifting from just a simple social phenomenon to the issue of national public opinion; in Britain the most encouraging factors, for the integration of Muslims in British society are education and Islamic schools, the role of universities, the role of mosques and Imams, and the economic and social conditions of the Muslims, the role of media and British foreign policy towards the Muslim world.

It is clear that there are several factors contributed to the evolution of Islam phobia in the West and bringing it to the stage of obsessing, and increasing fears of Islamic fundamentalism and Jihad, even the vast majority of Muslims in Europe are not involve in radical activities.

Attitude of European governments towards Muslims in Europe

European governments are doing more efforts to improve Muslim integration, such as introducing new citizenship laws, promoting dialogue with Muslim organizations, developing Imams who are more familiar with European culture and traditions and improving educational and economic opportunities for Muslims but in the same time European governments have also sought to
strengthen security measures and tighten immigration to combat (so called) terrorism ( January 2011 CRS Congressional Research Services Report prepared for the Congress title is Muslims in Europe: Promoting Integration and countering Extremism) Countries such as Germany and Spain remain caution about limiting the rights of freedom of speech and assembly, as well as security policies that could intrude on the right to privacy or on religious freedoms.

The CRS Congressional Research Services Report suggests that: Recently, Europeans have come to recognize the necessity of better integrating their Muslims population, to reduce social tensions and inequalities, to help prevent radicalization and counter violent extremism.

The OSI research report suggests that Religious discrimination against Muslims remains a critical barrier to fill and equal participation in society, research suggests that level of religious discrimination directed towards Muslims have increased in the past five years. European –born Muslims identify the police as a key source of unfair treatment and discrimination, for Muslims, the persistence of discrimination and prejudice affects the sense of national belonging. But The OSI research finds many positive initiatives taken by European officials at the local level to engage with ethnic and religious organizations, and there are ideas to support Muslims and non-Muslims communities strengthen their trust in each other and increase their ability to work together to achieve common goals. PP 26-29

Young Muslims, with more education and familiarity with political institutions, have greater confidence in their ability to effect local change than the older generations; Muslims are active in mainstream political parties. Parties based on ethnic and religious identity have not gained the support of Muslim votes.

What Muslims in Europe should do according to Tariq Ramadan?

Tareq Ramadan asserts that Muslims today are required to abandon all sectarian tendencies; it should not be confused with the assembly of faith and methods of sectarian tendency dumped in isolation and uniqueness at the social, political and legislative levels.

He added, there is something that is clear now within the mainstream public Muslim discourse: Europe is home, it is not perceived as though we are not at home, this old business of Dar al Harb and Dar al Islam is something which is still in some discourse, but those who speak this way are on the margin of Muslim communities, the reality is that the main stream Muslim leaders, organizations and even citizens feel at home in Europe. Problem of Immigration in Europe is similar to that one in Japan, but in Europe it is perceived a threat, and yet at the same time a necessity, it is that Europe needs 11 million workers within the next fifteen years. Where are these workers supposed to come from? Europe is thinking now and having new laws and new security rules that are very tough because Muslim presence is perceived as a threat. Now I want to end asking you; do you think it will be perceived as a threat in Japan as well?! I leave you to think about it!

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INTRODUCTION

How did the EU--Japan relationship develop over time? How can the dots be tied together? I try to explain both the path which the EU and Japan have embarked on since the 1970s and the direction these economic giants are heading to. It has often been said that there is no future without history. If that is so, the insights to be gained from an analysis of the dynamics of the past and present relationship between the EU and Japan can provide valuable contributions to the preparation and implementation of a future EU--Japan political and economic framework. Looking at what has been achieved in the past, considering which approaches have been successful and which not, reflecting on which hurdles had to be overcome and which obstacles still remain is instructive not only from an academic point of view, but also for those involved in drafting the contours of the future partnership between the EU and Japan.

THE GENESIS OF POSTWAR EU--JAPAN RELATIONS

Economic growth in Japan developed at a remarkable pace already since the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The first export markets that were targeted by mainly the textile industries were to be found in Europe. France, Germany, England but also the Netherlands and Belgium played an important role as export markets and advisors for the modernization of Japanese institutions that became the base for industrial growth.1 The most important trading partner of Japan during the nineteenth century was not the US neither China, but Europe. Indeed, the ‘first economic miracle’2 in the decades after the Meiji Restoration was induced by Europe.

After the Second World War, the European countries became once more a stepping stone for Japan’s ‘second economic miracle’, but this time much more in the shadow of a newly arisen superpower: the United States. Europe’s high income-elastic markets became the other target for Japan. As a large, economically advanced and increasingly integrated area, Europe was attractive to Japanese exporters of especially high value-added industrial goods. As a result, Japanese products overflowed the European markets and complaints by domestic producers started to erupt for various reasons. Consequently Europe, initially at the level of individual member states but increasingly at the European level, experienced growing trade tensions and became engaged in outright conflicts with Japan just as the US were.3 At times the tensions that arose between Japan and European states were as serious as those facing the US and Japan, and just as difficult to manage without resorting to outright protectionism, which, in turn, might have invited a protectionist backlash from the US. Indeed, from the late 1970s until the mid-1990s, the most difficult period in the relationship, both the US and the EEC/EC/EU remained very much alert to any risk of trade diversion should the other

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take trade restricting measures vis-à-vis Japan.

**INCREASING TENSIONS IN THE 1970s**

Economic relations between the European Community (EC) and Japan first came into focus in the 1970s. The EC was at that time engaged in internal institutional and economic developments as barriers between Member States were reduced. Japan, for its part, was building up its industry by advances in new growth industries, such as consumer electronics and computers, and higher productivity in industrial industries. The net result of these adjustments in its economic policy was to increase the energy efficiency of manufacturing and to expand so-called knowledge-intensive industries. This new policy of the Japanese authorities also aimed at developing exports of motor vehicles, electronic products and other specialized sectors.4

The first multilateral negotiations between the EC and Japan started in 1971 and aimed at concluding an EC--Japan agreement to replace the existing bilateral arrangements and restrictions. The discussions failed when Japan baulked at the inclusion of a safeguard clause. It was clear from the onset that negotiations on trade issues would not be easy because both sides wanted to sustain similar levels of economic growth as during the 1950s and 1960s. Nevertheless, one step forward was made through the establishment of permanent missions in Brussels and Tokyo, regular High-Level Consultations and ministerial visits. On the trade side, however, there were mounting difficulties throughout this period. Japanese exports increased substantially in a range of sectors such as steel, cars, machine tools, ball bearings, TV and electro-technical products. EC exports to Japan, on the other hand, showed little improvement. European negotiators increasingly realized that the closely integrated nature of the Japanese industry at all levels made import penetration exceptionally difficult and that therefore no substantial changes in import levels of manufactured goods could be achieved.5 The ‘closed’ Japanese market started to attract the attention for the first time of American scholars and policymakers alike. The difficulty of exporting to Japan, aggravated by the 1973 and 1979 oil crises, led to an ever-increasing EC trade deficit with Japan. For both, relations with the US were of critical importance, with apprehensions on the EC’s part that Japan would favor the American side of the triangle. The beginning of Japanese investment in manufacturing industries in Europe was one of the few positive signs. Although the number of meetings intensified and agreements such as the 1978 Ushiba--Haferkamp Joint Statement provided a brief respite, the political and economic pressure for stronger measures grew steadily and in 1982 the EC called upon Article XXIII of the GATT on the ground of Japan’s nullification and impairment of the benefits negotiated in successive GATT Rounds.6 The EC arguments and evidence were set out in written proceedings and the matter was pursued in a series of meetings in Geneva. Japan rejected the EC’s position, although the facts advanced were not disputed. The basic issue between the two sides thus remained unresolved. The general discourse in the first period of the EC--Japan relationship was therefore one of tension and confrontation.

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A THAW IN NEGOTIATIONS IN THE 1980s

EC–Japan negotiations entered a new stage from 1983 onwards as they focused on export moderations and the problems of their subsequent management against the background of persisting and growing mutual trade balance problems. The EC struggled with finding a way to efficiently tackle trade frictions which arose from the ascent of Japan as a determined exporter and a major industrial power. Throughout the negotiations in the 1980s, the Commission consolidated its trade policy authority which showed that the process of transformation in Europe was gradually leading to a more unified Europe. EC–Japan trade negotiations during this period can only be fully understood if they are seen in the context of the earlier development of overall bilateral, including political, relations. The Member States did not easily give up their own bilateral approach to trade policy. In the 1980s especially, some powerful French politicians were very active in setting the agenda for Community trade action. The first results from the trade negotiations were obtained in this period. Both Japan and the EC started genuine discussions to move ahead to solve extant trade frictions. Both parties even agreed on such issues as the setting of quantitative, verifiable export restrictions and obligatory export floor prices. This clearly gives evidence of the fragility of trade doctrines when they are confronted with global economic reality. The GATT Article XXIII dispute procedures which the EC had launched were de facto settled in 1983 when Japan adopted a wide-ranging Voluntary Restraint Agreement which limited and controlled Japanese exports of sensitive products to European markets.⁷

In the second half of the 1980s, also other solutions to trade disputes and positive developments were recorded. Some of the disputes resulted into policy changes and legal reforms in Japan and proved that the European insistence on the issues of concern were not futile. Among the long-lasting trade disputes which had troubled relations between Japan and the Community up to and during the 1980s, there was one concerned with the structure of excise taxation applied to alcoholic beverages in Japan’s Liquor Tax Law, which underwent a major reform in 1989 in response to a GATT dispute case brought by the Community against the discriminatory effects of that taxation. From the European side much was expected from these reforms which in practice would substantially reduce the incidence of taxation, especially on premium alcoholic beverages such as whisky and brandy, relative to domestic alcohol. There was the prospect of a substantial expansion of the market for western-style liquors and, within that volume, a greater market share for European imports given their global prominence. The reforms within Japan on the issue of liquor tax were only effective in light of foreign pressure. Foreign pressure or gaiatsu was often the only possible way to obtain policy changes in the wake of a weak opposition to the ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party and its allies in the bureaucracy and industry.⁸ The foreign firms and trade councils were part of the game, representing large and legitimate interests. They also employed skilled and determined lobbyists, both in public and private. In the end, resolution of the dispute was welcome on both sides, allowing Europe and Japan to move forward to deepen their relationship with one less thorny issue to tackle.

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At the time of the Japanese Bubble Economy, the EC’s trade policy consisted primarily of continuing efforts to control trade frictions between the EU and Japan. The reason for this was that the EC's trade policy towards Japan suddenly had to cope with the effects of more aggressive US’ trade policies (cf. Reaganomics and the Super 301 clause), but at the same time the Commission opted for an approach which differed from that of the US towards Japan. While the US resorted to bilateral negotiations by threatening and partly implementing protective and retaliatory actions against Japan, the EC’s stance reflected the fact that quite a number of member states, most prominently the UK, found the option of becoming host to Japanese manufacturing investment and technology far more attractive than economic warfare. While all Member States wanted things to be kept on an even keel, they nevertheless did not hesitate to support the Commission in new GATT spats over liquor tax, semiconductors and automobile tax. Nevertheless, the EC's policy of containing trade problems during this period was very attentive to any possible diversion of Japanese exports from protected or threatened US markets towards the EC. The EC was also determined to counter any trade discrimination by Japan relative to the US, inter alia by seeking to uphold the MFN principle of the GATT. It also sought to benefit from concessions which the US had wrought bilaterally from Japan. This approach differed from the US and the EC endeavored, while defending the interests of its Member States, to avoid discrimination regarding access concessions by Japan.

Aside from the liquor tax conflict, three additional cases of trade friction called the attention of the Europeans at the end of the 1980s. The first case concerns the Japan Harbour Management Fund (JHMA) which was apparently resolved in 1992 to the satisfaction of the EU (and the US). The issue revolved around extra costs extracted for restricted stevedoring services in Japanese ports. The second case concerns the so-called Nagoya Connection Case, typified by abuses of large-scale fraudulent pork imports which were brought to an end, although illegally underpriced import competition continued intermittently for years. The third case relates to the issue of European requests for fair access to Japan's large and lucrative construction market. The problem of discriminatory public procurement has been an issue that various European countries wanted to solve. Given the political strength of vested interests in Japan, European industries quickly gave up after the failure of some tentative attempts to tackle the issue, and diplomatic efforts were suspended before they even started. These cases indeed are important and relevant for today’s relationship between the EU and Japan, especially in the light of European approaches in the ongoing scoping exercise for an EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement: the EU has put government procurement in Japan on the agenda of the EPA discussions.

GAINING MOMENTUM IN THE 1990s

As the 1980s turned into the 1990s, the relations between the European Community—from November 1993 the European Union—and Japan underwent a profound change that was to define their character for years to come. The year 1990 marked the end of decades of harsh trade conflicts during the 1970s and 1980s. The 1991 Hague Declaration on relations between the EC and Japan

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11 Ibid.
spells out a commitment of both sides to build a new, more cooperative relationship reaching beyond economic issues and trade disputes. The EU subsequently developed and confirmed its policy of cooperating with Japan in Commission policy papers and Communications as well as related Council Conclusions in 1992 and 1995. By opting for a cooperative, less confrontational approach, both parties made substantial efforts to develop an overall balanced relationship which combined cooperation in various areas, including in the political field, while trying to improve the skewed trade and economic relationship. Although the frustrating bilateral trade and economic situation—which, until that point, had practically defined the EC--Japan relationship—did not change fundamentally, this approach was a strategic and tactical choice on the part of the EC.

Yet, on some issues the relationship continued to include structural barriers that the European negotiators realized would never change. A case in point are the Uruguay Round negotiations.\(^{12}\) Japan, the world’s most dynamic economy of the time, had indeed a sacred cow: agriculture. While the reform of internal policies would have been a prerequisite for progress in trade relations, the fact was that Japan could not and would not change its agricultural policy. In the end, both the EC and Japan managed to protect the core of their respective agricultural policies. Curiously, in the case of Japan, this was made possible by the fact that Japanese consumers shun American rice as a staple. The Japanese government therefore decided to buy up the quantities that Japan was supposed to import under the minimum access commitment. Apart from rice, the Japanese government managed, just like the EC, to preserve enough border protection and domestic support to keep its agriculture afloat under the new rules. As explained by Möhler, this was possible not because of the Japanese insistence on food security, but because the eventual compromise struck by the EC and the US gave enough room for Japanese agricultural policy to adjust.

Despite the slowly unfolding economic crisis in Japan after the bursting of the Bubble in 1990, the EC deliberately shifted from earlier, more muscular policies towards non-confrontational, cooperative policies on economic and trade issues. Seeing signs during the first years of the 1990s that exports from Europe to Japan were increasing and that structural changes related to market access were forthcoming, European policymakers did not want to risk alienating a more powerful Japan. It was a time of intensifying dialogues and optimism on the European side, believing in self-generating structural economic adaptation processes in Japan and the power of objective arguments for improving EU market and investment access in Japan. The decision was therefore taken to pursue a different course to the US’ aggressive bilateral market opening campaigns which, at the time, smacked of ‘managed trade’. The positions on trade issues, which were not resolved at all, were subordinated to the further development of a comprehensive EU--Japan relationship. One important example of this less confrontational European approach towards Japan is to be found in the agreement between the EC and Japan to phase out restrictions on imports of Japanese cars which existed in a number of EU member states prior to 1992. This agreement became known as the Elements of Consensus and represents a fascinating example of the flexibility of European institutions as they adapt regulatory processes to achieve political ends within an ostensibly rigid legal framework.\(^{13}\)

What followed was the beginning of a relatively quiescent time in EU--Japan relations.

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(1996-2000). Indeed, this period is characterized by the consolidation of positive developments in bilateral ties along the lines set out in the Commission's March 1995 Communication *Europe and Japan: the Next Steps* (covering political and economic relations as well as cooperation in other fields). This period laid the groundwork for the realization of a more solid framework for cooperation from 2001 onwards, known as the 2001 Action Plan. While not spectacularly, EU--Japan relations improved with a steady pace across economic, political and cooperation activities. Following increased Japanese investments in the EU, motivated *inter alia* to escape anti-dumping measures, mutual economic relations expanded and trade disputes were resolved. This, in turn, gave rise to regulatory and structural reforms which were beneficial to both sides. The political dialogue improved, underpinned by reciprocal engagement in shared spheres of interests. The onset of new global challenges—e.g. climate change, food security, ageing population, drugs and organized crime—constituted an opportunity for the EU and Japan, as like-minded partners sharing the same values, to cooperate more deeply and effectively. One might, therefore, conclude that this was a period which reflected the growing maturity of EU--Japan relations and mapped out a step-by-step plan to realize greater cooperation in the future.

**STRONG COMMITMENTS, BUT ‘UNTAPPED POTENTIAL’ IN THE 2000s**

In a speech in Paris in January 2000, Japanese Foreign Minister Kōno Yōhei, known to be a reliable friend of Europe, outlined his proposal for a deepened EU--Japan partnership. This resulted in a Joint Action Plan for a ‘decade of cooperation’ from 2001 to 2011. This was a rather ambitious plan with multiple objectives ranging from a world free of weapons of mass destruction to intercultural dialogue, based *inter alia* on the exchanges of trainees and school twinning. No fewer than 22 different fora for sectoral dialogues were established and formalized, an edifice crowned by annual summits. As often when bilateral relations are harmonious, media interest in the EU and Japan for the ‘decade of cooperation’ and the state of EU--Japan relations was small compared to the earlier periods of trade frictions. In Japan, public concerns were limited to worries about the lifting of the EU arms embargo against China in 2005, while in Europe the focus was on Japanese barriers to EU investments—especially after EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson raised the matter in unambiguous terms during his visit to Tokyo in 2008. Later, during 2011, cooperation on access to rare earth metals and large Bank of Japan (BoJ) purchases of Eurobonds of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) triggered media interest on both sides. However, at the annual EU--Japan Summit in Tokyo in April 2010, the summit leaders (Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy, and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, joined by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton and European Commissioner for Trade Karel De Gucht) declared 2010 to be the year of renewal and pledged to share best practices in reviving their economies.

Increasingly important and crucial for future progress in the relation between the EU and Japan is the role of the European parliament. Parliamentary exchanges between Japan and the EU constitute a significant aspect of the relationship and are growing in relevance. The importance of parliamentary exchanges has been increasing commensurate with the adoption of different EU treaties, especially since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009. This Treaty also enlarged the competences of the European Parliament (EP), especially in the areas of
climate change and foreign and security policy. The additional competences of the EP in the decision making process of the EU now also cover international agreements. As the EP now has a decisive say in the conclusion of international agreements on trade, including services, direct investment and the protection of intellectual property rights, the EP will certainly insist on being well-informed during the negotiation process from the beginning of discussions in order to influence the negotiations in all stages and ensure conformity with the negotiation mandate. For this the EP can inform itself through its own inquiries, either by its respective committees or through its delegations for the relations with the relevant third country. The same will be true for the further deepening of EU climate policy as well as for foreign and security policies in the coming years. In this sense, the EP delegations for relations with Japan and the corresponding Japanese Diet delegations can and will grow in importance and influence. This is all the more true as parliamentarians in Japan and the EU realize more and more that third country relations are of great importance to national policies and that these relations should therefore not be left only to governments.

WITHER EU--JAPAN RELATIONS?

The 2010 Summit Declaration called for a conscious effort of both sides to go beyond the (over)concentration on economic issues in future EU--Japan relations and widen the ambit of cooperation to include political and strategic elements. A political framework, in addition to an EPA, is crucial to this end. Bringing the EU and Japan, despite their geographical distance, closer together will require an increased level of mutual economic and political engagement. Success stories such as the joint engagement of the EU and ASEAN in Aceh, Japan's activities in Mindanao (the Philippines) in cooperation with the UK, and its engagement in Sri Lanka together with Norway and the EU, could point the way. Reiterer in this book identifies a number of shared interests which could provide platforms for common political and strategic actions by discussing numerous examples: the EU and Japan have a joint interest in keeping Iran a nuclear weapons free zone and to assure non-proliferation in general; the EU appreciates Japanese engagement in Africa in the TICAD process (predating the Chinese offensive to assure access to raw materials); there is a joint interest in energy security and the security of the sea lanes leading to and from Japan; both the EU and Japan have common interests in combating international terrorism as well as piracy as demonstrated by the participation of Maritime Self-Defence Force ships in anti-piracy actions off the coast of Somalia; and both partners engaged in disaster relief operations in Haiti and Sumatra. Finally, Reiterer refers to the case of Afghanistan, where the Japanese role in training Afghan police forces (including financial support) contributes to the reconciliation process, and to the case of Pakistan, which clearly reveals that the EU and Japan share a common interest in spreading the rule of law and ensuring that states do not fail politically and economically. Cooperation between the EU and Japan is therefore not only important for both parties: it has a far-reaching impact on regional constructs in Asia and other parts of the world.

CONCLUSION

The timing for this presentation assessing past EU--Japan economic relations is most serendipitous. At their Summit in May 2011, the EU and Japan committed themselves to launch parallel
negotiations on 1) a deep and comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and Economic Partnership Agreement (FTA/EPA), addressing the whole range of issues of shared interest to both sides including tariffs, non-tariff measures, services, investment, intellectual property rights, competition and public procurement; and 2) a binding political agreement, covering political, global and other forms of cooperation in an all-inclusive manner. The former reflects Japan’s emphatic wish to negotiate a comprehensive FTA/EPA in the face of EU reluctance, while the latter represents a continuation of the 2001 Action Plan which, given its non-binding nature, has proven to be rather unsatisfactory. The commitment to explore a remodeling of the past relationship has to be seen also against the background of the current rise of Asian economies, in particular China, and the increasingly closer relationship which the EU is developing with Asian nations.
ドイツ大学教育制度改革と日本語教育—ハンブルク大学の場合
杉原早紀

外国語教育や日本語教育を論じる文脈で、「ボローニャ宣言」や「CEFR」は多くの人に知られるようになってきた。これらは、筆者が日本語教育に従事しているドイツの大学教育制度改革や言語教育政策の指針となる枠組みである。両者は、一国の決定ではなく、ヨーロッパ共通の決定による取り組みである。その概要については改めて述べるまでもないと思うが、本稿の論を進める上でポイントとなる点を簡単にまとめ、さらに、ドイツにおける外国語教育・学習事情を踏まえた上で、大学の専門課程の日本語教育を目指すハンブルク大学独自の取り組みを紹介していきたい。

まず、「ボローニャ宣言」から詳しく見ていく。これは、1999年6月にヨーロッパの教育大臣レベルによって出された声明で、29カ国が署名して、2010年までにヨーロッパの高等教育制度を統一することが決定された。目的とされたのは、学生や教師・研究者にヨーロッパ全域での自由な学習と研究の機会を与えることである。そのために、比較可能な学位制度と相互単位認定制度を確立し、また国ごとに異なっていた大学の履修課程と卒業資格を統一して学部・大学院の2サイクル制度（BA・MA）を実施することにより、学生や研究者の移動を促進し、ヨーロッパ次元の就業可能な能力を開発することを目指された。

もう一つの「ヨーロッパ言語共通参照枠（CEFR）」は英語のCommon European Framework Reference of Languageの翻訳である。欧州評議会によって制定され、2001年に初版が出版された1。その目的は、外国語教育における国際協力を推進すること、ならびに、客観的な達成度の基準を設定することで習得済みの技能の相互認定を容易にしてヨーロッパ内の人間の移動を促進することとされている。そのためには、一人の人間が場面や目的によって異なる言語を使い分けるという複数言語主義（plurilingualism）2の言語観である。

この共通参照レベルは、実際には3段階のレベルに分けられていて、その内訳は、A. 基礎段階の言語使用者、B. 自立した言語使用者、C. 熟達した言語使用者となっている。さらにこの3つが、それぞれ2段階（1, 2）に分類されており、合計で6レベルについて、能力記述文（Can-do）で規定されている。またポートフォリオの考え方をも取り入れられており、全体としては、中等教育から成人教育、生涯教育（含む、職業教育、移民教育）へと学習を継続することを目的かつ前提にした設定となっている。CEFR自体は文字や敬語など、そのまま日本語には適用できないという難点があるため、国際交流基金がCEFRの日本語対応版としてJFスタンダードを発表し、日本語への適用を支援している。

ここで、ボローニャ宣言とCEFRの言語教育に関する共通点を確認してみたい。両者に共に見られる考え方はとして挙げられるのは、まず、学習、研究から就業までを視野に入れた

1 ヨーロッパ日本語教師会編「ヨーロッパにおける日本語教育とCommon European Framework of Reference for Languages」国際交流基金 2005年
2 吉島茂・大橋理枝他訳・編「外国語教育Ⅱ 外国語の学習、教授、評価のためのヨーロッパ共通参照枠」朝日出版社 2002年
ヨーロッパ内の人の移動の促進で、そのために共通の評価基準・単位・学位の設定が必要だとされている。次に、場面・目的に応じた複数言語の使い分けが考えられており、そこでは「言語 = 目的遂行の手段という考え方」を基盤として、言語学習・言語教育はコミュニケーション能力の育成が主目的だととらえられている。これらのことから、両者の目的改革の共通の目的の一つは、ヨーロッパ内での相互理解、寛容性を高めること、および知識や技術の習得、就業を容易にすることであり、言語にはそのための手段としての役割が期待されていることがわかるであろう。

次に、ボローニャ宣言やCEFRの考え方が前提となった大学教育改革が、ドイツで実際にどのように実施されたかを見る前に、ドイツの最近までの一般的な外国語教育事情を紹介しておきたい。

ドイツでは、州によって学校教育に関する法律が異なるが、州の教育大臣が集まって1999年に決定した全国の基準によると、学校教育における外国語の授業に関しては次のようになっている。まず、英語の授業は小学校から始まり、通常は3年生から、場合によっては1年生から学習を開始している。中等教育では、第2外国語が通常6年生から、第3外国語が通常8年生（日本の中学2年生に相当）から学習されることになっている。学習言語はヨーロッパの言語が中心であるが、一部の地域や学校では日本語、中国語なども選択できる。ただし、その数はまだまだ少ない。その他、CLIL（content and language integrated learning）と呼ばれる内容言語統合型学習を導入する学校も多く、児童生徒の母語以外の外国語で、数学や社会などの教科の学習が行われるプログラムが実施されている。また、学校での言語教育以外でも、移民の2世、3世など、複数言語を話す環境で育つ子供も珍しくないため、上述の複数言語主義が日常の様々な場面で実践されていると言えるだろう。

それでは、以上見てきたような外国語学習環境におかれたドイツの学習者が日本語を学習する動機・目的とはどのようなものだろうか。図1は国際交流基金の2009年海外日本語教育機関調査結果4で、緑色の線が高等教育機関の学習者の回答である。ここからわかるように、日本語そのものへの興味や留学、就職が答えとして多く挙げられ、漫画、アニメ、歴史、文学、政治、経済などが続く。初等や中等の教育機関の学習者と大きく異なるのは留学や就職などをはっきり意識している点にあると言える。

冒頭で、中等教育から成人教育、生涯教育へ長く学習を継続することを可能にするため

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ドイツの大学における日本語教育では、1990年代ごろから、それまで行われていた旧来の文献訳読中心の教授法への反省から、コミュニケーション能力の育成の重点化が始まった。一方で、中等教育や成人教育を対象としたCEFR、さらに「専門分野に関係なく」すべての大学生を対象にする基準として作られたUNICertだけではカバーしきれない日本学専攻の学生のための大学間共通の取り組みはままだくなく、各大学で、どの状況に応じた対応が必要とされている。その背景としては、日本研究とひとくくりにされる中にも、経済学や社会学、宗教学、思想史から文学、言語学まで多岐にわたる研究分野があり、大学ごとにその重点が異なるというドイツの事情が考えられる。

ハンブルク大学アジア・アフリカ研究所の前身である植民地研究所は、1914年に商業港湾都市ハンブルクの商人の対外交易上の必要から設立された。設立当時から研究の中心は日本文化一般や言語古学を含む文献研究に置かれ、「源氏物語」をはじめとする日本古典文学作品のドイツ語訳の多くがハンブルク大学の歴代日本学教授によって出版されている。ボローニャ改革前までは、基本的にはこの流れを継承して日本語教育が行われてきており、授業は文献訳読を軸としてきた。一方で、商人の要請により設立されたという経緯もあり、日本学科では広く一般にも日本語を学ぶ機会を提供するため、社会人向けコースも実施されてきた。

このような伝統の中で、現在のハンブルク大学では、1）一般成人を対象とした集中コース、2）日本学を専門としない学生のための全学対象コース、3）BA日本学主専攻・副専攻向けコースの3タイプの日本語コースが開かれ、それぞれのコースで対象にあわせた日本語教育が行われている。「大学における日本語コース」というレベルの維持が前提でコース運営が行われ、1や2のコースから日本学専攻へ移る（あるいは3の準備として1や2を利用する）というケースも見られ、三者の間には流れがある。ヨーロッパの大学間での流動性を視野に入れたコースシラバスをとるという点では、1、2はCEFRを、2はUNICertを取り入れることが可能であると考えられるが、まだ検討段階である。日本語学習上の国際的な指標・指針としては、国際交流基金との共催で年一回日本語能力検定試験（JLPT）がハンブルクで実施され、ハンブルクや周辺地域、一部は外国からの参加者も受験していることも付け加えておきたい。
および実用的な（職業に直結する）日本語能力だけでなく、専門課程に必要な日本語能力の育成はボローニャ改革によるBA課程移行後も必要となっている。具体的には、専門文献の読解能力やフィールドワークなどの調査研究を遂行できる言語コミュニケーション能力などが、研究のための前提として期待されている。もちろん、BA取得までの6〜8学期間という比較的短期間に身につけられる能力には限りがあり、これらの能力育成はMA課程を含んだ長期的スパンで考える必要があるため、日本語コースでは、BAの初級コースからMAの上級能力育成まで視野に入れた教育コンセプトの実現を目指している。

BA課程で日本学を主専攻とする学生のためのコースの概要に移ろう。この課程はボローニャ宣言に基づき、2007年10月から導入され、正式名称は東アジア研究国際学士課程（Internationaler Bachelorstudiengang Ostasien）である。通常のBAより修業年限が1年長く、合計4年間つまり8学期間の課程で、そのうち1学期または2学期間、日本か例外的にヨーロッパの大学へ留学することが義務づけられている。卒業に必要な必須取得単位150単位のうち、留学の単位換算で取得する30単位を除くと、語学コースだけで63単位を取得することになっており、必須単位の半分を占める。このように、単位数の上からも、日本語能力の育成が重要視されていることが見て取れるだろう。

具体的にその日本語コースで各学年で学ぶべき内容は、図2のようにになっている。具体的なコースシラバスを決める際には、「いつ、どこで学ぶか」に配慮しつつ計画を立てる。6学期目か7学期目に全員が留学するハンブルク大学の日本学コースでは、この「いつ、どこ」は「ドイツ＝留学前」と「日本＝留学中」に大別でき、さらにそれぞれ「教室内」と「教室外」に分けられる。ドイツの大学で教える日本語教師として実際に学生と関わるのは、「ドイツ」の「教室内」と「教室外」である。「ドイツの教室内」において教師は「何をどう教えるべきか」「ドイツの教室外」では「学生をどのように動機付け、支援ができるか」を考える必要がある。目標はまず日本留学、次のステップは専門課程に必要な日本語能力の習得ということになる。つまり、留学前の「ドイツの教室内外」での学習活動は、留学中の学習成果を高め、専門課程での自立的な日本語学習への準備という位置づけにあっているということが見て取れるだろう。

具体的なコースシラバスを決める際には、「いつ、どこで学ぶか」に配慮しつつ計画を立てる。6学期目か7学期目に全員が留学するハンブルク大学の日本学コースでは、この「いつ、どこ」は「ドイツ＝留学前」と「日本＝留学中」に大別でき、さらにそれぞれ「教室内」と「教室外」に分けられる。ドイツの大学で教える日本語教師として実際に学生と関わるのは、「ドイツ」の「教室内」と「教室外」である。「ドイツの教室内」において教師は「何をどう教えるべきか」「ドイツの教室外」では「学生をどのように動機付け、支援ができるか」を考える必要がある。目標はまず日本留学、次のステップは専門課程に必要な日本語能力の習得ということになる。つまり、留学前の「ドイツの教室内外」での学習活動は、留学中の学習成果を高め、専門課程での自立的な日本語学習への準備という位置づけにあることは明確である。

ハンブルク大学日本学科

B.A.日本語コース概要

これ出発点とし、初級・中級前半における学習の重点を文法・文字・読解に置いて、媒介語としてドイツ語も比較的多く使用して授業を行っている。結果として、BA移行後学生の日本語基礎能力およびコミュニケーション能力が総合的に向上しているというのが教える側の印象であるが、このような授業のやり方は、一見現在の日本語教授法の流れに逆らうものと映るかもしれない。しかし、1. 論理重視 2. 内容を伴う活動 3. 自習学習、というドイツ人学生の傾向に適応した授業方針により、模倣や反復だけに終わらない、より深い理解を伴う日本語学習が実践できるという手応えを感じている。また、学習したことを活用する場もなるべく多く設けるようにし、宿題で小さなテキスト産出を課したり、教室
では場面によって日本語とドイツ語を使い分け、ミニスピーチやディスカッションの機会をなるべく取り入れることなどで、四技能のバランスのとれた育成にも配慮している。

基礎日本語力の育成については以上簡単にまとめたとおりであるが、ここで、日本学を専門にする学生達の専門課程に向けた応用力養成のために、授業の枠内外で取り組んできた最近のプロジェクトを2つ紹介してみたい。応用力と一言でとらえたが、一つはコミュニケーション能力、もう一つは読解能力（文字・語彙力）の養成を目指して、1.日本人学校訪問プロジェクト、2.漢字集中コースの2つのプロジェクトを実践した。1は「ドイツの教室外」での活動指導と支援の例、2は「ドイツの教室内」でのコース構想の例と言えるが、以下にその内容を述べてみよう。

ハンブルク大学での教室外活動プロジェクトとしては、サマー・スクールが10年以上の伝統を持っている。学生達に「教室内での日本語体験」と「日本留学」の間で、疑似日本体験をさせるという意義は、日本人学校訪問プロジェクトとも共通する。ただ本稿では、自由参加で日本人学生のドイツ語学習サポートを主目的とするサマースクールは考察の対象外とし、全員参加の授業の枠内での教室外活動として行われる日本人学校訪問に焦点を当てることにしたい。

このプロジェクトの中で学生は、大きく分けて3つの体験をすることになる。まず、新たな言語体験として、児童生徒や先生と話すことにより、年少の相手への話し方や敬語の使用など待遇表現を実際に適切に使う場面を体験する。また、大学以外の日本の教育現場で日本語が使用されている様子を直接見聞することで、特に各自の習得した漢字や語彙を日本の児童生徒の水準と比較するという経験にもなる。次は文化的体験で、日本の学校・授業を体験し、特にあいさつや授業進行などの規律が重視される点など、知識として持っていった日本文化の一部を実際につなげることになる。三つ目は、新たなコミュニケーション体験で、未経験のコミュニケーション場面に遭遇することにより、バーバルまたはノンバーバルでの意思疎通を余儀なくされ、日本語能力の不足を、その他のあらゆるコミュニケーション手段（ジェスチャー、絵や図、英語など）を使って補うというストラテジー行使の体験をする。とまとめや失敗もあるが、総じてこれらは一種の成功体験として肯定的な感情とともに受け止められ、さらなる学習への動機付けともなっている。

大学の授業での学校訪問準備は、図3のように4月から7月まで夏学期を通して、授業に並行して準備を進めていく。訪問当日は、1時間目は大学生の発表と質疑応答、2時間目は通常授業が見学するという流れになっているが、2時間目は国語、社会などそれぞれの科目の中に、ドイツ人の学生を考慮した活動（討論や日独比較など）を取り入れる先生方も多く、この機会を学校側も積極的に利用しようとしている姿勢が伺われる。

授業での学校訪問準備

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訪問後は授業中に口頭で活動を振り返り、それをグループごとに文書化して、児童生徒らへのメッセージを添えて、日本人学校に送付する。日本人学校の先生方からも、学生の
日本人学校訪問や発表内容についてフィードバックをもらえることが多い。隔年でこれまでに3回実施し、学校側でも大学生の訪問を年中行事の一つとして期待されるようになり、今後も継続し両校の交流を深めていく予定である。

次に、「教室内」での新たなコース構想として、漢字集中コースを紹介する。一般成人向け日本語集中コースはハンブルク大学で1970年代から続いている。ただ、これまでは日本学主専攻・副専攻の学生とはほぼ無関係に実施されていたので、日本学の学生にも単位取得可能なコースを提供できないかと考えたのが出発点である。春夏の休業期間に集中的に学習する意義のある内容をいう考えから、2012年春、漢字のみのコースを試験的に実施するに至った。

このコースでは文部科学省制定の教育漢字1006字の認識と意味の理解をめざした。個々の漢字の成り立ちを図で示し、それにドイツ語一言で「訓」を与え、学生は視覚化された成り立ちを見ること、そして集約的に表された意味（訓）を理解して、漢字を見て意味がわかるようになる。いわば、「漢字ドイツ訓」の習得を目指したコースである。会意文字、会意形声文字に関しては、部首や部品、音符の組み合わせで、どのような意味ができるかという説明を行う。

実際のコースでは、これらをパワーポイントを使って、大教室で講義形式で説明したが、その際絵や色彩や動きを使って視覚的に伝え、わかりやすい説明に努めた。その後少人数グループに分かれ、ゲームなど遊びを取り入れた活動で定着を図る時間も設けた。2012年3月の参加者は、BAの1年生から3年生を中心に合計67名に上り、参加者の反応も非常によかった。日本語学習のどの段階でもこのようなコースが有効か、というのは教師側でも明確でなかったが、初級者は今後の漢字学習の基礎として、上級者はこれまでの漢字学習のまとめと整理として、コースの成果を感じたようである。また、教師の側は、参加者が漢字そのものに対する抵抗感が少なくなって、その後の漢字学習への取り組みにも変化がみられたという印象を受けた。

日本人学校訪問や漢字集中コースなどこれら教室内外の活動の拡大の目的および意義を確認すると、日本人学校訪問は、日本留学の準備の意味も含めたコミュニケーション能力の活性化の場ととらえることができるし、漢字集中コースでは、専門過程に向けた日本語
基礎能力の強化の一部として、漢字の体系的な学習により、語彙力ひいては読解力の向上につながることが期待される。これらの活動は、ボローニャ宣言・CEFRが掲げる目標と大学専門教育に必要な日本語力の習得という目的の双方を補完しつつ、規定の授業外で実践する試みとなっていると考えられるだろう。

その具体的なメリットを挙げてみると、まず第一に、教師のサポートやコントロールの下で活動が行えるという点である。日本留学経験のない学生が大半であり、その時点の言語能力段階では、まだまだ教師のサポートが必要な参加者に対し、教室や教科書の外へ導く手引を行いつつ自立学習を促すことにつながっている。次は、学生の自主的な学習への取り組みが前提となっており、それを促進する活動となっているという点で、三つ目は時間的・心理的な負担の軽減である。漢字でも、疑似日本体験でも、少々高めのハードルを乗り越えることで、不安が減り自信が生まれるという傾向が強い。そして、これまで日本に行ってから気づく、あるいは後悔することが多かった事柄に、留学前にドイツにいながらにして気づけるという点も大きい。

以上、ドイツの大学教育改革の枠組みの中で、実践的かつ専門的な日本語学習のための活動への取り組みを紹介してきた。最後に今後取り組みたい活動についても少し述べておきたい。まず、コミュニケーション能力・実践力育成のためには、現在すでに実施段階に入っている神戸大学とのスカイプタンデム授業に改良を加えていくこと、また、ポートフォリオを日本語授業に取り入れていくことを考えている。そして、専門課程に向けた日本語基礎能力の強化のためには、多読を取り入れてみたいと考えているが、まずはそのサポートとして多読ができるための環境作り（書籍や学生の動機付けなど）から始めるつもりである。さらに、ハンブルク大学日本学科の特色を生かし、文語や古典の授業とタイアップした授業コンセプトを日本語コースに取り入れていき、言語史、文学史的な要素も組み込んだ授業作りをして行くことも考えている。
Homeland Tourism, Long-distance Nationalism and Production of a New Diasporic Identity (Armenian case)

Tsypylma Darieva

Abstract

This anthropologically informed paper attempts to re-conceptualize the nostalgic concept of homeland and more precisely the changing meaning of homecoming – a key feature of any diasporic identity. I examine the phenomenon of contemporary homeland trips and homeland tourism in Armenia through the lens of long-distance nationalism and new cosmopolitanism.

Introduction¹

The Armenian diaspora is considered to be a paradigmatic diasporic group associated with strong affiliation to ethnic roots forging long distance nationalism and political ethnocentrism. This ethnocentrism is reified in the notion of ancient culture, the uniqueness of the Armenian race and its history (as the first Christian nation). Much has been written about Armenian diasporic nostalgia, its diverse representations and manifestations of cultural memory concerning the Armenian massacre in 1915 and the ways this memory forms diasporic belonging across borders and generations that has not disappeared to this day. It is not new to draw attention to the variations in intensity and goals of the ways in which diasporic members can combine transnational ‘rooted’ and assimilative strategies. As noted by Peggy Levitt (2005), it reveals that transnational ethnic practices and assimilation are not diametrically opposed to each other. Instead, as this chapter shows, transnational ethnic practices and assimilation create diverse interconnectedness across different generations.

Armenians who comprise the diaspora call themselves Spiurk and Armenians from the Republic of Armenia are known as Hayastantsy. These two notions characterize differences between these two groups along political, social and cultural lines. Historians identify Hayastantsy as Transcaucasian or Russian Armenians and spiurk as Ottoman or Turkish Armenians due to the geographical and political divisions between two Empires in the nineteenth century. A significant number of diasporic Armenians were expelled from the former Ottoman Empire (today Turkey) and not from the territory of modern-day Armenia.² They settled in the USA and other countries at the beginning of the twentieth century not only as refugees, but also as labour migrants. In terms of identity transformation, by the end of the 1980s, Armenian-Americans were characterized by Anny Bakalian (1994) as ‘feeling’ and not ‘being’ Armenian anymore. Despite a high level of assimilation and social mobility, there is still a remarkable level of institutional completeness in terms of diasporic community organizations (schools, churches, media, museums, charity organizations) and political lobbying in the US.

¹ This paper is based on my previous publications (Darieva 2011, 2012) and a discussion after the lecture given at University of Kobe on 22.November 2012. I am grateful to my colleagues at Graduate School of Intercultural Studies, University of Kobe (Kazuko Iwamoto) for inspiring discussions and valuable comments, in particular to Shinnosuke Matsui, Kumi Tateoka and Takayuki Yokota-Murakami.
² I leave Iranian Armenians aside.
We get out of the plane… a smile runs across my face as I see Armenian writing and hear airport employees conversing in Armenian. Wait is it Armenian? It sounds like it, but I don’t understand most of it. Oh no, my first feeling of culture shock. I get to the gate, fill out the paperwork and go straight to the immigration officer. I end up conversing him for 10 minutes! He looks through my passport and asks me the most thought provoking yet simple question: ‘what has taken you so long to visit Armenia?’ Indeed, why has it? I had vacation time, I had the money, and I have the stamina to survive a long flight, so why not?

(Armenian Volunteer Corps, spring 2007)

This interview excerpt describes the emotional experiences of a third generation Armenian-American when he embarked on his diasporic homeland trip in Yerevan. It draws attention to a growing intensity of transnational meaningful interactions beyond leisure and tourism (Basu 2005) between members of second and third generation Armenian-Americans and ancestral homeland, the Republic of Armenia.

In May 2007, during my fieldwork in Armenia3, I interviewed twenty young English speaking volunteers of ethnic Armenian background who had travelled to Armenia as members of the Armenian Volunteer Corps (AVC): part of a ‘three month programme to move mountains’. 4 The Armenian Volunteer Corps, an international non-profit organization founded in 2001, ‘calls on diasporic Armenians to volunteer their time, knowledge, and energy by living and working in Armenia to invest in the development of the homeland’ and enjoy a meaningful exchange. There are many different activities included in this meaningful exchange program, for example working in Yerevan’s public organizations, schools, hospitals, NGOs, helping to develop an impoverished village or to rebuild a church. Among them, one specific activity which attracted many volunteers was to plant trees in urban parks, neighbourhoods, tree nurseries and in the city of Yerevan and its suburbs, organized by the diasporic Armenian Tree Project organization in Boston.

Generally, this set of transnational activities and claims is identified as long-distance nationalism that connect people living abroad with a specific territory that they see as an ancestral home. They feel commonality with this land in terms of origin, history, identity and geographical distance and even other citizenship do not play any role in legitimization of their claims. Long distance nationalism is more likely to produce a specific ideology –not just nostalgic imaginations for the past, but politics designed to influence the political situation within the territory of the homeland. These actions are often related to repatriation programs regulated and funded by the nation state: Jewish Aliya, in-gathering policies in Germany (Vertriebenegesetz and Aussiedlergesetz), Kazakhstan (Law on Oralman), India, Italy and Japan. In Armenia, after WWII, between the 1940s and 1960s, Western Armenians enthusiastically participated in the state repatriation program known as nerghakh. Attracted by Stalin’s campaign to repopulate the regions of Kars and Ardahan, which were contested with Turkey, about 100,000 Armenians from different countries resettled in Soviet Armenia. A formal territorial claim was made by the Kremlin to the

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3 The ethnographic field work was conducted within the research project ‘Identity Politics in Societies in Transition. Armenia on the Way to Europe?’ (2006-2008) at Humboldt University, Berlin and funded by the German Research Society.

4 See http://www.armenianvolunteer.org, last accessed 11 February 2012.
Turkish ambassador in Moscow, but it was dropped in 1949 with no border change (Suny 1993, Pattie 2004, Panossian 2006).

Mobility in these cases is seen to renew and reinforce bounded identities and social relations. In this paper I am concerned with one other perspective, the possibility and potentiality that these transnational projects can be inspired by, or produce multiple, overlapping identities and cosmopolitan aspirations and projects. My main argument in this paper is that travelling, homeland tourism and other ‘homecoming projects’ have increasingly less to do with a long distance nationalistic re-enactment of the past and vengeance for the past, but rather with a creative ‘journey to the future’ and to some extent naïve ideal of a more cosmopolitan and global grassroot player ‘Weltverbesserer’ (world improver).5

Multiple forms of homeland attachment

One of the key features identifying members of a ‘diaspora’ is their continuing attachment to the homeland, regardless of whether it is an imagined or real country of exodus (Safran 1991, Brubaker 2005). Much has been written about the maintaining homogeneous ideals and ethnic paradigms of the diasporic identity, but there have been fewer investigations of the ways diasporic people practice this kind of attachment in the transnational age. Much has been said about the phenomenon of long-distance nationalism among diasporic activists (Glick Schiller 2005), but less has been studied the notion of diasporic cosmopolitanism. Real or symbolic attachment to the homeland can take many different forms and meanings. Cultural forms of homeland attachment go back to the production of ideas, symbols and images of an imagined ethnic community within a new homeland combined with the process of sacralization and worshipping the land of exodus visible in artistic expressions of nostalgic longing for home or in a simply hanging an image of the homeland in the living room. This sense of cultural repertoire is related to a more individual homeland attachment and transnational mobility is a less of importance. Other types of transnational homeland attachments recognize a growing mobility of diasporic people due to political and economic dimensions of their motivations. Activities related to financial investment, remittances, nostalgic trade, homeland and heritage tourism, temporal volunteer visits, civil society engagement among the first and second generation of diasporic people can be characterized as economic and social form of homeland attachment. In contrary, the political type of homeland attachment is associated with public activities of political diasporic associations which often based on practices of territorial claims or repatriation movements including in-gathering campaigns designed by national state programs in the home country. What is new for this type of transnational networks is an increasing role of mobility and travel within a specific trajectory and routs.

‘Come move the mountains!’ Newcomers in Armenia and homecoming projects

Along with dozens of visible, larger non-profit organizations working in the education and health...
sectors in Armenia, there are two quite successful homecoming target-oriented diasporic organizations, Armenian Volunteer Corps (AVC) and Birthright Armenia. Founded in 2001, both organizations are engaged in a kind of social and economic ‘homecoming project’ for young diasporics in a particular way. Both volunteer organizations share the mission of affording the diasporic youth an opportunity to contribute to local development through professional work. Their specific goal is to support volunteering activities in Armenia by those who grew up in Western countries and who have at least one Armenian grandparent. Between 2007 and 2009, more than 400 male and female volunteers from the US, Canada, France, and Australia between the ages of 21 and 34 went to Armenia for periods varying from three months to two years. The number is growing. The question how can we understand the ways second and third generation Armenian-Americans engage with their homeland in transnational age when the ideal of repatriation entirely lost its attractiveness and the number of those who visit Armenia with a specific ‘mission’ is growing? Admittedly, there is a new recent trend in diasporic-homeland relationships in Armenia. In 2008 the Ministry of Diaspora has been established in Armenia. A growing presence of the Armenian government and its strategic view on diasporic communities can reshape the ways diasporic Armenians engage with their homeland. This paper deals predominantly with non-governmental networks created by members of diasporic centers and individuals in the US.

Source: www.birthrightarmenian.org

Volunteer organizations (of particular interest to individuals under the age of 21)

- Birthright Armenia
- Armenian Volunteers Corps
- Land & Culture Organization
- Armenian Assembly of America
- Armenian Youth Federation
- AYF Western Region Youth Corps
- CYMA (Western Diocese)
- AGBU Yerevan Summer Intern Program
- Our Lady of Armenia Boghossian Educational Center
According to the charts above, more than 44% of all volunteer organizations are based on the NGO level, and 70% of the organizations are based in the US. The interesting point is that the Armenian volunteer work may speak of a desire to ‘serve to the nation’; their efforts are not solely encompassed by this nationalist type of motivation. Without nationalistic slogans its goal is empowerment of “human rights, women, minorities and ecology” and a desire to join with those around the world who work to save the planet. This form of cosmopolitan ‘bifocality’ links the fate of the nation to that of all humanity. Politically, AVC statements differ significantly from the goals of nationalist diasporic Armenians who identify themselves as ‘Dashnaks’. In contrast to traditional Dashnak’s claims to annex lands in Eastern Anatolia inside Turkey and to establish an Armenian state on that territory, the AVC recruits young volunteers through a humanitarian rhetoric and focuses on the territory of the Republic of Armenia (Phillips 1989). Explaining his drive to settle in Armenia within the official AVC slogan ‘Come Move Mountains’, one 30-year-old male volunteer from Boston emphasized: ‘There are many things to change here. You know, there is a problem of poverty, infrastructure. There is a problem of corruption’. (Yerevan, on May 7, 2005).

A unique feature of the Armenian homecoming in the twentieth century is that instead of returning to the actual ancestral places, the hometowns and villages in the Eastern Anatolian plateau (Turkey), grandsons and granddaughters instead invest, engage and settle in Armenia and the land neighbouring Turkey. Therefore, Armenian-American diasporic visitors have no local dimension and intimate knowledge of a particular genealogy, place, or village in the territory of Armenia. It is not surprising that, unlike so many migratory transnational networks built on a foundation of individual informal ties of kinship and remittances to family members and an obligation to support

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6 A hostile attitude towards Turkey among the spuirk still keeps Armenian-Americans from visiting Turkey.
local households (Armenians in Russia, Indians, Chinese or Ghanaians in the USA and Europe), members of the US-American diaspora build homeland ties primarily through formal NGOs and international organizations. This tendency by some diasporic groups to invest in countries other than their ‘source countries’ (such as Croats from Serbia who invest in the newly independent Croatia) has rarely been studied by migration scholars. The question is whether this specific trajectory of travel influences the scope and intensity of engagement with the homeland and the tendency to combine ethnic parochial claims with globalized and universalist values.

According to my observations and interviews, there is a shift in intensity in the way Armenian-Americans engage with the Republic of Armenia. In the early 1990s, some second generation Armenian-Americans were interested in ‘cultural’ and emotional reconnection and individual homeland tourism, like visiting the country to touch materialized highlights of ancestors heritage (see Mount Ararat, visit medieval churches and monasteries), or for a symbolic act such as re-burying family members in the Armenian soil, or by bringing family relics to local museums in Yerevan (Darieva 2008). Here we can recognize different types of homeland tourism: rooted tourism, heritage tourism, cemetery tourism, and religious tourism.

My recent observations and interviews reveal today these diasporic Armenians donate and invest in infrastructure projects like roads, the greening of urban parks, programs for poverty reduction in villages, and environmental projects. This kind of transnational mobility is still combined with homeland tourism, but it takes a new form which can be recognized as social remittance, where diasporic people transfer resources, ideas and behavior from receiving to sending countries (Levitt 1998, 2002). However, in the case of the Armenian diaspora in the US, we are dealing with a specific pattern of social remittances, which are driven by ideals of social entrepreneurship and the American culture of philanthropy.

The number of contemporary diasporic newcomers in Armenia is not high, but it is generally believed that they have a significant political and economic impact in Armenia. Whereas, Armenia’s neighbouring countries, such as Georgia and Azerbaijan, are considered to have been shaped by internal forces such as the effects of the Rose Revolution and oil businesses respectively, Armenia, as an impoverished and isolated country became a recipient of labour migrant remittances and of a large amount of donations and know-how input from diasporic networks in Western countries. Members of the third generation of Armenian-Americans are very heterogeneous with regard socio-political characteristics and their intensity of involvement in the activities of ethnic Armenian organizations. One feature that many American-Armenians share is their social status in the US, as they belong predominantly to the middle class.

Although the investment and remittances have not significantly reduced the level of poverty in Armenia, Armenia continues to be more dependent on remittances and international aid than other post-Soviet, South Caucasian societies (Caucasus Analytical Digest 2011). By transferring social and economic capital to help a poor country, Armenian-Americans gain a feeling of incorporation into their separate ‘sacred homeland’, but also the global issues of ‘development’ and ‘democracy’. Today, they reclaim Armenian soil through activities that contribute to the global issues of human rights and the environment, issues that supposed to affect the entire planet and its inhabitants.
Homeland trip motivations: From nationalistic to global motivations?

Regarding their motivations, diasporic people arrive in Yerevan not just to see the holy Mount Ararat (*Agri Dagi*), but rather to ‘develop Armenia’. Temporary visits with a duration of three months to two years are often described by these young volunteers as a kind of philanthropic ‘giving’ or individual adventure, as well as a symbolic act of reuniting with the ancestral homeland. In both cases, the motivations and aspirations of volunteers and of the institutions that mediated their travel have been framed in discourses of an ‘exchange’ of skills and know-how between developing and developed societies.

Conducting a group interview with eight young volunteers in Yerevan on 5 December 2007, I posed a question regarding the direct and indirect motivation to participate in this program. All the respondents stated that their travel was not necessarily related to a ‘natural’ behaviour of diasporic decedents. A volunteer from Australia explicitly emphasized the individual and pragmatic dimension of her goal:

I came here primarily as a volunteer…it was not so much about Armenia as it was about me coming here to help people, as I had no real links with my homeland before I came…My travel is kind of giving me a big kick, showing me where I want to be…

Another informant stressed his aspiration of engaging with Armenia as a ‘perfect time’ for a life-stage event and as a good place for collecting life experience. Similar to the experiences of other European second generation transnationalists (Turkish Germans, Swiss Italians, Greek Germans or British Pakistani) the ‘homeland trip’ was made in a quest for personal freedom and self-realization (Wessendorf 2009, King and Christou 2011). Victoria from Washington DC talked of her decision to travel to Armenia:

I am not tied down with family, with a career, with all these things and it is a perfect, perfect time to travel. And I always knew that it was the place where I would want to go. There are a lot of life experiences that I think are necessary to gain right now and it is a great time to do that.

Australian-born third generation Serena, who travelled to Armenia for nine months, talked of the adventurous side of her ‘homeland trip’:

I am trying to make my everyday life like an adventure, because I am not in Australia now, and do not have to stick with this or that job, do not have any responsibilities.

Finally, many interview respondents emphasized the cultural heterogeneity of the social environment in which they grew up. This aspect is related to the fact that at least four of the interview respondents identified themselves as being half-Armenian and having grown up in ethnically mixed families. Many of the volunteers explained that their motivations were not influenced by their parents’ ambitions, but rather their decision to come to Armenia was independent of their parents. Moreover, the majority of the volunteers I talked to during my field work viewed their transnational activity and behaviour in a different way to their parents, the latter seemingly following a ‘sedentary’ pattern.
of interaction. Lucia (26 years old), whose father is of Armenian descent and mother Austrian, explained her experience in this way:

My father has never been to Armenia. I was hoping that I would get him to come to Armenia during my stay, but unfortunately he is not going to come. I suppose he is scared to come to Armenia to see how ideal it is not…It is not the utopian ideal society that he kind of wants it to be.

Only a few of the volunteer’s parents had actually travelled to Armenia before their children visited the ‘sacred land’. Thus their transnational engagement with the homeland differs in character and intensity, but it does not mean that they do not participate in transnational social connectedness. As mentioned previously, some parents prefer to support transnational organizations by donating and investing money in their children’s travel or in maintaining transnational projects.

**Armenian Tree Project: Between metaphors of ethnic rootedness and cosmopolitanism?**

One of the areas where long distance notions of attachment to the homeland is pronounced in a less nationalist framework and rhetoric, is that of social remittance which stresses the value of individual engagement, global development and ecological harmony on humanitarian values. In the following section, I give some insights into this practice which was developed in Watertown (Boston area, MA) by the Armenian Tree Project. Though, the idea of this project has been inspired by the Jewish Zionist nationalistic Tree planting campaign in the 1960-70, it has significant differences.

The ATP was founded in 1994 in Watertown and in Yerevan by Caroline Mugar, a second-generation Armenian-American, whose father left the village of Kharpet in Anatolia in 1906 to settle in Massachusetts. Later, between the 1940s and the 1960s, Mugar’s father and his brother became very successful businessmen, establishing the popular US supermarket chain, **Star Market**. The Watertown ATP office brings a large amount of capital into Yerevan, opening nurseries, planting trees and starting projects in surrounding villages. The local office’s activities in Yerevan are divided into three main tree-planting sites: community sites in the city, nurseries, and impoverished villages with a high percentage of Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan. Soon, Armenian Tree Project expanded its activities to larger projects such as reforestation and environmental education programs in the Lori region, in the northern part of Armenia. The economic resources derive mostly from public fundraising ceremonies organized by the ATP in the Boston area and elsewhere among Armenian-Americans. Memory of the Armenian losses in 1915 has become a powerful symbol for successful fundraising campaigns within diasporic networks in Massachusetts. However, the ATP has not only received generous support from a cluster of US Armenian family foundations, but also from international such as **Conservation International** and the **World Wildlife Fund**.

The projection of the homeland as an evergreen landscape, which has been created by the ATP, is built on European and North American romanticized images of nature. In its aesthetic design and combination of colours, the tree landscape differs from the traditional representations of the Armenian garden, which uses vineyard metaphors (Petrosyan 2001). The ATP’s official logo design is three triangular green trees, which is similar to the design on oriental rugs. Flyers, Websites, newsletters, and donation certificates are identified by an image of three evergreen trees without any
specific mountain images. Both the mountain and the trees are essentialising symbols of nature. But unlike the mountain, which is highly associated with a particular historical longing for a past and the Armenian territorial loss, a tree represents social qualities, such as vitality, cultural universality, and a powerful orientation towards the future. At the same time there have been strong connections between environmental romanticism and nationalism since the end of the nineteenth century (Lekan 2004, Rival 1998). Thinking in terms of roots and trees reminds us of the yearning of nations in the search for their roots in an ethnic past (Smith 1986, Malkki 1997). The trees are the physical evidences of the Armenian attachment to the heritage and provide a unique emotional bond established through the act of tree planting between the past and the present. It is true that the emotional power of tree planting action are reinforced by the ecological assertion that trees can be good for the environment. The trees and their images are intermediaries between past and present, death and birth bonding the diasporic place with the holy Mount Ararat. However, unlike the Zionist forestation campaign in Israel (Bardenstein 1999, Braverman 2009), which pursued the aim of putting down roots in a new place and reclaiming the territory to the exclusion of others, tree-planting actions in Armenia serve as a social marker of a new transnational bond between the homeland and the diaspora, and between a small corner of the world and global issues.

There are specific techniques of cultivating donors among the Armenian-Americans. The most popular individual donation is 50 US $ given several times in the year. More 11.000 diasporic Armenians are involved in this activity. In the US over 250.000 Armenian-Americans, around 4000 donors from MA donate more than 100 US $ and over 520 record of those who regular donate over 1000 US $ per year. According to the ATP office in Watertown, donations are made mostly at the end of the year close to the fixed day of tax declaration.

Tree-planting in Armenia has had a particular transnational impact on life circle rituals (birthdays, anniversaries and deaths) within the Armenian diasporic organizations in the Boston area. Increasingly, diasporic people donate to the ATP in commemoration of a family member. Another transnational technique developed by the ATP is a ‘Green Certificate’ that can be presented to donors confirming their sponsorship of tree planting in Armenia. Increasingly, donors also make pilgrimages to the sites where sponsored trees were planted and to nurseries in Armenia.

In the Armenian case, national imaginary can stimulate a simultaneous inclusive globalism so that universal and cosmopolitan ideas and practices are implemented within redefinitions of homecomings and transnational narratives of reconnecting the diaspora with the homeland. The rhetoric of the Armenian Tree Project tries to create a new dimension for envisioning a mutually acceptable future that diminishes the tensions between ‘us – spiurk’ and ‘them – Hayastantsy’ via global issues. In 1998, for example, the Armenia Tree Project jointly initiated an event to mark Earth Day and Arbor Day in Armenian villages. The date, 22 April, coincides with Vladimir Lenin’s birthday; the traditional day for celebrating volunteer work initiated by the Soviet authorities. In the soviet period, everyone (Soviet institutions, schools, enterprises, etc.) was required to mark this day by cleaning the immediate area around which they worked or studied and then plant a tree. This day has since been transformed into global Earth Day.

In an ATP newsletter from spring 2007, one can read the official, twofold vision and pledge to Armenia: ‘We will use trees to improve the standard of living of Armenians and to protect the global environment’ (2007: 2). This quotation indicates that planting trees simultaneously brings to mind a naturalized and ethnicized connotation based on the typical diasporic search for roots of renewal,
and is also re-conceptualized within broader global frameworks. By positioning actions within a movement to sustain and protect the planet, the act of tree planting to help Armenia is transformed into a form of creative cosmopolitan discourse. The newsletter also states:

We are proud to join the international effort to plant trees to fight climate change, which is worsened by rampant deforestation around the world. In 2006, the ATP joined the worldwide tree planting campaign launched by the ‘Billion Tree Campaign’ (2007: 2).

There is a tendency to compare contemporary Armenian diasporic inspirations and mobility experiences with the Jewish case, but the Armenian engagement with the homeland should not be equated with the Jewish Zionist movement. In contrast to the Jewish Zionist project and its relationship to Israel, the Armenian diaspora does not have an ideological foundation for supporting Armenia as there is with Zionism. In spite of its continuity, the ties between the homeland and the diaspora are relatively weak and the diaspora’s support for Armenia is less institutionalized and less ‘strategic’ (compare with Braverman 2009), but more individualistic and project-specific. There is no such a state funded repatriation program and a strong ideology of Zionism. Until the end of the 1980s there were only weak and irregular connections between the Soviet republic of Armenia and the US Armenian diasporic communities. But, today it seems dreams to be united with the homeland became real and there is a new interest towards the holy place and that leads to a growing mobility among diasporic Armenians.

Whereas the Zionist project is characterized by a mono-cultural use of the pine tree (and a physical occupation of the land through planting pine trees) promoting an ethnically driven security agenda (Braverman 2009), the Armenian Tree Project, in both donation and landscape greening techniques, is not fixed to the ecological symbolism of any particular tree. Instead, it emphasizes Armenia’s biodiversity in a global context and sees Armenia as part of a larger region – the Caucasus.

Having started with planting fruit trees for villagers, the ATP now plants a wide range of decorative trees as well as forest trees: North American and Eastern Asian thuja, Crimean wild rose, Chinese magnolia, etc. As a part of an international project, ATP tree planting is linked to a commitment to biodiversity, which is made explicit in the curriculum for environmental education published in English and Armenian:

There is biodiversity within a forest. Forests contain many communities that support diverse populations of organisms. Different forests have different levels of biodiversity. Armenia has a complex relief, as a result of which the regions have strongly differing natural climatic conditions (e.g., precipitation, temperature, topography, etc.) These variations lead to different forest communities with differing species, thereby contributing to Caucasian biodiversity. Armenia is considered part of the world’s 25 most ecologically diverse ecosystems by the World Wild Fund for Nature (Wesley 2010: 16).

Thus, the idea and practice of engaging with the homeland among second- and third-generation Western diasporic Armenians in the Republic of Armenia is based less on regaining a lost intimacy and a place of origin, but rather on the desire to connect a specific territory to the rest of the world.
by ‘developing the country’. The question is to what extent this specific trajectory of travel gives
trend to combine ethnic parochial claims with globalized and universalist values.

Cosmopolitanism is often equated with the experience of mobility in the modern world
(Cahloun 2002, Appiah 2006). I am against making teleological connections among mobility,
transnational networks and cosmopolitanism. In this sense, it would be wrong to assume that
diasporic people and the nature of transnational networks develop evolutionally from ethnic/national
members of the first generation, to transnational members of second generation
Armenian-Americans and finally to cosmopolitan members of the third generation. It is rather an
overlapping process, with a temporal modus and embedded in different local contexts.

In my mind, the anthropological approach to understanding diasporic cosmopolitanism and
diasporic social activism is not only to analyse the ethnic roots and regularities within which
migration takes place, but also to study how social change is affected by migration, to study the
transformations in both host and homeland societies and generational change. In this case ‘rooted’
cosmopolitanism means simultaneity of ethnic parochial closure and openness to diversity and
global human ideas where rootedness and openness cannot be seen in oppositional terms but
constitute aspects of creativity.

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Ⅱ．講演概要
国際部第1回講演会

2012年5月11日（金）午後5時～7時
神戸大学大学院国際文化科学研究科E棟4階 学術交流ルーム

CEFR（ヨーロッパ言語共通参照枠）から見たフランス母語学習者の
言語運用能力～グルノーブル大学の場合

今日のフランスにおける日本語教育をテーマにお話しすることですが、皆さんが中には留学希望者も多いようですので、ケーススタディとしてグルノーブル大学の日本語学習者が日本滞在後にどのように言語運用能力が変わったかをデータを見ながら一緒に考えていきたいと思います。流れとしては、フランスにおける日本語教育の現状・動向を概観したあと、CEFR（ヨーロッパ言語参照共通枠）的な見方とは何かについてお話しします。フランスで外国語教育の一環として日本語を教える場合、他の言語と同様にヨーロッパ言語共通枠の理念を理解することは避けられることだからです。そしてフランス語を母語とするグルノーブル大学の日本語学習者が、CEFRのAレベルから日本滞在を経て、いわゆる自立した言語使用者となったBレベルへ移行したケースを取り上げ、言語運用能力の向上を特に方略に焦点を当てて観察したいと思います。各レベルにはそれに応じた方略があることを実際に収録した会話ビデオの例を見ながら確認していきます。

まず、フランスにおける日本語学習者のイメージは、アニメ、マンガ、コスプレ、Jポップ、ビデオゲームのファンという風に日本のポップカルチャーと密着していますが現実はどうでしょうか。国際交流基金が2009年に行った、国別日本語教育事情の学習目的に関する調査でもマンガ・アニメが学習動機となりやすいという結果が出ています。実際にマンガ・アニメが直接のきっかけであっても、その後より伝統的な文化や思想に関心が移っていくというケースも多いように思います。私はフランスの大学で25年間日本語を教えていますが、学習者のタイプの変遷を実感します。まず入門の段階で、インプットの量と質が違うこと。主にインターネットの普及により、多くの初心者でも最近は何らかの知識・情報を持って教室にやってくるということが多く、その内容も時代と共に変わるのわかります。例えば、数年前は、終助詞を習う段階で「だってばよ」（ナルトの言葉）というのは何ですか、という質問が多く出てきましたが、最近は、初心者でも人称の提示時には、「おれさま」という言葉が出されたり「これは何ですか」という基本的な構文を提示すると「なんだこりゃ」と言えますかというような質問が出たりします。文化面では、日本の作家はということと、20年前は三島由紀夫、川端康成の名が挙がりましたが、今では知らない学生が多く、逆に村上春樹、村上龍の名が挙がります。

現在フランスに於ける日本語学習者数は世界で15位、ヨーロッパでは英国について2位という統計が出てます。フランスの日本語教育は1980年代後半から1990年代初頭にかけて、高等教育を中心に発展し、現在は安定期にあるのですかが、教育機関の大半が高等教育レベルであり。ポップカルチャーで人気の高い年代である中等教育レベルでは正規のコースが
少ないというのが現状です。ですから大学で日本語を履修する学生の大多数が初心者です。ということはよほどの集中コースでない限りリサンス終了時までに十分な日本語運用能力を習得させるのは難しいのです。留学・インターシップ制度による日本長期滞在はそのような現実を反映して非常に人気がありますが在学中に留学のチャンスがない学生が大半です。そのような学生に対して効果的に言語運用能力を育成するには学習者を主体とした、開かれた教育理念が不可欠でしょう。

そこで、欧州評議委員会が外国語学習と教育に関する理念を参照できる枠組みを示すために、2001年に発表したヨーロッパ言語共通参照枠（以下 CEFR）に目を向けてみたいと思います。CEFR は、フランス国民教育省によっても推進され、近年では、中等教育機関をはじめとする外国語学習のカリキュラム、評価、一部の大規模試験に反映されています。CEFR といえば、学習者の言語能力を A1 から C2 の 6段階に分けたグリッドがまず思い出されるかと思いますが、それ以前に理念的な特徴をよく理解しておく必要があります。

CEFR に準じたカリキュラム設定を表示しているコースの中にも、カリキュラムや教授法を変えないで初級レベルを A1 という名称に置き換えただけのようなケースがあります。また、自分たちのやり方を壊してやり直すのがいやなので、CEFR の導入を拒否するような教師もいます。このような状況で大切なのは、CEFR 的教育、CEFR のエッセンスを理解した教育法を考えることではないかと思います。今までの教育をすべて壊す必要はなく、見方を変えるだけでかなり CEFR 的になるということです。CEFR の代表的なキーワードを取り出し、それが教育にどのように反映するのかを CEFR 的でない教育と CEFR 的なものとの例を挙げながら考えてみます。

キーワード 1 「行動中心主義」
知識習得よりも行動を目標とした教育。文法指導に関しては、例えば活用形の作り方を知っていても学習項目が使用場面と結びつかないのは CEFR 的でない教育になる要因となります。つまり「行動としての使用」を意識し文法を学ぶ、文法を社会的行為を結びつけ、タスクを援用するようなことが CEFR 的授業です。

キーワード 2 「スキル熟達度の肯定的評価」
学習者を評価するときに減点法や間違いにばかり注目するは CEFR 的でない見方であり、コミュニケーションレベルでの目標を設定し、何ができるのかというポジティブな評価をするのが CEFR 的な教育といえます。

キーワード 3 「学習者中心」
CEFR 的教授法とは教師が絶対的主導権を持った授業から学習者の気づきを大切にした学習者主体の授業へと移行すること。

キーワード 4 「言語使用者・学習者の自律（オトノミー）」
学習者が自分の熟達度を計れない、受身の学習環境から、熟達度をモニタリングできるような意識をつけを行なうことが大切。

キーワード 5 「複言語・複文化主義」
これが CEFR のもっとも代表的な概念ですが、つまり現在の日本語学習のみに注目するの
ではなく、その学習者の第一、第二、第三言語や文化的バックグラウンドも考慮すること。また学習は生涯続くものと捉え、たとえば 1 年間の学習がその人の人生に何を与えたのかを考えてみたり、部分的エネルギーを認める、など「教えること」の視野が広がると思います。

さて、複言語・複文化主義との関連で、ヨーロッパの大学で近年脚光を浴びているのが、モビリティ、つまり機関を超えた、または国を超えた移動です。ヨーロッパの大学間の交換留学システム、エラスムスなどは、主に大学の 3 年次他の国で行い単位換算があるというもので、それに準じて日本への留学も実施されているところが多いようです。

今回はエラスムスやヴェルサヌス・イン・ジャパンプログラム（インターンシップ）などで日本滞在を経験したグルノーブル大学の学生の滞在前と滞在後の日本語運用能力を、行動主義の立場から観察します。グルノーブル・スタンダール大学には外国語応用過程で日本語・英語・社会科学を専攻するコース（LEA、外国語応用過程）と、他の専攻の学生のためのコース（LANSAD）があり、この 2 名の学生は専攻が理工系のため後者のコースで学習していました。クラスはできる範囲で CEFR に沿って設定されており、また上記のキーワードを留意した教育を行っていますが、週 2 時間年間 48 時間の授業では上達のリズムはゆっくりしたものです。途中で留学が入るとそのリズムがどのように変わるのでしょうか。

ガエル（仮名）とマテイ（仮名）は、2 人ともフランス語母語話者、専攻は理工系で日本語は選択科目として始めました。第 1 回目のデータ収録時は日本語学習 2 年目で学習時間はおよそ 100 時間。口頭やり取りルービルはガエルは基礎段階（A1+）でマテイは A2 前半と判定できます。その後、ガエルは 1 年間の日本滞在中、4 ケ月の日本語集中講座のあと企業でインターンシップを行います。マテイは 1 年半の日本滞在中、大学の日本語の授業を受けながら大学の研究所でインターンシップを行い、週末にはアルバイトもしていました。この 2 名を今回の対象に選んだ理由は、日本滞在後目立ってコミュニケーション能力が伸び、その変化はストラテジー能力の習得と無関係ではないと思われたからです。帰国後は両者とも自立したレベル（ガエル B1～マテイ B1+）に達したと判定しました。

データは、初対面の日本語母語話者による 20～30 分インタビューの対話をビデオ録画したものを使用します。そして録画ビデオと文字化したデータをエンソメソドロジー・会話分析のアプローチで綿密に観察します。相互行為への参加者としての振舞い、その行為の織り方、ターンのとり方を直線的でなく、重層的に観察し、その連鎖における意味づけを考え、記述するような手法です。その際、取り出すのは、目立つ点、繰り返し観察できた点、詳細な観察の結果気づいた点の 3 点です。また相互行為の枠組みでの考案であるため、学習者側の言語行動のみに注目するのでなく相手の振る舞いも考察に含まなければならない。それでは、日本語学習者における相互行為への参与という観点から、基礎段階の言語使用者と自立した言語使用者にそれぞれ特徴的なコミュニケーション上の方略は何かを考えていきます。CEFR では、コミュニケーション能力や活動と違い、方略には能力のレベル付けがされていませんが、それぞれのレベルに合った方略があると考えました。方略、つまりストラテジー能力は、コミュニケーションのブレイクダウンを補い、コミュニケーション効果を高めるためのアクションに使われる言語・非言語レベルの能力（Canale & Swain...）
1980) と定義されていますが、ここでは CEFR で定義されている「効果を最大限にするために取られる一連の行動」 (吉島・大橋 2002: 61) と捉え、相互行為活動の中で、手持ちのリソースと駆使するダイナミックなものと考えます。

相互行為は社会的な活動であり、かつ参加者たちの共同的な作業であるので、参加者同士の関係、行為の意味など、相互行為の中で構築されていくということに考察の焦点をあててみましょう。これには CEFR の行動主義の考え方とも結びついています。

A1 レベルの学生は母語話者の話を理解する過程で困難を示すことがまだ多く見られます。そこで頻繁に見られる方略は、ノンネイティブとしてのアイデンティティを前面に出し、会話の流れを止めて説明を求めるということです。ただ、いつも会話の流れを中断しているわけではないので、曖昧な相槌を打ちながら聞き手として参加し、知っている語彙が出てきた段階でその意味を全体の流れを推測し、意味を自分なりに再構築して会話に参加し直すという方略が繰り返し観察されました。次の例を見てください。

抜粋 1 学生ガエル (A1+) と母語話者ちえ 「人文学」

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ガエル</th>
<th></th>
<th>ちえ</th>
<th></th>
<th>ガエル</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ののさままたは専門は</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ののさま</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ちえ</td>
<td>わたしの専門は人文学とゆって、言葉の勉強とか文化の勉強をしています。</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
<td>(1) 「じんぶん」</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ちえ</td>
<td>「じんぶんがく 人文学というのはすごく広い 分野で言葉とか歴史とかいろんなものを勉強します</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
<td>(1) euh : : : :</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>ちえ</td>
<td>わたしは特に英語を勉強しました＝</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7→</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
<td>えあいうん（1）えいご</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8→</td>
<td>ちえ</td>
<td>話せますか</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
<td>はいちょうと</td>
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</table>

抜粋 1 の連鎖はガエルからの質問で開始します。その前の部分で母語話者が同じ質問をしたのでこれは相互的な質問です。ガエルは相手の応答を理解に通しないまま聞いていますが (2～5)、「英語」という言葉を認識すると、6 を応答と捉え、7 でその連鎖を完了します。母語話者ちえは、自分の応答の補足的要素（英語）から 8 で新トピックを展開させます。学生 G の終了部分にあたる「英語」(7) は、相手の次の質問の主題として再利用されています。つまり A1 レベルの学習者にとって、語彙の認識は大きな意味を持ち、相手の長い発話の中からひとつだけ認識可能の語彙があった場合、それをよりどこかに理解に結び付けることが多いのです。そのプロセスは認知変化状態のマーカー (あ、うん) からも伺えます。ガエルにとって連鎖完了の発話を、相手の日本語話者ちえは再利用し新しいトピックの質問をしています。連鎖のデザインにずれがありますが、両者は少しでも共通認識可能の語彙があるとそれを利用して会話を続けることを目指し、連鎖のねじれはあまり気にしないのがわかります。

また、流れの中断を避ける方策として、質問をするという行為が挙げられます。例 1 でもちえは英語について話すかもしれません (8) と質問し、ガエルもインタビューを受けているとい
う状況にも関わらず、頻繁に自分から質問をします。一方マテイは、自主的な質問は非常に少なかったことから、言語行為のパターンは個人の性格や対話への認識形態に依存しているのかもしれません。しかし、自分から質問をする行為は、発話の理解に困難があるガエルにとって会話の流れを管理しながら相互行為に参加するための方略であると考えられます。質問は相手の質問を繰り返す相対的なもの（抜粋1の1）である場合もありますが、唐突な方法が多く見られました。

抜粋2 ガエルと母語話者ちえ「どこに住んでいますか」

<table>
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<th>ガエル</th>
<th>ちえ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
<td>Euh あなたはどこに住んでいますか</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ちえ</td>
<td>わたしは今サンマルタンデールに住んでいます</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
<td>［サン</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ちえ</td>
<td>［サン</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
<td>あ、はい</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>ちえ</td>
<td>すぐ近くです</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
<td>うん</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ちえ</td>
<td>ガエルさんは どこに住んでいますか</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

抜粋2は、ドイツ語に関するテーマの連鎖完了後に続くものです。その連鎖では、ガエルは流れを停滯させ、相手の代弁によって連鎖を完了させており、その完了方法には疎疎が見られます（抜粋4参照）。そしてその直後、関連のないテーマの質問を利用し相互行為に自主的な参加を試みています（抜粋2の1）。ちえはその質問の唐突性に気づかぬように応答し（2）、それを利用して相対的な質問を行うように連鎖をデザインしています。抜粋1と抜粋2から観察できるように、A段階の言語使用者が入っている相互行為では自分がデザインした連鎖組織の通りに相互行為を続けることが優先事項ではなく、途中でねじれが起きても、隣接ペア（質問・応対）のレベルで連鎖を続けるような方略を駆使することが多いということがわかります。では1年半の日本滞在を経てB1レベルに達したガエルの言語行為を観察してみましょう。

抜粋3 ガエル（B1）と母語話者えり 「フランスに来てまだ3ヶ月」

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>えり</th>
<th>ガエル</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>出身はどこですか。</td>
<td>えり</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
<td>あ、出身はブザンソンという町ですけど＝</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>えり</td>
<td>＝どこですか</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
<td>Franche-Comté という県 ［が（…）</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>えり</td>
<td>［わたしはまだフランスに来てまだ3ヶ月なんで</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
<td>ああそう 『なんですか</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>えり</td>
<td>［わからないんですあんまり</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
<td>ああそうですか</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>ええっとですね、ちょっと地図を描きましょうか</td>
<td>(( 地図を描きながら説明 ))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
<td>お3ヶ月前に来たんです</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>えり</td>
<td>そうなんです 9月に来たんでまだ3ヶ月にならないかな</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
<td>ん[ん</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
母語話者えりがフランスに来てまだ3ヶ月ということで、フランスの地図を書いて説明したガエルは、その直後質問の形でその話を再提示します(10)。これは「既知情報」なので、「情報要求」の質問ではなく、「それについての話を促す」ための質問と考えられます。「あ」の認知状態標識と「んですか」の確認要求モダリティーを組み合わせ、「フランスにきてまだ3ヶ月」(5)を「3ヶ月前に来た」(10)と言い直し、前の文脈に結び付けています。この行為は、「フランスどうですか」という質問(14)の準備段階と考えられます。このようにガエルは質問という行為を方略として利用し、重層的な連鎖を行っています。また、ガエルが「あなた」を相手に向けて全く使用しなくなったことは、社会言語的能力の変化と言えるでしょう。学習者の質問に唐突性がなくなったのと同時に、母語話者からの質問にも同じ配慮が見られます。トピックとずれる場合は、「ちなみに」、「そういえば」、「ところで」などの前置き表現、またはその質問をしの理由、根拠が付け加えられるようになっています。学習者とネイティブというタイプの会話から、言語使用者として母語話者同士に近い会話に移行している、ということかわかります。

CEFRでは、いかに手持ちの言語リソースを駆使して、効果的に表現をできるかを『叙述の正確さ』という項目で説明しています(5.2.3.2機能的能力)。Aレベルの学習者の場合、相手が自分の意図を正しく認識しなかった場合、その修正を断念することが多くみられます。それと同時に手持ちのリソースを駆使して、修正を加えようとする試みはAレベルでも観察されました。

抜粋4 ガエルと母語話者ちえ「ドイツ語」

| 1→ | ちえ | あ、すごいですね。じゃ英語と日本語とフランス語が話せ :: [るんですね。 |
| 2 | ガエル | はい[
| 3 | ちえ | [ドイツ語も話せるんですか |
| 4 | ガエル | はい |
| 5→ | ちえ | [すごいですね |
| 6 | ガエル | Euh くねん かん |
| 7 | ちえ | きゅうねんかん |
| 8 | ガエル | ぐらいい Euh ドイツ語を習 っています |
| 9 | ちえ | ああ ほとんどですか |
| 10 | ガエル | はい |
| 11→ | ちえ | ええ ドイツ語は難しいですよ |

47
母語話者ちえは 11 でドイツ語は難しいという考えに対しガエルの同意を求めますが、彼は 12 で言葉探しのフィラーを駆使して自分が同意でない方向に向かっていることを予告しつつ、ターンを保持しています。その後、同意でないという説明を始めますが、このレベルでは理由表現や複合助詞（例えば「〜にとって」）は見られず、使われた統語的リソースは、「わたしはフランス人です」、「ドイツ語は難しくありません」といった「～は…」の構文を対比的に並列させたものでした（12, 14）。一方母語話者ちえはドイツ語は難しくないという要因を母語との近さに求めようと発展させますが（15, 17, 19) ガエルは理解ができません。ガエルはそれまでの連鎖をキャンセルさせ、説明を再スタートさせますがここでも再び「X は…・Y は・・・」と 2 つの対応する構文がリソースとなっています（20～22, 24～）。最終的には、ちえの先取りによりこの連鎖は完了の形を持ちます（25）。ここでガエルは一応承諾するのですが（26, 28）、自分の言語行動に満足していない様子が 28 の「笑い」から伺えます。もうひとりの学習者マティも A レベル時に手持ちの言語的リソースが限られている中、見解の認識の違いを説明しようと試みています。
抜粋5 学習者マテイ（A1+）と母語話者ゆみ

| 1 | ゆみ | 仕事の：仕事場の：人と（0.8）こう（1.1）話をしたり（0.6）飲んだり食べたりするの楽しいですよ |
| 2→ | マテイ | はいいでもHH euh フランスで 仕事は仕事 HH＝ |
| 3 | ゆみ | [ああ] |
| 4→ | マテイ | ＝ともだちはともだち HH |
| 5 | ゆみ | （0.7）そうですか |

ここでは日本人の仕事の仕方について話しています。マテイが仕事の同僚と飲みに行くことを拒否すると母語話者ゆみはそれを肯定します（1）。マテイのデータでは、相手の見地を理解した上での違いを示すときに「はい、でも」（フランス語で Oui mais の応答パターン）が談話的リソースとして頻繁に見られ、また、「仕事は仕事、友達は友達」のように、抜粋4と同様、統語構造としては「Xは・・・Yは・・・」と2つの対立する事項を出しています。最も基礎的な構文が統語リソースとして様々な状況で使われるという方略が観察できます。ところがB1に達すると統語的リソースが変化します。次に見るのはマテイの帰国後のデータの抜粋です。

抜粋6 マテイ（B1）と母語話者しおり 「仕事先」

| 1 | しおり | もうじゃ仕事先は見つかったんです [か] |
| 2 | マテイ | そう見つかったんですよ |
| 3 | しおり | ああフランスで |
| 4 | マテイ | グルノーブルで |
| 5 | しおり | グルノーブルで |
| 6 | マテイ | はい |
| 7→ | しおり | ああじゃ近くていいですね |
| 8→ | マテイ | そう っていうか ちかくてぼく的には近くではないんですけどね |
| 9 | しおり | あそうなんですか |
| 10 | マテイ | 地元はアヴィニョンなんで[・・・南の・・・] |
| 11 | しおり | ああアヴィニョン[そうか じゃあ] |

母語話者しおりは、マテイにグルノーブルに仕事先が見つかったとのことで気配りの言葉をかけますが（7）、マテイは「そう っていうか」の組み合わせで方向転換をしながら、「近くではないんです」と相手の認識を修正するモダリティを使用しています（叙述様式説明のモダリティ、益岡2007）。そしてAレベルで頻繁に見られた「はい、でも」は使われなくなっています。統語的には複文（ex. ので、たら）を駆使し、相手の認識とのずれを明確に表現できるようになっています。

会話分析ではひとつのターンスペースに複数の話者が参加することを協働的ターン連鎖と呼びていますが、学習者がAレベルのコーパスでは、先取り完了は母語話者によるものがほとんどで、先取りされた学習者は、そこで躊躇を表したり考え込んだり、あるいは、自分が流れを止めたことに対して謝るなどの行為を行い、言語上の不足を補ってもらったというメタ言語的な認識を表しています。これは母語話者による「支援・協力的」活動で、協
働的活動とは異なると考えます。協働作業はどちらかが相手に依存しきれていたり、アイデンティティの面で大きな壁があると成立しないからです。

B1レベルでは様々なパターンのターン連鎖が頻繁に見られましたが、一例を見てみましょう。

抜粋 7 ガエル（B1）と母語話者えり

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ガエル</th>
<th>母語話者えり</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>日本語の授業を[はい受けて]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>[ほおあーい]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ええ あと8ヶ月を(0.8) euは 日本の会社ではたらく</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>日本の会社にたらく=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>えー=はい</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6→ えり</td>
<td>じゃ日本の大学に留学したんじゃなくて:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7→ ガエル</td>
<td>それではなく:はい[あの日本の・・・]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8→ えり</td>
<td>[その会社(0.1)に]入ったんですか</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9→ ガエル</td>
<td>はい、インターンシップ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10→ えり</td>
<td>あ インターンシップか</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11→ ガエル</td>
<td>はい インターン インターンとしてあそこに入りました</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

母語話者えりの相槌や確認表現をガエルがうまく取り入れながら、それを自分の言葉で再産出し(6 - 7, 9 - 11), ターンを完了させているのがわかる。このタイプのインターアクションは臨場感と話者の一体感を与え、対等な話者、つまり自立した話者の参加態度を示していると考えることができるでしょう。

最後に、相互行為に必ず見られる現象として、参与者同士の感情的な一体化や同意による一体感の共有があります。特に日本語では文末モダリティにより、情感的なコメントを述べたり気遣いを表すことが多いのです。最後に、会話の開始部の儀礼的やり取りと、褒める行為への回答を観察してみましょう。前者に関しては、部屋に入ってきた学生が席に着く前に、母語話者が一声かけるという行動が繰り返し観察されました。これはインタビューに入る前に、相手を対話相手として感情的に引き込む行為と考えられます。拔粋 8 は、A1レベル時のガエルが部屋に入ってきたときに母語話者ちえが声をかけた場面ですが、理解が困難であったのはこのような挨拶行為をガエルが予測していなかったからだとも考えられます。一方、抜粋 9 は B1レベルになった同じ学習者が部屋に入ってきたときのやりとりです。母語話者の発話にほぼ重なるようにして同じ構文で応答しています。状況で予測して応答する方策を獲得したと考えられます。

抜粋 8 ガエル（A1）と母語話者ちえ 「重そう」

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ガエル</th>
<th>母語話者ちえ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1→</td>
<td>ちえ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>ちえ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4→</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
抜粋 9 ガエル（B1）と母語話者えり「今日は寒い」

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>えり</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ガエル</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

（=はポーズなしに二つの発話が続くことを示す）

また、褒める行為への応答は社会言語的能力です。抜粋 4 の 1 と 5 で母語話者ちえが「すごい」entityという発話を繰り返しますが、ガエルはそれを褒め言葉と認識していません。A レベル時のマテイは認識ができましたが、肩をすくめるなどの非言語的リソースで応答をするだけでした。B1＋に達したマテイ（抜粋 10）は、明示的に相手からの褒め言葉を否定し、また相手自身の謙遜を否定して、仮定表現を駆使して気配りのコメントを加えています。

抜粋 10 マテイ（B1＋）と母語話者しおり「日本語上手」

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>しおり</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2→</td>
<td>マテイ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>しおり</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4→</td>
<td>マテイ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>しおり</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 名のフランス人学生の日本語運用能力を相互行為への参加という面からの方略的変化を中心に観察してきましたが、このように「何ができるか」という観点で観察することは CEFR のいう「行動主義」を重なります。文法的間違いやコミュニケーションの挫折にばかり注意を向けた観察方法は CEFR 的とは言えません。ここでは、日本滞在という貴重な体験を経て、ある程度自立した対等な言語使用者として会話に参加することができるようになった例を観察しました。もちろん長期滞在を経ても必ずしも同じような方略を習得するとは限らず個人差があります。留学地でのインターアクションの質や量、及ぶ態度によるのでしょうか。日本滞在なしでも同じような方略の取得は可能なのかどうか。インプットの量では比較にならないので、ある程度相互行為を意識付けて指導に結びつけることが考えられます。

これからフランス留学を目指す皆さんは、このようなステップを経てフランス語の運用能力を身に付けていくことと思いますが、自分がどのような方略を使っているのかなどについては時々意識的に考えてみるのも面白いのではないかと思います。

注。

1 文字化の主な記号 : → 解説されている発話 ; [xx] 発話の重なり ; = 間隔なし ; (数字) 間隔の秒数 ; : : 音の引き延ばし ; HH 笑い ; (…) 間隔取り不可, (( xxx )) コメント, ↑上昇抑揚.
＜参考文献＞
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東伴子(2011) 「相互行為における日本語学習者のストラテジー再考 - 基礎段階の言語使用者から自立した言語使用者への移行に注目し」 『ヨーロッパ日本語教育 15』 pp. 127-134
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国際交流基金 日本語教育国・地域別情報 フランス
研究部第3回講演会

日時 2012年11月12日（月）午後5時~7時
場所 大学院国際文化学研究科A棟4階 中会議室

移民を受け入れ、なんとか円満に共存し、国力の源泉にする
システムをつくりあげているオーストリア

高坂哲郎

【はじめに】
2001年3月から2005年2月まで、オーストリアの首都ウィーンの支局に駐在し、同国やその周辺の中・東欧諸国を担当した。本日はその機会に知った「移民国家」としてのオーストリアについてお話させいただく。

【暮らして知った移民国家オーストリア】
オーストリアは中部欧州に位置し、周囲をドイツやスイス、イタリアのほか、チェコやハンガリーなどに囲まれている。首都ウィーンは古代ローマの城塞都市が起源であり、古くから欧州の南北と東西を結ぶ「交通の十字路」であると同時に、ゲルマンとスラブ、マジャールとイタリアという諸民族が交差する「民族の十字路」でもあった。現在は、欧州有数の観光都市であると同時に、ニューヨーク、ジュネーブに次ぐ第3の国連都市でもある。

ロンドンやパリなど欧州の主要都市は今やさまざまな人種が暮らす多民族都市であるが、ウィーンも同様で、欧州人だけでなく、中東系やアフリカ系など多様な民族が暮らしている。ナッシュ市場などに行くと、トルコ系やバルカン系といった移民の々さんが働いているのをよく目にする。

移民たちの多くは商店や飲食店などで懸命に働いている。オーストリアはカトリックの国なので、土曜日の午後から日曜日いっぱいは商店が閉まってしまい、ものを買うのを困るときがあったが、そんなときに頼りになったのが土曜の午後でも開いていた近所のトルコ系の商店だった。車で通勤する途上、路上の新聞売りから新聞を買ったが、彼らの多くはエジプト系だった。子供の通っていた幼稚園で一番頼りになったのは、用務員を務めていたボスニア系の女性だった。

【移民国家の歩み】
オーストリアは今でこそ人口約800万人のゲルマン系を人々を中心とする国家だが、第一次世界大戦に敗北し、さまざまな民族国家に分裂するまでは、最盛期で人口4000万人を擁する大きな多民族国家だった。その領土は、現在のオーストリア、チェコ、スロバキア、ボーランド南部のガリツィア、ウクライナ西部のルテニア、ハンガリー、ルーマニア北西部のトランシルヴァニア、セルビア北部のボイボディナ、ボスニア・ヘルツェゴビナ、クロアチア、スロベニア、イタリア北部からなっていた。

現在のオーストリアは内陸国だが、当時はアドリア海にも面していたため海軍もあった。
1869年に日本とオーストリアが「日墎修好通商航海条約」を結んだとき、オーストリア側
の代表はA・フォン・ベッツという海軍少将だった。

このオーストリア帝国を、日本でいえば鎌倉時代から大正時代までの間、統治したのがハプスブルク家だった。彼らは多民族国家を統治するうえで、それぞれの民族の自尊心に配慮することに腐心していたようだ。ウィーン駐在時代、最後の皇帝カール1世の息子で「最後の皇太子」だったオットー・フォン・ハプスブルク氏（1912〜2011）に直接取材する機会を得た。彼は「軍事ならドイツ人（＝ドイツ語を話す現在のオーストリアに暮らしていた人々）、商売ならポーランド人というふうに、それぞれの民族の得意とするところを尊重するように、家で教えられていた」と話していた。

帝国議会では、各民族ごとに議席を割り当てられ、登壇者の発言内容に不満を持ったある民族の代表がインク瓶を投げつけるなど、「闊達」な多民族議会だったようである。ウィーン旧市街（1区）にある新王宮には、帝国を構成するさまざまな民族の衣装をまとった兵士の石像が壁に配置され、当時の多民族国家ぶりがうかがえる。

ちなみに、現在のオーストリアの名物料理に、たたいて薄く伸ばした子牛肉を揚げた「ウィンナ・シュニッツェル」があるが、これは「ミラノ風カツレツ」が起源だ。ウィーンのカフェで楽しめるコーヒーとアップルパイ（アップル・シュトゥルーデル）はイスラム文化圏に由来し、こんなところにもオーストリアの歴史が表れている。

さまざまな民族の混血もすすんでいた。スロバキアの首都ブラチスラヴァを拠点とする「スカイ・ヨーロッパ」という格安航空会社を創業した若き実業家を取材したことがあるが、彼は祖父の一人はチェコ系、祖母の一人はハンガリー系とのことだった。「多民族帝国の遺伝子」を体現した人物だった。

「多民族国家」として積んできた「年季」の長さを象徴するのが、イスラム教との付き合いの古さだ。首都ウィーンは、1529年と1683年の二度にわたり、トルコ軍に包囲され陥落寸前までいったが、なんとか難を逃れた歴史がある。「文明の衝突」をその時点で経験したわけだ。その後、イスラム系住民の暮らすボスニア・ヘルツェゴビナを領有した関係で、1912年にはイスラム教を国家の主要宗教の一つとして認定している。現在、ウィーンにはドームと尖塔をもつ正式なモスクもある。

こうした歴史を眺めていると、ハプスブルク・オーストリア帝国は、数百年にわたり、地続きの帝国版図の中で多様な民族が交流する、いわば「超長期・自然熟成型の移民国家」と呼べる。そのあたりが、同じ欧州でもフランスやドイツなどと違う部分ではないかと思われる。

また、ウィーンで生活して実感したことだが、現在のオーストリア社会は、「生粋のオーストリア人」の周りに、オーストリアにきてからの期間が比較的長い「旧移民」の層があり、その周りに最近来た「新移民」の層がある、いわばタマネギのような重層構造になっている。シュランメルンのポルカに「ウィーンはいつもウィーン」という曲があるが、まさに、旧移民が新移民にオーストリアでの生活のルールなどを教えることで、移民が流入してもオーストリアらしさが薄れない、「ウィーンはいつもウィーン」である続ける仕組みが出来上がっているように見える。

ドイツで2008年にトルコ系移民の暮らすアパートが放火され、女性や子どもが犠牲になる痛ましい事件が起きた。このような事件がオーストリアではいまだ起きていないのは、もしかすると、これまで述べてきた「超長期・自然熟成の移民国家」「玉ネギ型社会構造」という側面が寄与しているのかもしれない。
【現在のオーストリアの移民受け入れ策】

現在のオーストリア共和国では、オーストリア国籍所持者に加え、欧州連合（EU）市民であれば滞在は自由である。そのほかの国民は、自分もその一人だったが、企業駐在員のような（短期）滞在者とその家族も必要な滞在手続きを満たせば生活できる。それ以上の滞在をするには、「永住許可」を経て「国籍取得」というプロセスで進むことになる。近年は、特殊技能保持者の滞在をしやすくする「赤白赤カード」発給という制度もあり、国際的な人材争奪戦にオーストリアも参戦していることがわかる。

オーストリアの移民政策の特徴を一言でいうと、「統合（Integration・イントレグラツィオン）」に力点を置いているということである。今のオーストリア社会を基軸として、それを崩さない範囲で、新たな移民を加えていくというイメージである。オーストリア人に聞くと、問題の捉え方は『移民問題』というより『統合問題』なのですという。

だから、短期滞在許可をする場合にも、ドイツ語の基礎的能力を試す。自分と妻も区役所に行って簡単な面接を受けたことがある。国籍取得には、より難しいドイツ語試験と、オーストリアの社会と文化に関する知識を問う試験があるという。

オーストリアに移民・帰化した著名人として、クロアチア出身のサッカー選手でオーストリアのナショナル・チームで活躍し、日本の名古屋グランパス・エイトでも仕事をしたイヴィツァ・バビジッチ氏、ボスニアからオーストリアに留学し、テレコム・オーストリア社長まで上り詰めたボリス・ネムシッチ氏、幼少期にトルコからオーストリアに移り住み、レストランやケータリング事業を世界展開するに至ったアッティラ・ドグダン氏らがいる。

【「なんとか円満に共存」はいつまで持続けるか】

歴史的な遺産もあって、これまで「なんとか円満に共存」が続いてきたオーストリアだったが、これから先もそれが続くかどうかをめぐって、岐路に立っているようにも見える。

気になる要因は 4 つある。まず、ついに 2 ケタを超えた外国人比率という事実だ。自分がウィーン駐在を始めた 2001 年は 8.9%だったが、2008 年に 10.0%に達し、現在は 11.5%という。この比較的急ピッチな上昇がオーストリア社会にどういう影響を及ぼすのか、さらにスポンジが水分を吸収しきれなくなるようになって、さまざまな事件が起き始めるのかが懸念される。

第 2 に、移民の中でも「統合されにくい」とされるトルコ系移民たちの存在だ。2010 年のある調査によると、オーストリア在住のトルコ系住民の 69.3%が「オーストリアよりもトルコへの帰属意識が強い」と回答している。同じ調査で、同様の回答をしたのは旧ユーゴスラビア系では 37.3%、ポーランド系やルーマニア系は 28.4%にとどまっており、トルコ系住民の特徴がうかがえる。

第 3 に、「統合のコスト」の問題がある。移民の子供たちの中には、ドイツ語が苦手なために学校での授業についていけてず、その結果、就職もし難になり、さらにその子供も同様の事態に陥るという悪循環が、オーストリアに限らず世界的に行きている。オーストリア政府はその対策として、学校での移民の子供向けのドイツ語教育だけで年間約 10 億円を投じている。

第 4 に、すべての犯罪件数（＝裁判での有罪確定ベース）に占める外国人犯罪比率の上昇という状態がある。オーストリアでの犯罪総数は、1999 年時点で年間約 6 万件だったのが、2011 年は 4 万件弱と減少しているが、この間、外国人による犯罪は 1 万〜1 万数千件の間で推移し続けている。
こうしたことの影響なのか、ある調査で「移民への反感指数」でオーストリアが西欧主要国の中で1位になったと同国主要紙「シュタンダルト」が報じた。表面的には移民を標的にした重大事件は起きていないが、オーストリア人の心の内面には移民への違和感や反発が存在することを示している。

【移民国家化する日本へのヒント】
日本では急速な少子高齢化が進む中で、社会の中での外国人移民（ここでは研修生・就学者や不法滞在者を含む広義の移民を指することとする）の存在感が大きくなっている。飲食店やコンビニエンス・ストアにとどまらず、農業や水産業などでも外国人移民は大きな力となっている。

ただし、日本は「超長期・自然熟成型の移民国家」オーストリアのように社会に移民を受け入れるシステムが内蔵されていないため、なし崩しや無秩序な形で短期間に大量の移民を受け入れれば、社会に混乱をもたらす恐れもある。過去に見られた、特定の省庁による「思いつき」のような外国人労働者受け入れ策ではなく、国としての「移民受け入れ策」の構築と実行が必要となる。

その際、オーストリアの経験から日本が学べそうなことを3点指摘したい。第1点は、「移民を受け入れる側が主体性を失わない」ことである。

日本では国内の外国人問題というと「多文化共生」という言葉が頻繁に使われる。ただ、あまりに「多文化共生」の度が過ぎると、日本社会の中に、日本語を解さない人々の社会が出来上がり、日本人とのトラブルを誘因するだろうし、現にあちこちで起きている。こうした事態が放置されると、現在は移民に反していない人々までが、移民受け入れに抵抗を感じるようになりかねない。

震災が起きても人々が整然と列を崩さず食料や水の配給を受ける日本の風景は、日本社会の良さとして世界が賛賛するところである。しかし、もしそ先々、日本が無計画に大量の外国人移民を受け入れていけば、社会が急速に変質し、「日本らしさ」が徐々に失われていくのではないか、と懸念される。そうしないためにも、日本人自身が移民を受け入れつつも「日本社会およびその良さ」をなくさない、という姿勢を保つ必要がある。長らく多民族国家であり続け、文字通り「多文化共生のベテラン国家」のオーストリアが、「多文化共生」でなく「統合」という概念を強調している事実を、われわれは重く受けて直らない必要がある。

これと裏表の関係になるが、第2点は、「移民の人々の側も、日本社会が歴史的に培ってきた良好さを保つための努力を続けてもらいたいと思う」ことである。「郷に入れば郷に従え」という教えは、移民を受け入れる側のストレスを軽減し、トラブルを極小化し、ひいては移民自身も平和裏に暮らせるという点でメリットがあるはずだ。日本社会にも、旧移民が新移民に日本流儀を教える「玉ネギ型社会」ができるものかとも思う。

第3点は、多少テクニカルになるが、自分は安全保障・危機管理をメインテーマに取り組んでいる関係上、「治安維持」ということを挙げておきたい。

ドイツでの2008年のトルコ系移民を標的にした事件がいったん起きてしまった。その国中の（もとある）国民が移民の双方向に不信感や敵対感情が芽生え、さらなる事件を誘発しかねない状態となる。ウィーン駐在時代、ボスニアとコソボという凄惨な民族紛争の現実となった地を取材した。両国とも、かつては複数の民族が一応は平和裏に共存していた場所だったが、いったん内戦が始まり民族同士の殺し合いが起きてしまうと、もはや共存はほぼ不可能な状態になってしまった。複数の民族の共存というのは、実はもろいものなの
了。そうした共存関係の破綻を引き起こすのが、凄惨な事件だとすれば、そうした引き金となる事件を極力抑止する必要がある。外国人移民や外国人を標的にした事件の抑止は、善良で懸命に働く移民たちを守るだけでなく、日本社会と移民の平和裏の共存を守ることにつながる。

オーストリアは観光立国だけにやわらかいイメージがあるが、実は警察力も国際的に定評があり、民間航空機に私服で乗る「航空保安官」制度を 1982 年に開始して、米同時テロ後の米国や日本が参考にしていることなどは案外知られていない。今後ますます移民国家化する日本も、治安維持機能というポイントを抑えておく必要がある。

【おわりに】
今回、ここでお話する機会をいただき、4 年間暮らしたオーストリアという国・社会と移民問題、さらには日本のこの先を改めて考えることができた。神戸大学と坂井一成准教授に感謝したい。ありがとうございました。
なお、今回の話は私個人の見解であることをお断りしております。

【略歴】1966 年生まれ。1990 年東京外国語大学ドイツ語学科卒。同年日本経済新聞社入社。国際部、政治部、証券部を経て 2001 年ウィーン支局長。2005 年防衛省防衛研究所特別課程（第 51 期）修了。2011 年 4 月編集委員。2012 年 4 月から東北大学大学院非常勤講師も兼務。
Understanding Growth Strategies in Retailing:
From Internationalization to the Development of New Retail Formats
Karine Picot-Coupey

The research presentation consisted in the presentation of an overview of my research topics. The common theme to my research works is the understanding of growth strategies in retailing. It is from the perspective of internationalization on the one hand, and the perspective of developing new formats on the other hand. The workshop was organized around three papers that illustrate these fields of research.


Many retail companies are currently developing their store networks beyond their domestic market. Each operation abroad requires choosing an internationalization mode. The aim of this research consists in analyzing the determinants of retail store networks’ choice of an international expansion mode. A conceptual model of the determinants suggested in the literature is developed on the basis of results of previous research and enhanced by the analysis of eleven interviews with top retail managers. Based upon the results of a study involving 43 top international managers of French fashion retail networks, the model is tested using the PLS approach. This research provides evidence which highlights the explanatory influence of the chain’s international marketing policy, the strategic and capitalistic profile and the perceived attractiveness of the foreign market through the three dimensions of an international expansion mode: dissemination risk, control over decisions and resource commitment. The moderating influence of the international involvement of top managers and that of relationship networks are also highlighted.

2. Picot-Coupey K., The pop-up store as a foreign operation mode (FOM) for retailers, Under Evaluation in International Journal of Retail and Distribution Management

The objective of this research is (i) to describe the characteristics of a pop-up store in an international context, (ii) to investigate the motivating factors for its choice and (iii) to analyse the way in which it is managed. A multiple-case study was adopted. Research was carried out using secondary data sources, social media measurement and semi-structured interviews with senior managers in charge of the international development and management of pop-up stores. A conceptualizing content analysis was conducted both manually and with NVivo software. The main results cover the following aspects of an international pop-up store and highlight the differences between this choice of FOM and other store formats:
• key characteristics: location, design and architecture, merchandise mix, and in-store or store-related events;
• choice motivations: three motivations were found, which were (i) to test and adapt the concept with foreign consumers possibly unfamiliar with such a store concept, (ii) to raise and sustain the international profile of a retail brand, and (iii) to develop relationship networks with stakeholders in foreign markets;
• management: a dynamic approach is adopted as management style varies from mode switch at the entry stage to mode combination at the further expansion stage.

The results of this research suggest avenues for future research, particularly in relation to how the concept of the international pop-up store will evolve over time. This research provides guidelines for international retail managers wishing to choose a pop-up store as a foreign operation mode (FOM). This research provides a new insight into the characteristics, choice motivations, and management of a pop-up store in an international context.


The growth of e-commerce calls into question the viability of traditional retail formats. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), especially the Internet, now play a major role in retailing. With the stagnation of the hypermarket format in France, developing ICT could be a way for grocery retail companies to reinitiate growth. Some questions arise concerning the consumers' acceptance of these new technologies for food retailing. How does the consumer perceive the opportunities for the Internet and what associations do they hold for their favorite store? To what extent could consumers integrate ICT, especially the Internet, in their current or in future grocery shopping behaviours? Within this context, this paper focuses on the ‘consumer–store’ relationships. The research aims to explore consumers’ perceptions of hypermarket and cybermarket formats for grocery shopping. The methodology is qualitative and based on 18 semi-structured interviews and on three focus groups of French consumers.

Results show that the hypermarket format continues to appeal to French consumers while the cybermarket format remains unclear. The two targets – ‘the organised’ and ‘the grumblers’ – are an exception to this trend.
Ⅲ．講演会実施記録
研究部講演会

第1回 実施要領

日時 2012年6月22日（金）午後3時15分～5時15分
場所 大学院国際文化学研究科E棟4階 学術交流ルーム
講師 Luc López Vidal（カタロニア放送大学准教授）
報告 "Japan-EU’s Relationship: limits and hopes in the new century"

第2回実施要領

日時 2012年10月31日（水）午後5時～7時
場所 大学院国際文化学研究科A棟4階 中会議室
講師 Samir A. Nouh（同志社大学神学部教授）
報告 「日本におけるムスリム—ヨーロッパのムスリムと比較の観点から」
　"Muslims in Japan in comparison with those in Europe"

※報告内容については、第1部に掲載された論文を参照のこと。

第3回実施要領

日時 2012年11月12日（月）午後5時～7時
場所 大学院国際文化学研究科A棟4階 中会議室
講師 高坂哲郎（日本経済新聞編集委員）
報告 「移民を受け入れ、なんとか円満に共存し、国力の源泉にするシステムをつくりあげているオーストリア」

※報告内容については、第2部に掲載された講演概要を参照のこと。
第4回実施要領

日時  2013年1月12日（金）午後6時～7時30分
場所  大学院国際文化学研究科A棟4階 中会議室
講師  八谷まち子（九州大学法学研究院教授、EUIJ九州代表）
報告  「アラブの春とトルコのEU加盟の新たな課題」
国際部講演会

第1回実施要領

日時 2012年5月11日（金）午後5時～7時
場所 大学院国際文化学研究科E棟4階 学術交流ルーム
講師 東伴子（グルノーブル第3-スタンダール大学准教授）
報告 「CEFR（ヨーロッパ言語共通参照枠）から見たフランス母語学習者の言語運用能力—グルノーブル大学の場合」

※報告内容については、第2部に掲載された講演会概要を参照のこと。

第2回実施要領

日時 2012年7月19日（木）午後5時～7時
場所 大学院国際文化学研究科A棟4階 中会議室
講師 Dimitri Vanoverbeke（ルーヴァン・カトリック大学教授）
報告 “From Confrontation to Global Partnership: Europe and Japan”
「対立から協力へ：ヨーロッパと日本」

※報告内容については、第1部に掲載された論文を参照のこと。

第3回実施要領

日時 2012年9月24日（月）午後4時～5時
場所 大学院国際文化学研究科A棟4階 中会議室
講師 杉原早紀（ハンブルク大学アジア・アフリカ研究所専任講師）
報告 「ドイツ大学教育制度改革と日本語教育—ハンブルク大学の場合」

※報告内容については、第1部に掲載された論文を参照のこと。
第 4 回実施要領

日時 2012 年 11 月 28 日（水）午後 5 時～7 時
場所 大学院国際文化学研究科 E 棟 4 階 学術交流ルーム
講師 Tsypylma Darieva
（フンボルト大学社会秩序表象センター客員研究員／筑波大学特任准教授）
報告 “Between Long-distance Nationalism, Homeland Tourism and Production of a New Diasporic Identity”「遠距離ナショナリズムと祖国ツーリズムと新しいディアスポラ・アイデンティティの形成のはざまで～アルメニア、イスラエルなどを例に～」
※報告内容については、第 1 部に掲載された論文を参照のこと。

第 5 回実施要領

日時 2013 年 2 月 22 日（金）午後 4 時～5 時 30 分
場所 大学院国際文化学研究科 E 棟 4 階 学術交流ルーム
講師 Karine Picot-Coupey（レンヌ第 1 大学准教授）
報告 “Understanding Growth Strategies in Retailing: From Internationalization to the Development of New Retail Formats”
※報告内容については、第 2 部に掲載された講演会概要を参照のこと。
Ⅳ． 国際ワークショップ
国際ワークショップ

（1）2013年2月6日「政治・経済・社会の劇変とEUにおけるアイデンティティ形成」

全体討論の様子：4人の報告者と司会の坂井准教授

ワークショップの報告者、討論者、司会者
左から村尾准教授、岩本教授、Raube講師、西田講師、齋藤准教授、松井研究員、Lanna准教授、坂井准教授、Vanoverbeke教授

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齋藤准教授
(2)2013年2月7日「ReC共催ベルギー研究会」

第1部

Freek Adriaens講師による発表
松井真之介研究員による発表

第2部

三田順氏による講演
ブリュッセル王立音楽院
声楽科正木裕子氏による演奏

音楽院の学生による演奏
音楽院の学生による演奏
プログラム

・趣旨

近年、EU（欧州連合）を取り巻く国際環境には大きな変動があった。一つに、地中海の対岸での「アラブの春」とその余波での大量の難民の押し寄せである。ソーシャルメディア（SNS）を用いた社会動員を背景に突き進んだ「アラブの春」を受けて、EUとしての移民政策や域内移動の自由についての見直しが迫られ、またノルウェーやフランスではイスラム原理主義者による深刻なテロ事件も起こった。もう一つはユーロ危機と欧州信用不安であり、これによりイタリア、スペイン、ギリシャ、さらにフランスでも政権交代が起こった。こうしたEU内外の大きな変動を受け、注目されるのがEU各国はこれまで通りEU自体を重視するのか、それともむしろナショナルな枠組みに閉じこもるのかということである。そして、こうしたプロセスのなかで、EU市民のアイデンティティにはどのような変化が生じているのか。

そこで本ワークショップでは、①「アラブの春」がEU市民のアイデンティティや政治意識にどのような変化をもたらしたか、②EUのあり方をめぐる議論やEU内でのアイデンティティの変容や社会動員においてもソーシャルメディアの重みが増しているのではないか、③こうしたEUにおけるアイデンティティの変化がEUの対外関係（特に地中海関係、さらには日本との関係）にどのような影響を与えているかに注目し、EUの変動について考察する。

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司会・総括
坂井一成（神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科准教授）

パネリスト

(1)Kolja Raube（ルーヴァン・カトリック大学講師 Katholieke Universiteit Leuven）
"From Crisis to Integration? – European Diversity and Identity, Transnationalism, and Institutional Change"

(2)齋藤剛（神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科准教授）
"Political Change in North Africa and Its Influence on the EU"

(3)村尾元（神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科准教授）
"Evaluating the City Characteristics through Geo-Tagged Tweets"

(4)Noemi Lanna（ナポリ東洋大学准教授 University of Naples “L’Orientale”）
"What crisis? Japan, EU and Political Change in Middle East and North Africa"
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The Crisis of the European Union

The European Union is in crisis. But the crisis of the European Union (EU) is not only an economic and fiscal crisis. As analysts and academics have pointed out, the current situation and solutions thereof resemble a larger crisis of EU integration – a crisis of all lack of public support and trust in EU institutions and actors, in their capability to provide the people with effective decision-making. Public perception of the EU is increasingly negative, while political elites do not necessarily buy into the necessity of an ever closer union; the proposed referendum of Cameron whether the UK remains in the EU being a good, but extreme example, indeed.

Hence, we face at least a two-fold problem in the EU at the moment; the one being related to an economic and fiscal crisis in parts of Europe, with large impacts on societies, austerity measures, a slowing down of economic productivity, unemployment and reduced economic demand; the other one being related to a growing skepticism of whether the European integration and related institutions and actors are able to foresee policy decisions which would improve living conditions of European societies in the future. In other words, one of the fundamental incentives of the EU project is set in question: to which extend the Union is able to serve as a framework that is perceived to be beneficial for European societies.

In this contribution to the workshop of the University of Kobe in Brussels I make the argument that crisis can be a starting-point for further integration. While building this argument on ideas by Hartmut Kaelble (2005) and – more recently – Timothy Garton Ash (2012), I argue that the crisis of the EU can be seen as a chance to reflect upon a couple of options how the EU could be understood in order to move the integration process forward.

On the one hand, I show that the current crisis has underlined diversities in the EU. While in the past ‘unity in diversity’ served as a phrase to justify the diversities within a homogenizing EU (see Kaelble 2009), this positive notion of ‘diversity in unity’ seems to have come under attack. Currently, diversity in the EU is seen more and more not only as a threat to the integration project, but to European individuals and societies at-large, especially in view of their ability to maintain and progress their conditions of life. As a consequence, the question on the benefit of the integration process is often linked to material objectives. The question “What’s in it for me?”, as Joseph Weiler recently argued, implies a reduction of the European project to the “measurable”, leaving out those aspects of the project which are of added-value to European societies, but simply uncountable (2012). Overall, diversity in Europe is not only resembled in how differently citizens feel attached to the EU in times of crisis, but also how different they feel from others, and whether they are willing to cooperate with other people and societies in the future.

On the other hand, I argue that if we want to take the crisis as a starting point for further integration this would mean to understand if, despite all diversity, integration is a viable concept for further integration. In this regard, it is necessary to outline some options how the EU could be understood if the crisis was a perceived as a starting point for further integration. In the remainder of
this contribution I will argue that such an understanding of the EU could, *inter alia*, be linked to a) an understanding of the EU as a space of transnational interactions and interdependence, b) an understanding of the EU in which diversity and difference are a normality and of added-value rather than a state-of-affair that needs to be overcome, c) an understanding of the future European integration as a deliberative choice, including institutional changes, between what Jürgen Habermas recently called “executive federalism” and “transnational democracy”. It is, amongst others, these three understandings of the EU that impact on presenting the crisis as a starting-point for further integration.

Diversity and the perception of the European Union in times of crisis

The European Union has a famous motto: “Unity in Diversity”. Adopted in 2000, it is essentially about two inseparable and competing aspects of the EU. While unity points to the coming together and the united achievements of European societies, diversity points to the fact that European societies remain essentially different. The motto obviously underlines the need for both – unity and diversity – in the course of European integration. The concept of diversity is a concept that has sharpened the awareness for the EU’s own plurality. Indeed, as Calder and Ceva argue “dealing with diversity has become a familiar part of institutional practice in the public sphere, just as it has become more prominent in legislation. Attention to the questions it raises has become more and more important in public life. The European Union slogan ‘United in Diversity’ reflects this importance.” (Calder and Ceva 2011: 1). European integration theories have often seen integration as a synonymous process to fusion, cohesion and convergence (Mair/Zielonka 2002: 2).

As a concept, diversity is essential to understand that the EU is not only about commonalities, but that there is an inherent cultural, historical, political, legal, economic plurality in the EU, that continues to be shaped by diverse European societies. Overall, diversity rather points to the underlying diverse structures of the EU. For instance, diversity is essentially about Europe’s diverse social stratification (Mau/Verwiebe 2010), diverse legal and political institutions, diverse economic and financial markets (Zielonka 2005). As Landfried has pointed out: “diversity describes [solely] the existing structural differentiation within a society and between societies.” (Landfried 2011: 20) And, indeed, diverse structures matter, as after the last large enlargement round the structure of European society presents itself as more diverse than before (Mair/Zielonka 2002; Zielonka 2005).

Diversity can also change over time. As EU enlargement shows, diversity within the EU and diversity of European societies and member states can change. Institutional changes, following the “diversity logic” (Mair/Zielonka 2002), can lead to an increased diversity within the multi-level institutional structure of the EU (Zielonka 2005). One obvious example is the Council setting in the European Union where – after the last enlargement – the intake of new member states led to the representation of 27 member state governments. In the case of foreign policy, the structural differentiation increased not only based on the new formal representation of Eastern European countries, but also because of the increase of structural representation of pro-transatlantic views in EU foreign policy.

The European public-debt and economic crisis has made diversities come to the fore. European economies are highly intertwined through transnational economic and capital business; but
European economies and societies at-large are affected asymmetrically by the crisis. This is not only clear in front of the sheer numbers of, for example, unemployment rates and economic growth across EU Member States. Also the effects of the EU’s emergency measures (austerity) to counter-act and to avoid the failure of the European Monetary Union (EMU) have impacted upon European societies in different ways, with Greece being the most radical example.

While in the past ‘unity in diversity’ served as a phrase to justify the diversities within a homogenizing EU (see Kaelble 2009), this positive notion of ‘diversity in unity’ seems to have come under attack. Currently, diversity in the EU is seen more and more seen not only as a threat to the integration project, but to individuals and societies at-large regarding the ability to maintain and progress their conditions of life. Protesters in Greece show their disagreement with the overall austerity measures, identifying German Chancellor Merkel as being responsible for the enforced austerity measures and the worsening of their social conditions. On the other hand, Germans express in their public debates their prejudice against the way “Südeuropäer” (“South-Europeans”) run their public households, fearing that the interdependent relationship between the “South” and the “North” will lead to less economic progression in the future.

Figure 1: Copy from Eurobarometer 78, 2012

Eurobarometer findings show in the first place that indeed the perception of the economic situation by citizens and the personal problems that citizens face differs according to countries of
origin. Germans still see the economic situation as “in total good” by 75%, while 99% of the Greek respondents state the situation is “in total bad”. Germans see by 37% that government debt is the most important thing that they face currently, whereas Greek people see by 66% that the unemployment is the most important issue. Moreover, the Eurobarometer findings of 2012 show that in times of crisis European citizens do not see themselves connected to other citizens in Europe (see Eurobarometer 78, 2012).

At the same time that diversity is reinforced during the crisis, the question of how the integration process benefits citizens has become more and more a questions of material benefits. The question “What’s in it for me?” implies to reduce the European project to the “measurable”, leaving out those aspects of the project which are off added-value to European societies, but simply uncountable (Weiler 2012). Overall, diversity in Europe is not only resembled by the question how much citizens feel attached to the EU and “European” in times of crisis, but also by how different they feel from others, and whether they are willing to cooperate with the other in the future.

The trust in European institutions, as the Eurobarometer surveys show, has steadily declined in the EU on average. In 2007, the EU saw a peak at 57% of respondents stating that they trusted the EU on average. In 2012, five years later, only 33% tend to trust it. Likewise the “positive image” of the European Union has lost support. In 2006, the EU was said to have an overall positive image (50%), while it came down to an ever-low 30% in 2012 (see figure 2). The negative image of the EU has however increased throughout time, almost meeting the positive image with 29% in 2012 (see figure 2). In other words, there is some evidence that, if not skepticism in integration, it is a less positive and more and more negative image that the EU has to face amongst its EU citizens.

Overall, the reinforced diversity in the EU seems to coincide with an overall less and less persuasive integration process that would in theory have to balance between on the one hand homogeneity and diversity on the other hand. For the moment, ever more homogeneous EU (austerity) policies and increasing diversity seem to foster questions of “what’s in for me?” on all sides, while at the same time the overall trust in the EU is decreasing.
Given these sketches on diversity, a lack of trust in EU institution, a darkening picture of the EU, there is the question whether European integration will be seen as a necessity and something in the future. Next to the findings shown above, Eurobarometer (EB) data also shows that overall EU-Europeans see “more” coordination of Member States as the most likely step to respond to crisis. 85% of EB-respondents agree that the crisis will foster more coordination amongst Member States (see EB 78, 2012). In other words, while it is far from clear that EU integration will be favored in the future, coordination is seen as unavoidable in times of crisis.

In this perspective, the crisis might not only be seen as an end, but rather as a new beginning for European integration, a starting point for integration after the crisis. But how can the crisis be seen as a starting point for further integration?

Understanding of the crisis as a starting-point for further integration

In this regard, it is necessary to outline options how the EU could be understood if the crisis was a perceived as a starting point for further integration. I will focus on three conditions of how to understand the EU, which are not meant to be exhaustive in nature. I will argue that our understanding of the crisis as a starting point, is, inter alia, dependent of a) an understanding of the EU as a space of transnational interactions and interdependence, b) an understanding of the EU in which diversity and difference are a normality and of added-value rather than a state-of-affair that needs to be overcome, c) an understanding of the future European integration as a deliberative choice, including institutional changes, between, for example, what Jürgen Habermas recently called “executive federalism” and “transnational democracy”.

It is, amongst others, these three understandings of the EU that might impact on presenting the crisis as a starting-point for further integration.

Understanding the EU as a space of transnational interactions and interdependence

Transnationalism is at the heart of the crisis, but it can also be seen as part and parcel of an understanding of European integration that sees the EU project as a tool to facilitate ever more transnational interests. 

Transnationalism can be understood as cross-border-activities in which actors are non-governmental actors (see Keohane/Nye 1974, Hurrelmann 2010). Europe as a common social space of transnational daily activities has emerged only since the Mid 20th century (Kaelble 1997). The process of transnationalisation “expands the scope of cross-border exchanges, transnational socialization and policy transfer below the EU level” (Kaiser/Starie 2001: 1). In the EU, transnationalism is encouraging Europeanization to take shape through horizontal transnationalism (top-down between EU institutions and transnational actors) and vertical transnationalism (pan-European transnational actors). In short, transnationalism facilitates a drive for an ever-more unity of European decisions and rules.

Obviously, transnational dynamics can be both seen as factors having a vital role in the building up and creation of the crisis. But rather than providing an explanation of the crisis, I take it as a given and argue that transnational activities can also be seen as being very much at the heart of overcoming crisis. Pointing to studies of Fligstein, but also Mau/Verwiebe (2009), who address the
link between experiencing Europe and impacts upon your European identities, I suggest to think about networks of transnational activities, like the increasing transnational mobility and economic interactions Europe, as factors that impact not only on how individuals perceive Europe, but also on the direction of European integration at large.

“Transnationalism from below”, the involvement in transnational activities and the experiences thereof, matter with regards to the understanding of the EU. At the same time, it has been argued that “transnationalism from above means the intensification of international exchange relationships created by nation-states, international and supranational organizations, as well as internationally acting corporations, but also by international financial and product markets.” (Mau 2010: 24) The EU is both a space of and facilitator of transnational action. These transnational interactions have created an ever denser web of interactions which create interdependencies amongst European societies. Moreover, transnational interaction impacted upon interdependencies of between the EU and the world. For example, the EU’s Neighbourhood – both to the East and the South – is linked to the EU through all sorts of transnational interactions. The EU’s external action is especially required when transnational activities underpin the interdependent relations between the EU and the rest of the world.

According to the above said, understanding the crisis as a starting-point implies to put transnationalism into the centre of providing arguments why integration matters. In a similar way that transnationalism has helped academics to escape “methodological nationalism” and start thinking about societal developments and interactions in the direction of one “European society”, it may help underlining and understanding why further integration matters for the EU and European societies, which both have become part of ever closer webs of transnational relationships.

Understanding of the EU made of diversity and difference

At the same time that transnationalism is likely to serve with arguments to understand why “more Europe” is necessary; we have to understand the complexities of diversity within Europe and possibilities to manage differences within the EU.

Diversity does not equal difference (Landfried 2011). The basic argument in this is that whereas diversity is overly concerned with structural diversification (see Landfried above); only difference brings diversity to the fore in times of dissent. However, if the EU is keen to put its logo “Unity in diversity” into place, then it needs to provide space for differences to be articulated. Difference is activated by actors or institutional actors: Actors need make claims that clearly distinguish them from others. It is that gap, that opens in times of conflict and dissent between them and others, that can be identified as difference. Rather than avoiding this gap, I would argue that it is essential to communicate differences within the European Union in times of crisis and beyond. This however implies that the EU provides arenas where difference can be articulated. The lack of one common public sphere in the EU is clearly detrimental in that regard. Today, differences on European issues are mainly, if at all, articulated in many national public spheres. While a politicization of European issues pushes the relevance of EU topics, they are predominantly articulated in national public spheres.

In a normative variant of the concept of difference, it has been argued that the EU in an effort to live up to is motto “unity in diversity” needs to take difference seriously (Beck 2009;
Beck/Grande 2004; Beck/Grande 2007; Grande 2011; Landfried 2005; 2006; 2011). Difference needs to be accepted and recognized within the EU (Beck 2009: 605), because any further integration will only be carried out if difference is sufficiently recognized in EU legislation and integration steps (Beck/Grande 2007). It seems that a lot of frustration within European societies with EU decisions during the crisis stems from the fact that differences were not perceived to be dealt with in a communicative, transparent and inclusive way. For the EU it matters that in times of crisis and enforced diversity differences are seen as a normality, in fact an added-value. Based on the idea that differences can matter in a positive way, differences should in fact become embedded in a communicative, transparent and inclusive way. The EU, but also its Member States’ settings should provide institutions where such a way of dealing with differences can be handled. As EB findings show, Europeans still feel disconnected from each other. If the EU wants to provide arguments for why ‘unity in diversity’ matters, it should manage dealing with differences in most open ways.

Understanding future European integration as a deliberative choice

Jürgen Habermas has lately pointed out that the institutional choice for Europe is one between ‘executive federalism’ and ‘transnational democracy’ (2012). Rather than making a point for the one or the other choice, I would share the notion that there needs to be explicit institutional choices for the further integration process to be made. The reason is that the permissive consensus amongst governmental elites which basically has driven the European integration process for most of its existence seems to have come to an end.

Over time executives in the European Union have increasingly increased their powers, e.g. the European Council, which has made academics argue that the EU is a political system of “executive federalism” (Dann 2010). In other words, the EU is a shared-sovereignty arrangement (federalism) in which executives (national governments and the Commission as a supranational executive institution) have increasingly become central forces in European decision-making. Indeed, ad hoc decisions by the European Council during the financial and public debt crisis have shown how powerful executives are in the EU these days (see Dinan 2012). At the same time, we have also seen that the European Parliament has extended its powers over time in the European integration process (Rittberger 2003), providing us with the argument that the EU has also gone through a parliamentarisation process over time, culminating in the Lisbon Treaty.

Making the case for the crisis as a starting point for integration cannot be built on the permissive consensus any longer. Rather, institutional choices for the integration process should be deliberate. There must be a choice. If European citizens were to make a choice for further integration, institutional choices have to follow. Sovereignty-sharing, delimitation of powers, executive federalism and supranational democracy are but a few choices that can be foreseen.

A first government leader has recently announced to pose the question whether EU membership should come to an end in a public referendum. In order to have a fruitful debate about the future of European integration, that both takes into account a deliberate choice about institutional choices and the need to manage difference in Europe, it seems to be problematic that this debate will mainly be made in one Member State alone. There should be a Europe-wide debate on the institutional choices Europe wants to take. A referendum on the question “in or out” is simply
oversimplifying. All the institutional choices – including the choices to rethink or enhance common internal and external policies – need to be re-discussed. It has been argued elsewhere that another Convention on the Future of Europe, bringing together various national and European stakeholders, could be an alternative option to search for a new institutional choice which would also represent the needs of European citizens. There are good reasons to believe that such a method to re-constitute the EU is necessary to push a Europe-wide debate, to think about transnationalism, to take differences seriously, and to make a deliberate institutional choice for Europe.

Conclusion

In this brief paper, I have argued that currently the European crisis can be seen as a starting point for further integration. I have argued that transnational needs, the recognition of manifold differences and the deliberate option for an institutional choice could be taken into account if we are to understand the crisis as a starting point for further integration.

When looking at the EU’s external relations, especially its relations with the Southern Neighborhood (but with other parts of the world, too), it becomes evident that the world is not waiting for the EU to act. While external threats and global development might push the EU to integrate, it depends upon European societies to decide whether they are willing to share a common destiny in the future. One way of doing this is to think about how they want to balance transnational needs, diversities and differences.

Literature


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Reflections on Political Change in North Africa and Its Influence on the European Union

Tsuyoshi Saito *

Introduction

Behind the theme of the international workshop, “European Identity in Political, Economic and Social Changes,” there is an awareness that the international environment surrounding the European Union has experienced dramatic change in recent decades. In their prospectus, the organizers of the workshop invoke symbolic examples such as the boom in immigrants from North Africa to Europe after the so-called Arab Spring, and serious outbreaks of terrorism in Norway and France¹. Undoubtedly, terrorism and illegal immigration are serious and intriguing issues that the European Union must deal with in order to preserve its security and identity. European societies seem to consider Middle Eastern societies as hotbeds of terror and illegal immigration, especially after the events of September 11, 2001, and the emergence of the Arab Spring at the end of 2010. Thus, awareness of the issues provoked in this workshop on European identity has significant relevance for understanding the influence of the Arab Spring on the European Union. With this understanding, I was assigned the theme, “Political Change in North Africa and Its Influence on the European Union.”

However, what kinds of changes has the Arab Spring brought in terms of the identity and political consciousness of EU citizens? Further, in the first place, is it possible to grasp current drastic sociopolitical changes in various Middle Eastern countries as a monolithic phenomenon that influences the European Union as a whole? Is it not necessary to take into consideration both the diversity of emerging forms of the phenomenon known as the Arab Spring, and the interaction between each movement spreading across Middle Eastern countries, before analyzing its influence on the European Union? Furthermore, should we not pay deliberate attention to the particular perspectives that we use to comprehend the Arab Spring? In other words, even if we use the term Arab Spring only for convenience, should we not avoid overlooking the importance of the diversity of the phenomenon? Moreover, does exclusively connecting the Arab Spring with current problems facing the European Union not pose a danger of differentiating the European Union and the Middle East as intrinsically different entities, culturally and socially, which will result in over-emphasizing the threat and menace? Thus, is it not true that simplifying diverse sociopolitical movements in various Middle Eastern countries into the singular concept of the Arab Spring, and in turn regarding this as a threat to the European Union, becomes a discourse reproducing a representation of the Middle East that Edward Said once rebuked as “Orientalism?”

Based on an awareness of this problem, I slightly modified the title proposed by the organizer to “Reflections on Political Change in North Africa and Its Influence on the European Union” in order to restate our problem. Thus, I will shed light on how the Arab Spring influences, in an epistemological sense, European perception of Middle Eastern countries and Islam, instead of arguing directly that the Arab Spring influences the European Union in sociopolitical dimensions.

In the first section, I look at the historical and spatial context for clues to reexamining some

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characteristics of the perspective on the Arab Spring. I will provisionally distinguish between the long-term, mid-term, and short-term perspectives for demonstrating the importance of comprehending the Arab Spring from a long-term perspective, and of emphasizing the danger of understanding the phenomenon only in terms of current affairs. Regarding “the spatial context,” concern about the influence of globalization on local societies is currently increasing; however, it seems that nationalism is in the process of being reconfigured in relation to the spread of globalization. Thus, it is indispensable to understand the dialectic relationship between the local and the global. Such an understanding also holds true in the case of the Arab Spring, which means that elucidating the influence of political change in North Africa on the European Union requires diverse analyses of the interconnection between trends in transnational, national, and local societies and networks.

In the second section, I briefly overview some characteristics of the Arab Spring that previous studies have focused on in order to deepen our understandings on their tendencies.

Based on these understandings, I will address the case of Morocco in the third section. Because of the lack of drastic transition in its political order, Morocco seems not to have been paid much attention thus far, compared to other countries such as Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen. However, this does not mean that Morocco has been immune to the influence of the Arab Spring. Rather, the monarchy has been engaged in creating countermeasures while applying various “global standards” in their new policy intended to stabilize the Moroccan socio-political climate. At the same time, demonstrators inspired by the Tunisian “Jasmine Revolution” have made various demands while not only appropriating idioms, vocabularies, and concepts that are widely circulated in the contemporary globalized environment, but also concepts and ideas produced in the process of colonial policy. These facts illustrate that current sociopolitical trends evoked by the outbreak of the Arab Spring have been driven both by appropriating concepts, such as human rights, democracy, and freedom, and by reconfiguring the colonial legacy to contemporary contexts. Explicating these points, I will claim that the interrelation between the Arab Spring and the European Union should be explored as a complex dialectical process of configuration with the participation of various socio-political actors in the milieu, and that it is too simplistic to see only the influence of the Arab Spring on the European Union.

I Temporal and Spatial Frameworks for Understanding the Arab Spring

After the outbreak of the Arab Spring in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and the severe conflicts in Libya, many people fled from the southern coast of the Mediterranean to its northern coast. It is not difficult to admit that such an enormous influx of immigrants and refugees to the EU zone raises questions about the nature of the Arab Spring and its influence on the EU. However, if we are trying to elucidate characteristics of the Arab Spring, we should also undoubtedly take into account the timing of when it occurred. In order to deepen our understanding of the Arab Spring, it is also necessary to situate Middle Eastern countries’ political-economic situations in a broader historical context. In this section, I will first provisionally pose three temporal divisions (the “long-term,” “mid-term,” and “short-term” perspectives) that will help us to discern the importance of situating the Arab Spring in broader historical contexts. I will then address three types of networks that can deepen our understanding of how local, national, and global societies are intertwined.
1. Temporal Scopes

First, the long-term perspective can provide an understanding of the Arab Spring as a phenomenon formed in broader historical contexts that extend as far back as colonialism. This perspective sees the contemporary political order in the Middle East as a consequence of colonial rule, in that, it was colonial power that provided the basis for national orders for the various nation states in the Middle East (Itagaki 2012, Usuki 2011). According to this perspective, seeing many Middle Eastern countries’ political order as authoritarianism and criticizing their current political situations as undemocratic can overlook the fact that authoritarian regimes are themselves historical products invented by the western colonial powers. According to this understanding, people’s struggle in the Arab Spring to achieve democratization is invalu ably precious; however, we should also make sure not to solely satisfy ourselves by criticizing the authoritarian regime, for such recognition will reproduce representations of the Middle East that essentialize difference between western countries and the Middle East, and situate the latter behind the former.

The second perspective, the mid-term perspective, focuses on the period from the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War. In the Middle East, there are two crucial points that we should not dismiss here in relation to our later argument. The period coincides with the diffusion of Arab nationalism as a political ideology for nation state building. At the same time, the period is marked by the Iranian Revolution (1979), during which the Pahlavi dynasty, which had been considered an exemplar following Western modernization, was overthrown. The Iranian Revolution has been seen in western countries as a religious resurgence that went against the modernization and secularization of the time. As E. Said vividly explicates in his work, Covering Islam, various media at that time produced and circulated news that emphasized the fanatic aspects of the Revolution (Said 1981). This period thus corresponds to the rise of nationalism in the Middle East, and of religious resurgence not just in the Middle East but also in other areas. In western countries, concerns about Islam and controversy over its merit have been widespread. In general, Islam has been seen as an obstacle for the integration of immigrants into European society where western cultural values are dominant.

Finally, the short-term perspective covers the period since the end of the Cold War, as determined by the collapse of the Soviet Union and socialist countries. During this period, the Gulf War broke out (1991), and the controversy around the wearing of the headscarf in the public domain culminated in France (1989). Further, the events of September 11 shocked the world. What followed was the development of the “War on Terror,” initiated by the U.S. government, under G. W. Bush’s direction, and the U.K. government, directed by T. Blair, to eliminate the fear provoked by al-Qaida’s terrorism. What we should notice is the fact that terror becomes a convenient word to rebuke anti-establishment sentiment (Kuroki 2002), which means the potential fears of Islam and Muslims acquire a new mode of expression in the political dimension. Islamophobia has also emerged in various countries, and some incidents, such as a cartoon satirizing the prophet Muhammad, or a film creating negative images of the prophet, provoked massive demonstrations, reproach, and violent reactions not just in European countries but also in Middle Eastern countries. Such collisions seemed to reinforce the negative image of Islam, and later became one of the factors that produced the positive evaluation of the Arab Spring that seemed, from the beginning, to keep its distance from religiosity.
Simultaneously, satellite TV broadcasting stations such as al-Jazeera and MBC have been
avoiding state censorship and have become popular among people living in Middle Eastern countries
(Eickelman and Anderson 1999). These stations allow people to access information and participate
in various public discussions that offer them a way to demand the introduction of democratization,
freedom of expression, and human rights to Middle Eastern countries. Moreover, many people in
Middle Eastern countries have experienced the advent of new communication technologies, such as
mobile phones and the Internet, especially since 2000² (Ilahiane 2009). It has been said that these
new communication technologies accelerate the exchange of ideas and thoughts among people,
facilitate the construction of informal transnational networks, and shape a new worldwide discursive
space.

2. Entanglements in Transnational Networks and States

The previous section provided us with a historical background of the Arab Spring, discerned the
importance of comprehending the phenomenon from a long-term perspective, and recognized the
general tendency of Western societies to negatively evaluate the Middle East and Islam in the latter
half of the twentieth century, which paved the way for the reverse—a particularly positive
expectation and evaluation of the Arab Spring.

It is noteworthy to briefly consider what symbolizes the new aspects of the Arab Spring
compared with the former social movements in the Middle East. These would include the diffusion
of unofficial transnational networks on the basis of the emergence of new technologies and social
media, represented by the Internet, cellular and smartphones, and satellite TV broadcasts that have
marked the advent of the age of globalization; they facilitate the exchange of information, ideas, and
the creation of connections beyond state borders.

However, not only did the unofficial networks of the “ordinary people” or the youth express
their interest in building a transnational relationship to strengthen their stability, but the nation-states
did so as well. Many countries have collaborated to form new alliances in reaction to the domestic
problems they experienced. For instance, Saudi Arabia invited not only Jordan but also Morocco to
the conservative regional organization known as the Gulf Cooperation Council of the Arab States
(GCC), in order to reinforce their ties, regardless of the fact that Morocco is geographically quite
distant from the Gulf region.

Thus, as the Japanese political scientist Sakai Keiko recently indicated, one can distinguish
three “layers” that were crucial in the network formations in the Arab Spring: (1) transnational
organizations founded on the basis of nation-states, such as the United Nations, the European Union,
Arab League, and GCC; (2) nation-states; and (3) transnational networks of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and other networks that are not necessarily based on a nation-state framework
(Sakai 2012). Transnational networks are formed on the basis of both the unit, that is, the
nation-state, and the associations and networks that have no direct basis on or relation to the
nation-state. The case of the GCC shows that pressures arising from the Arab Spring protests forced

² The estimated number of Moroccan internet users in 2000 was 200,000, whereas, the number reached as high as
10,300,000 in 2008 (The World Data Bank 2011). If we take into consideration the fact that Morocco approximately
had a population of 31.9 millions in 2010 (Royaume du Maroc 2010: 2), the rapid increase of the number of internet
users is obviously remarkable.
states to redefine their cooperation with other states and to reformulate the concept of areas.

Thus, the diffusion of unofficial transnational networks, which are estimated to surpass the control of the nation-state, has also resulted in the reinforcement of the framework of the nation-state. If we attempt to explore the influence of the Arab Spring on the European Union, the policy and sociocultural background of each state should be taken into consideration in this context. As I mentioned earlier, only analyzing the influence of the Arab Spring as a whole on the sociopolitical dimensions is insufficient. Following this introduction, in section 3, I will consider the case of Morocco to elucidate the interrelationships of social movements evoked by the Arab Spring, the state’s response, and the influence of Western ideas on the discourses applied by the state during social movements.

II Characteristics Noticed in the Arab Spring

The massive sociopolitical change in the Middle East triggered by the “Jasmin Revolution” of Tunisia is still in the on-going process, and it is difficult to expect the future of various countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. However, if one reflects on these two years, one can admit that there are some preferred subjects and perspectives for the arguments on the Arab Spring.

To deepen understanding on the phenomena, the media and studies seem to have focused their attention on the following points: (1) the critical role of the people, especially the youth, in movements and demonstrations; (2) the use of the social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and mobile phones, to organize networks and demonstrations and to shape public opinion and escape suppression by authorities; (3) the concerns on transnational networks; (4) the understanding that Middle Eastern countries are in political transition from authoritarian regimes to more democratic political order; (5) the distance from religiosity—that is to say, those points are associated with nonreligious, secular movements that will not lead to results such as the Iranian Revolution in 1979. One can admit a trace of such understanding even in the arguments on “post-Islamism” that interpret the influence of Islamism as diminished, and state that we have entered into the new era—(6) nonviolence in various movements, although there are exceptions in Libya, Syria, and Yemen; and (7) precaution against Islamic political parties that have become the ruling power after elections3.

In these respects, one can suppose that the Arab Spring is comprehended in its most ideal sense, in that the people and the youth will realize “democratization” by using nonviolent demonstrations in the Middle Eastern countries where authoritarian regimes have suppressed citizens’ voices, freedom of expression, and human rights. As a reaction to such an expectation toward the democratization of the Middle Eastern countries from the secular standpoint, the remarkable progress of Islamist political parties is seen as a potentially dangerous symptom. At the same time, with the encouragement from the people and the youth to self-sacrifice for democratization in opposition to an authoritarian regime, the fact that those regimes have been shaped and preserved by western countries’ support becomes invisible in public discourse.

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III Morocco and the Arab Spring

Morocco and the Arab Spring

Morocco, geographically situated at the far-western part of North Africa, is a constitutional monarchy. It has been under the reign of King Mohammed VI, who was enthroned in 1999. After the outbreak of the massive demonstration in Tunisia in December 2010, the “Jasmine Revolution,” Moroccan youth have called for demonstrations by using Facebook to diffuse their requests. The sociopolitical movement is named after the date of their demonstration, the “February 20th Movement”.4 Many people, not only men but also women, not only youth but also middle-aged persons gathered with various demands, such as the abolition of corruption, countermeasures against unemployment, the creation of new employment, the reinforcement of women’s rights, the release of political offenders from prison, the admission of stricter religious observance, and the official recognition of the language of the Amazigh (Berber) people, who have been known in recent years as an indigenous people, a minority in the North Africa, as an official national language.

The king and the royal palace quickly responded to these various demands in an attempt to calm down the demonstrations by delivering an official speech promising to change the government and to deal with the problems raised in the demonstration. The official speech by the king was made on March 2011, only a month after the formation of the 20th February Movement. After the public speech, in 2011, a general election was conducted in September after the dissolution of the national assembly, and the Amendment of the Constitution was determined by the plebiscite. The government also made a campaign to diminish unemployment and attempted to raise the salary of the public servants. Further, the Amazigh language acquired official recognition as an official Moroccan language. As for the results of the general election, the Islamic political party obtained overwhelming number of votes, and became a leading party5.

The 20th February Movement continues to organize demonstrations regularly in numerous cities; however, two years have passed since the outbreak of the first demonstration in Tunisia, and the numbers of the people who participate in the demonstrations are decreasing.

Thus, although Morocco shares the experience of the Arab Spring with other countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and so forth, Morocco’s current situation is different from other major countries that have experienced drastic socio-political change in these years. One of the major reasons is that the monarch has succeeded in demonstrating their will to respond to the various demands of citizens.

Furthermore, Moroccans have experienced changes in their everyday lives, from the last years of the late King Hassan II. After the enthronement of the King Mohammed VI, known as the “king of the poor” (al-malik al-miskin), various political and economic reforms have been initiated. Such endeavors and the popular image of the king among the people show clear contrast with the policy and image of the late king, who was known to use the power of the state to suppress the “rebels” and other political oppositions. The reign of King Mohammed VI has reached the 15th year, and it seems that Moroccans feel the differences between these two kings. Such experiences have

4 For more detailed accounts of the February 20th Movement, see Beurdeley (2012).
worked as factors that keep many people away from participating in the demonstrations.

Considering these points, it becomes clear that it is essential to understand the background of the Arab Spring according to each nation-state’s short-term and mid-term contexts. In the next section, I will take up the case of the Amazigh movement that has determined the Amazigh people as an indigenous group in North Africa and demanded the rights of language, education, and resources from the state.

Amazigh Movement in Morocco

The Amazigh movement has been formed under the particular sociopolitical climate that followed the independence of Morocco in 19566. At that time, Morocco’s most important problem was the need to achieve the national integrity to overcome the legacy of French colonialism and its ethnic policy, which differentiated ethnic groups and tribes to weaken the force of anticolonial movements. Thus, after the advent of the new nation-state, “Moroccanization” and “Arabization” became the most urgent foci of the Moroccan people. However, in parallel with Arabization, the use of the Berber languages (known as dialects at that time) in the public domains was strictly forbidden. At the same time, many Berbers had fled from their homeland in the countryside seeking jobs in the urban setting. Such urbanization led to the loss of customs and traditions among the younger generations, and the crisis for the preservation of their mother tongue, the Berber. Some activists launched associations for the preservation of cultures, customs, and languages in the late 1960s.

However, this movement did not gain popularity until the official recognition was made by the late King Hassan II, which was announced through a TV broadcast in three major Berber dialects. After the enthronement in 1999, King Mohammed VI recognized the Amazigh culture (using the word Amazigh to follow the determination made by the activists) in 2001 as one of the authentic Moroccan cultures. The king admitted the creation of the Institut Royal de la Culture Amazigh (IRCAM), and initiated the teaching of the Amazigh language in public schools. With that national support, the Amazigh movement started to acquire popularity.

In addition to these domestic factors, the global context has also been important for the development of the Amazigh movement. From the establishment of the first Amazigh association in Morocco, Moroccan Amazigh activists have had a relationship with the Amazigh activists from Kabyle, an Amazigh linguistic group from Algeria. The Kabyle-Amazigh activists who had immigrated to France have their base both in France and Algeria. Further, in parallel with the increase of the world-wide concerns on indigenous populations in the 1990s, a Moroccan Amazigh association sent their representative as an observer to participate in the Working Groups on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) of the United Nations (UN). Such associations have strong desires to form alliances with the associations of indigenous populations of other regions. That is to say, the Amazigh movement has formed a transnational network by using international organizations such as the UN to draw international attention to their demands and to apply pressure on the state.

What we should take into consideration, in addition to such usage of transnational networks to appeal their demands, is that their self-recognition is based on the academic and administrative results of the French colonial rule. French ethnic policy was based on the differentiation of the Arab

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from the Berber to fulfill the aim to “divide and rule.” Such differentiation was legitimatized by the academic research that ensured that the Berbers were seen as the first people who lived in the region before the first arrival of the Arabs in the seventh century, which means that the Berbers are Muslims who superficially converted to Islam. Thus, the Berbers are kept away from the Arabs who have stronger affinity with Islam. Discourses aiming at overcoming the pressure of Arabization and reclaiming rights have often been applied by the Amazigh activists in the contemporary context.

Self-recognition based on the ethnic policy and the particular point of view on the ethnic group published as academic contributions in the colonial era now have acquired new idioms and appearances for their expressions and representation, such as their being indigenous persons, which will support the subjectification of their existence as a collected subject whose preservation is “politically correct” in the global contexts.

Thus, the Moroccan Amazigh movement has developed with the involvement of transnational networks of associations and international organizations represented by the UN, and by attracting public attention in Western countries by using idioms that are familiar to Westerners. The outbreak of the Arab Spring, which is supposed to be characterized by democratization and nonreligiousness, was a golden opportunity for the Amazigh activists to enlarge their requests, and they have succeeded in gaining the recognition of the Amazigh language as an official national language.

Concluding Remarks

I have so far tried to illustrate the characteristics and meaning of the Arab Spring in general, with reference to the case of Moroccan and the Moroccan Amazigh movement in particular. In my concluding remarks, I will indicate several points that we can learn from the argument.

First, taking up the Amazigh movement as a case, the appropriation of academic contributions and the legacy of colonial policies to form the identity and legitimatize the demand for their rights as an indigenous/minority group in the Arab Spring show clearly that we should not narrow our scope for understanding what is going on in this new sociopolitical change. Rather, we should see how people are trying to appropriate various idioms and concepts to reconfigure their collected identities to adjust to the changing world contexts, and to appeal to the international, national, and local contexts.

Second, we can acknowledge that the movements, in using transnational networks and seeking to participate into the global context to diffuse their voices, are in fact strongly regulated by the nation, or by the state. Using transnational networks and gaining backup from international organizations, the Amazigh movement poses their demands to the state. At the same time, they are concentrated on improving the situation within Morocco, that is to say, within the state, without paying too much concern on the improvement of the situation of the Amazigh people in the other countries. The state also takes advantage of approving various rights claimed by the Amazigh movement to show internationally their concerns on the indigenous/minority group.

Third, concerning the theme of the self-recognition of EU citizens written in the prospectus, the current concerns on the Arab Spring seem to trace, principally, previous concerns on Islam and the Middle East at the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution, and the emergence of the Islamic resurgence, or “Islamic fundamentalism.” Focusing on the “nonreligious,” “nonviolent”
demonstration by the youth, the advent of democratization in the Middle Eastern countries has been expected in the Western countries. However, it becomes more and more clear that the Arab Spring is not a short-term phenomenon but an ongoing process that is allowing the emergence of the Islamist political party as a ruling party elected through democratic ways. In seeing these trends in various countries, the initial positive evaluations on the Arab Spring seem to be changed into worry about the diffusion of the religious influence in the Middle East. However, if we follow such a way of understanding we will reproduce the differentiation of self and other that originated previously. In reverting back to the apparently convenient categories of differentiation of, for example, religions and ethnic groups, what is at stake is our understanding of the new phenomena.

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Evaluating the City Characteristics through Geo-Tagged Tweets

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Abstract
We try to evaluate the city characteristics from emotional expressions in texts on the net which are posted at the city. An emotional dictionary developed at WordNet Affect[1] project is used to extract emotional states from them. We have tested the proposed method on three cities in U.S.A. and two cities in U.K. Principal component analysis (PCA) has been used to investigate the difference of characteristics between the cities.

1 Introduction
Evaluating and clarifying the city characteristic is very important for city development. Clear unique characteristics attract people and which vitalize the city. Political, economic, and social activities in the city cannot neglect the characteristics. In general, the city characteristic is evaluated from environmental, economic, and social point of view. However, we think it is also valuable to identify the city characteristic from the impression of the city by people living there.

To gather people’s impression of a city, we utilize the internet instead of doing questionnaires. That is, we collect texts on the internet which are posted at the city and extract emotional expressions. It must be investigated further but we believe that how many and what kind of emotional expression are included in those texts is related to people’s impression of the city.

Nowadays, there are several ways to exchange texts on the internet like Facebook, Twitter, etc. In many services, users can add location information where the texts are sent from. We can use any of them but here choose Twitter. There are studies trying to utilize Twitter in a similar way to our studies, where Twitter is treated as social sensors to detect emergent events like earthquake [2, 3].

Collected text from the internet out from a city are divided into words. Each of them are then looked up in an emotional dictionary to find corresponding emotional states. Finally, we can obtain a list of emotional states with occurrence frequency. By which we define the characteristics of the city.

2 Employed Techniques
2.1 Twitter
Twitter is a social networking service (SNS) created in 2006 where users can send and receive text-based messages called ‘tweets’ of up to 140 characters. Users can attach geolocation tags to tweets when sending them from GPS-enabled devices like smartphones. By using it, we can specify the location where the tweets are sent from.

There is a report saying that only 4.83% out of all tweets are geo-tagged[4]. However, Twitter has over 500 million registered users as of 2012, generating over 340 million tweets per day. 4.83% of 340 million tweets per day are not small.

To collect public tweets from the specific area, we can use application programming interfaces (APIs) officially provided from Twitter service. ‘Public tweets’ here means tweets from non-locked users, which anyone can retrieve using official APIs.

Twitter APIs are web APIs defined as a set of standard HTTP request. For example, the following request retrieves up to 10 tweets with a keyword ‘#brusselsws’ posted at the center of Kobe City.

https://api.twitter.com/1.1/search/tweets.json?q=%23brusselsws&geocode=34.7,135.2,1km&count=10

Where the location and the area is specified by 34.7 in latitude, 135.2 in longitude, and 1km in radius.

We use a streaming API which enables to track tweets matches one or more filters in real-time. There is a location filter which enables to track
tweets only within a specified bounding box on the earth.

2.2 TreeTagger

Before looking up into the emotional dictionary, we divided obtained tweets into a set of words and convert each word into lemmas using TreeTagger. TreeTagger was originally developed by Helmut Schmid in the TC project at the Institute for Computational Linguistics of the University of Stuttgart [5]. Which can be used to annotate texts with part-of-speech and lemma information. A sample output of TreeTagger is like the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>POS</th>
<th>Lemma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The</td>
<td>DT</td>
<td>the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TreeTagger</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>TreeTagger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>was</td>
<td>VBD</td>
<td>be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>developed</td>
<td>VVN</td>
<td>develop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmut</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>Helmut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schmidt</td>
<td>NP</td>
<td>Schmidt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3 WordNet Affect

In this study, we use an emotional dictionary with 1,536 entries developed at the project WordNet Affect[1]. Which is based on the concept of “six emotional states” proposed by Paul Ekman[6]. That is, one of the six emotional states: “joy”, “anger”, “disgust”, “fear”, “sadness”, and “surprise” is assigned to each entry. For example, the emotional state “joy” is assigned to the entry “cheerful” and “favor”, the state “anger” to “malicious” and “hate”.

2.4 Python

Python programming language is used to gather all above techniques. Over 500 line program can do the following automatically: retrieving tweets in target area, converting words in the tweets into lemma, looking up into emotional dictionary, and recording the frequency of emotional states.

3 Test Settings

3.1 Target Cities

We have chosen three cities: New York, Los Angels and Salt Lake City from U.S.A., and two cities: London and York from U.K. Detailed bounding boxes shown in Table 1 taken from Google Earth are used in experiments. Figure 1 shows how London was specified.

2.2 Table 1: Bounding boxes of observed cities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Upper Left</th>
<th>Lower Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>40.6,-74.2</td>
<td>40.9,-73.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angels</td>
<td>33.7,-118.9</td>
<td>34.1,-117.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt Lake City</td>
<td>38.3,-114.0</td>
<td>41.8,-111.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>51.3,-0.5</td>
<td>51.7,0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>York</td>
<td>53.9,-1.2</td>
<td>54.0,-0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 Observation Period

We have collected tweets in the specified area above for 9 days from Dec. 28, 2012 to Jan. 5, 2013 in JST.

4 Results

4.1 Word Occurrence

By observing the five different area during the periods, we obtained 3,000 to 27,000 tweets depending to the city as shown in Table 2. Figure 2 shows the 20 most occurrent words in the tweets and their emotional states. Since we collected tweets during the year change period, there is a strong bias in the occurrence. As you can see, “love”, “good”, and “happy” are the 3 most frequent words. This hides difference in characteristics between cities. That is, the main characteristic of all cities become same emotional state “joy”.

310x531 to 523x635
Table 2: The total number of obtained tweets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th># of tweets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>16,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>15,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt Lake City</td>
<td>3,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>27,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>York</td>
<td>4,088</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: The 10 most occurrent words.

4.2 Principal Component Analysis

PCA has been done by treating cities as original variables and words as observation. As a result, we have obtained a set of composed variables as principal components (PCs). The importance of the first 5 PCs are shown in Table 3. The standard deviations are over 1.0 from PC1 to PC2 and the cumulative proportion becomes more than 92% with the first three PCs, which means it is reasonable to use the first 3 PCs to distinguish the cities.

Figures 3, 4, and 5 are the 10 most important words in terms of the loadings for PC1, PC2, and PC3 respectively. Which can be used to estimate the meanings of each PC. In Figure 3, the words with emotional state “joy” in the first four words have positive loadings, and the word “offense” with emotional state “anger” has negative, accordingly we can say PC1 relates to joyful image especially having somehow the mood of festival. In a similar way, we can say PC2 relates to comfortable and calm image, and PC3 somehow dark or dull image.

Table 3: The importance of principal components.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>PC1</th>
<th>PC2</th>
<th>PC3</th>
<th>PC4</th>
<th>PC5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumul. Prop.</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Std. Dev. = Standard deviation.

Figure 3: The 10 highest loading words for PC1.

Figure 4: The 10 highest loading words for PC2.

Figure 5: The 10 highest loading words for PC3.

4.3 City Characteristics

Now, we are ready to investigate the characteristics of the cities. Figure 6 and 7 are cities drawn on PC1-PC2 plane and PC1-PC3 plane respectively.

As shown in figures, the cities in U.K. and ones in U.S.A. are separated along the PC1 axis. The cities in U.K. have greater values of PC1 than the cities in U.S.A., it shows U.K. cities have a more joyful mood than U.S. cities.

As shown in Figure 6, Los Angeles and New York are located far up from Salt Lake City. This means the former two cities have greater values of PC2 than the latter. It doesn’t clear to us but it perhaps means coastal cities like New York and Los Angeles have a more comfortable image than inland cities like Salt Lake City. This might give reasonable explanation to the positions of London and...
York. They are neutral in terms of PC2, it perhaps be because these cities are not completely coastal nor inland.

Similarly, London has quite large value of PC3, which is opposite to York. Which means London has a darker or a more dull image than York. It is also unclear but perhaps weather is related.

5 Conclusion

We have proposed a method to evaluate city characteristics by using geo-tagged tweets, text-based messages with geolocation information exchanged over the internet. The method has been tested with 5 cities of U.S.A. and U.K. during the year change period. As a result, the method could reveal the differences in characteristics between the cities. However, it is not yet verified that the observed characteristics match the people’s impressions to the cities. It remains as one of tasks to be solved in future works.

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What crisis? Japan, EU and Political Change in the Middle East and North Africa.

Noemi Lanna

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the implications of the Arab spring on EU external relations, with specific reference to the EU-Japan relation. Drawing on previous research related to the same issue,1 I will show how the Arab spring has made more compelling the case for a deeper consultation between the EU and Japan on issues concerning the so-called MENA area, that is, the region including the Middle East and North Africa.2 In order to do this, I will rely on the theoretical framework elaborated by Barry Buzan to analyse world politics since the end of the Cold war.3 Moving from the assumption that polarity “can only be useful if interpreted into the social structure in which it is embedded”4, Buzan combines the concept of polarity and identity with the aim of investigating the interaction of material and social forces in the international system. Polarity is broadly defined as a materialist concept, based on the idea that the distribution of capabilities largely determines what the behaviour of the actors in the system will be. In examining mainstream theories, Buzan identifies the flaws affecting the conventional understanding of polarity and of the “great power” concept, and suggests an alternative interpretation. The concept of identity is defined in accordance with the constructivist literature on the topic. Hence, the social context is considered to be a key variable and the basic assumption is that the actors’ behaviour is shaped by the way they perceive themselves as well as in the way they construct their identities in relation to each other. Locating polarity within the social context, Buzan identifies the most likely combination of polarity and identity in future world politics.

In this paper, the interplay between polarity and identity theorized by Buzan will be used to analyse Japan’s regional diplomacy in the MENA area and the changes in Japan and EU identity prompted by the crises that unfolded simultaneously with the Arab spring. The concept of polarity will be employed to investigate how the changing distribution of capabilities in the international system has affected Japan’s MENA policy. Historically, Japan’s pattern of behaviour in foreign policy has been heavily influenced by the structure of the international system. The shifting edges of Tokyo’s role in international affairs have been the by-product of the varying distribution of material forces in the global arena. Japan’s interaction with the outside world throughout the Chinese,

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2 In this article, I will conform to the geographical designation of the MENA area that is currently used by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Gaimushō defines the “Middle East and North Africa region” (Chūtō to Kita Afurika chiiki) as a region stretching from the Northern part of Africa to the Persian Gulf. Afghanistan is the easternmost border of the area, whilst Pakistan is not included. This geographical definition has been systematically used in the Diplomatic Bluebook edited by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the 2004 edition. See, for instance, the MENA area map included in the last edition. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.), Gaikō seisho 2011, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2011/pdf/pdfs/2_6.pdf, p. 102 (Accessed January 10, 2013).


4 Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers, p. 15.
imperial and Cold war world orders provides evidence of this. The link between the pursuit of national interests and the systemic constraints impinging on it is particularly evident in Japan’s involvement in the Middle East and North Africa. As it has been said, “MENA has been a prime site of contestation over Japan’s role in international affairs and successive MENA crises have altered this role. Japan’s MENA policy has been shaped by the demands, constraints and pressures emanating from the global, regional, intra-regional, and domestic contexts in which policy-makers must operate”. For this reason, it is vital to establish the structure of the international system before considering Tokyo’s strategic choices in the region. This is what I will do in the second section of the article. The post-September 11 global context will be analysed in order to identify the constraints and demands it has imposed on Japan’s MENA policy. In the third section, Japan’s regional diplomacy will be examined. In presenting Japan’s diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa as a response to the structural changes in the post-September 11 international environment, I will suggest that the reconfiguration of Tokyo’s MENA policy is strictly related to China’s growing presence in the international arena.

Finally, in the last section of this paper, Buzan’s understanding of identity will be used to formulate some tentative thoughts on changes in Japanese and European self-perception. The timing of the Arab spring coincided with the acme of two crises that profoundly impacted the ideologies that Japan and the EU used to constitute themselves, legitimize their political processes and differentiate themselves from other actors. The reflection on Japan and the EU’s role vis-à-vis the Arab spring cannot set aside this momentous factor.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide an analysis of the EU MENA policies. While taking into account the global and interregional context, I will focus my examination on Japan’s position vis-à-vis Europe and the Middle East. Indeed, a comparative analysis would allow a full understanding of the prospects for a strengthened bilateral cooperation between Japan and Europe, but it is not my purpose to engage in such an investigation. The conclusions presented in this paper are not definitive. Rather, they are intended to offer a preliminary analysis in order to stimulate discussion and critical comments as well as pave the way for future research on the same issue.

The global context.

Drawing on Buzan’s analysis, the post-Cold war international system can be defined as a structure with one superpower (United States) –and four great powers (China, Europe, Japan, and Russia). Because of the disparity of capability, role and status between the superpower and the group of great powers the system is not multipolar. Unipolarity is guaranteed by the US power and by identity factors as well. Buzan considers the absence of a counter-balancing coalition against the US, since the end of the Cold war, as the product of the deeply institutionalized role of the United States, based on supra-regional projects such as Atlanticism, Asia-Pacific and Pan-Americanism. The scholar does not dismiss the possibility that alternative structures could emerge. Indeed, two options for the future (two or three superpowers and a few great powers; no superpowers and several great

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powers) are thoroughly examined. Yet, the post-Cold war institutional framework is presented as a formidable support of the stability of the structure in the future as well.\(^8\)

Whether China will rise to the status of “superpower”—in Buzan’s sense of the term—is to be seen.\(^9\) Nevertheless, no matter what the combination of polarity and identity will be, the rise of China will be a consistent actor in future scenarios. For the purpose of this article, the key point is that China’s enhanced rank in the international system has acted as a powerful systemic constraint, exerting a considerable influence on Japan’s diplomacy and, in particular, on MENA policy. Pressed by its growing interdependence with China and committed to its security alliance with the United States, Japan has entered an uncomfortable “era of torsion” (nejire jidai).\(^10\)

Before we show the implications of this era for Japan, it would be useful to give an overall definition of the phenomenon. In East Asia, in the last decade, the “torsion” emerged as a consequence of the increase in commercial exchanges between China and its neighbours. The intensification of commercial and economic dependence on China prompted these countries to reconfigure their external relations in a manner compatible with the changed economic balance. Yet, since the alignment with the United States continued to be the benchmark for security policies, for these Asian countries, an “era of torsion” began. This “era of torsion” is characterized by non-correspondence between economic relations and political/security relations. The mismatching stems from the necessity to reconcile economic interdependence with China with the security needs granted by the United States. Not coincidentally, the phenomenon affects, albeit with different intensity, all the “spokes” of the “hub and spoke” system, namely the countries that as a consequence of the bilateral security agreements signed with the United States (hub) represented the linchpin of the Pax Americana in East Asia (e.g. Australia, Japan, South Korea, Philippines etc.). During the Cold War era, the Chinese factor was unimportant for these countries as far as the economic realm was concerned. On the contrary, the United States was a key-partner, as it acted not only as the chief provider of security, but also as an indispensable economic and commercial partner. The end of the Cold war and the rise of China jeopardised the underlying assumptions of this dual alignment. The growing economic relevance of Beijing produced a non-correspondence between the economic domain, heavily influenced by China, and the political and security domain, where the United States continued to play an essential role.

In Japan’s case, the mismatching took a particularly acute form. The data confirming Japan’s shift from an alignment to a “torsion” condition are significant. In 1980, 40% of Japan’s export was bound for the US market. Yet, in the following three decades, United States’ incidence on Japanese trade balance gradually decreased. If we assume as a parameter Japan’s trade dependence rate on the United States (calculated as a percentage of Japan’s GDP), we will see that the dependence was 27.1% in 1999; it scaled down to 18.8% in 2004 and it stood at 13.7% in 2009.\(^11\)

The reduction of the historic ally’s relevance in the commercial realm was not matched by a

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decline of the US role in the political and strategic domain. The United States continues to be the main guarantor of the archipelago’s security and bilateralism is still an essential benchmark of Japanese foreign policy. The end of the Cold war, far from jeopardising Japan’s alignment, has strengthened it. In particular, the so-called “war on terror” acted as a catalyst on the process of redefinition of Japanese security which had begun in 1992, giving way to the approval of the so-called PKO bill. In the wake of 9/11, the “Law on special measures against terrorism” (2001) and the “Law concerning special measures on humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in Iraq” (2003) provided an effective institutional framework for the reinforcement of the US-Japan defence cooperation. Besides, the emergence of new threats (North Korea, China), while further contributing to an incremental development of the Self Defense Forces role, confirmed the strategic relevance of the Japan-US alliance. On the other hand, notwithstanding the scaling down of the economic weight, Tokyo continued to be an essential ally to Washington.

The end of Japan’s dual alignment with the United States took place simultaneously with the emergence of closer economic ties with China. In 2007, China ranked first as Japan’s trading partner, displacing the United States. The increase in the dependence trade rate from China occurred simultaneously with the decrease in the dependence rate from the United States. In 1999, Japan’s trade dependence from China represented 9.1% of the country’s GDP. Yet, in 2009, it more than doubled, reaching 20.5% (16.5% in 2004). The growing economic interdependence was not a sufficient condition for peaceful relations between the two neighbours. “History problem” (rekishi mondai), the North-Korean nuclear issue, the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, Beijing’s strategic anxieties towards Tokyo’s international security policy were some of the thornier issues hindering the development of a fruitful bilateral dialogue. Indeed, the Japan-China relation is complex and cannot be easily framed by the optimistic neoliberal equation between interdependence and mutual gains (or, conversely in terms of coercive power resources as the pessimistic realist reading would have it). Several factors should be considered to give an exhaustive account of the post-Cold war relationship between the two neighbours (Japanese and Chinese domestic politics, public opinion, the US-Japan alliance etc.). What I would like to stress is that the opportunities and the constraints provided by the “torsion” exerted a considerable influence on Japan’s MENA policy, as it will be shown in the following section.

The evolution of Japan’s diplomacy in the MENA region after 2001.

Several analyses have investigated Japan’s diplomacy in the Middle East. Most of the studies...
emphasize the mercantile nature of Japanese diplomacy in the region, which is often referred to as “shigen gaikō” (resource diplomacy). Indeed, the pursuit of energy resources has been (and still is) the main driver of Tokyo’s MENA policy, given the country’s heavy reliance on oil imported from the Middle East. The alliance with the United States has been one more important factor in shaping Japanese strategic choices in the region. The United States expected from Japan the acceptance of its leadership in the region as well as “burden sharing” in conflicts with the MENA states that challenged the US leadership. The global hegemon, in turn, granted Japan a security umbrella, the defense of the open trade and investment system, and sea-lanes security. This strategic agenda did not necessarily entail Japan’s compliance with the US demands. In fact, Japan’s responsiveness has varied. When the US hegemony appeared to be declining, Japan’s MENA policy took a more independent course. This was particularly evident after 1973, when the effects of the oil crisis overlapped with the implications of the US’s waning global power. The first oil crisis dramatically reminded Japan of its vulnerability vis-à-vis the Middle East, prompting the implementation of a pro-Arab policy, which challenged the compliance required by US diplomacy in the Middle East. At the same time, a remarkable effort to rationalize and diversify energy sources was carried out, and the concept of “comprehensive security” (sōgō anzen hoshō) was spelled out to suggest that the implementation of security did not only require Japan’s protection from military threats, but also to make sure the country had free access to raw materials and energy sources. Conversely, in the aftermath of the Cold war, when the US hegemony appeared to be rising, Japan’s alignment with the United States was considerable as demonstrated by the Indian Ocean anti-terror mission (2001-2010) and the afore mentioned Japanese engagement in Iraq.

The “torsion” Japan is currently confronted with has urged the Japanese government to cope with a new variable, when thinking of its regional diplomacy in the MENA area. The rise of China has introduced a new determinant to Tokyo’s MENA policy. Whatever will be the final outcome of the power transition, there is little question that China has considerably strengthened its presence in several regions of the world. In the MENA area, economic interests, energy related needs as well as geostrategic concerns, have induced China to step-up its investments (particularly in the commercial shipping and in the ship-building market) and deepen its diplomatic activities. China’s growing influence prompted Japan to redefine and prioritize its diplomacy in the region. Indeed, since 2001, Japan has intensified its presence in the MENA area in several ways. Japan-led fora intended to strengthen relations with the MENA area countries –such as the Japan-Arab Dialogue Forum (2003), the Japan-Arab Conference (2007) and the Japan-Arab Economic Forum (2009)- have appeared one after another in the 2000s. Japan’s diplomatic activism has also been noticeable within multilateral frameworks, such as the BMENA (Broader Middle East and North Africa) initiative, which was launched in June 2004, at the G-8 summit held on Sea Island (United States).

This quantitative change was accompanied by a qualitative change implying a diversification of diplomatic leverages used to enhance Japan’s national interests in the region. Until 2001, Tokyo had pursued a developmentally focused diplomacy that was mainly based on economic

16 On this point, see Miyagi, “Japan’s Middle East Policy: ‘still mercantile realism’”, pp. 290-1.
18 The following section of the paper is based on Noemi Lanna, “Japan and Europe in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) Area: towards a New Bilateral Agenda?”, pp. 112-114.
means. Japan used aid for development and other "check-book diplomacy" resources to exert its power in the region. In so doing, Tokyo managed to mitigate its vulnerability within the asymmetrical relationship it had with countries in the region. The effectiveness of this economic diplomacy has been so great that Joseph Nye indicates the case of Japan as a good example of how fallacious it can be to equate a rich endowment in natural resources with economic power. Whilst Japan managed to become the second richest country in the world in the twentieth century without considerable natural resources, some of the well-endowed countries—oil producers among them—did not manage to turn their natural resources into national wealth or power. After 2001 Japan continued to rely mainly on an economics based diplomacy; yet, alongside economic diplomacy, Japan has occasionally resorted to non-economic means, as demonstrated by Japan’s involvement in Afghanistan and in Iraq, with the “two wheels of one cart strategy” (sha no ryōrin). One more case in point is the “Corridor for Peace and Prosperity” (Heiwa to han’ei no kairo) which involved a more significant political engagement on Japan’s part.

Overall, in the last ten years, the MENA area has become more important in Japanese diplomacy. This development is also demonstrated by the substantial reform of the “Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau” (Chūō Afurika kyoku) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, implemented in April 2001. Within this bureau a new section was established charged with addressing 48 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. This choice was inspired by the acknowledgment of Africa’s growing importance, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, by the recognition of the need to address the issues related to the Middle East and North Africa region. Not surprisingly, the first and the second “Middle East division” (Chūō daiikka, Chūō dainika) which were set up as a result of this administrative reshuffle, are in charge of the very countries belonging to the so called MENA region. Even more interestingly, three years later, the denomination “Middle East and North Africa” (Chūō to Kita Afurika) was officially adopted in the Diplomatic Bluebook (Gaikō seisho) edited by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the 2004 edition, the denomination “MENA” appears for the first time, replacing the separate denominations “Middle East” and “Africa” which had hitherto been used to title the chapter dealing with Middle East and African Affairs. These organizational changes were accompanied by a factual broadening of Japan’s diplomatic scope. In the last ten years, Tokyo has fully included in its diplomatic agenda areas that so far had not been very relevant, such as North Africa. For instance, the “Kono initiative” was launched in 2001, by Foreign Minister Kono Yōhei on the occasion of his visit to the countries of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The start of Free Trade Agreement negotiations with the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC), in 2006, can be considered an interesting spill-over of Japan’s greater interest in the region.

In the very same period, the upsurge in piracy activities in the Horn of Africa prompted a

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parallel intensification of Tokyo’s maritime strategy in the region. Assuring the security of the sea routes connecting the Middle East to Japan has been one of the main objectives historically pursued by Japanese diplomacy in the area. Faithful to this objective, Japan has devoted a considerable commitment to counter piracy activity in the Horn of Africa since 2006, when the phenomenon turned into a more relevant issue. Alongside patrolling activities, Japan steadily sought to contribute to the stability and security of Somalia, granting aid for development. The presence of the Japanese navy in the Horn of Africa dates back to March 2009, when Japan dispatched two vessels in the area in order to escort Japanese-registered ships, foreign-registered ships with Japanese on board and foreign-registered ships operated by Japanese ship transportation companies or transporting Japanese cargo. In addition to this operation, two P-3C patrol aircraft were dispatched to the Republic of Djibouti on May 28 for the mission of anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Later, 2009 saw the approval of the “Law to combat piracy”, providing Japan with more effective normative means to combat pirate activity. Finally, in order to allow the Japanese Self Defence Forces to work autonomously in the region, a facility operated by Maritime Self Defence Forces (MSDF) was inaugurated in Djibouti, on the 7th of July 2011.

Conclusions.

The analysis carried out in the previous sections of this paper allows for some tentative remarks on the evolution of the EU-Japan relations, to be made with specific reference to the MENA area. The Arab spring can be considered the last stage of a decade-long MENA-crisis that unfolded after September 11. This turning point has confronted the EU and Japan with new challenges. The increasingly volatile political and security environment prompted both actors to review their regional strategies. On the other hand, the post-September 11 changes at the global and regional level paved the way for a deeper cooperation between Japan and Europe on issues related to the MENA area.

In the first place, in response to the strategic environment that emerged after 2001, Japan has enhanced the level of engagement in the region. As it has been argued in section three, the rise of China and the increase in geopolitical risk caused by the “war on terror” have urged Japan to intensify diplomatic efforts in the MENA region. Not only has Japan showed an unprecedented diplomatic activism, but it has also engaged in a comprehensive redefinition of the very target of its activity in the region. Until 2001, Japan tended to consider the Middle East as the core objective of its regional diplomacy, thinking of Africa as a separate entity, mainly consisting of Sub-Saharan Africa. Conversely, in the last ten years the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has started to address the Middle East and North Africa as a single area. The reorganization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ section and the progressive inclusion of sub-regions, such as North Africa, that had hitherto been

marginal, are evidence of this. The result of this redefinition is an unedited convergence of the 
Japanese picture of the region with the geopolitical vision of the Mediterranean space which the EU 
has traditionally referred to. Since 2001, the North Africa centred southern bank –an essential factor in 
European geopolitical perception- has become a vital element of the Japanese understanding of 
the region. The Arab spring provided an additional rationale for this inclusion. The consequences of 
the upheavals that swept through the Arab world are yet to be known. Nevertheless, the growing 
relevance of North of Africa as a driver of geopolitical risk, affecting Japanese interests in the region 
is already evident. The history of Japan’s diplomacy in the region shows that Tokyo has regularly 
responded to increased instability in the MENA area with an effective reconfiguration of its strategic 
choices. This is what happened on the occasion of the two oil crises (1973; 1979), as well as during 
Tokyo’s regional politics once again. With this event, a diplomatic redefinition is again under way. 
What is really new is that the changes in the surrounding environment allow (and even prompt) a 
reconfiguration that does not only involve Japan, but could result in a strengthened bilateral 
cooperation with the European Union.

In the second place, after 2001 new specific issues of mutual concern for Japan and the EU 
appeared. It has been remarked that a “new pragmatism” is emerging in Japan-EU relations. The 
complexity of contemporary problems and the diverse level and parties to be addressed have caused 
a change in the relations between the two actors. Instead of focusing on overarching visions of action, 
they tend to be based on issue-led agendas. The case of Russia has been presented as a manifest 
evidence of this. Whereas former Japan-EU positions vis-à-vis Russia were based on shared 
ideological positions and the desire to see Russia democratize, this approach is now replaced by a 
pragmatic strategy, driven by imperatives such as energy security. 
The increase in incidence of piracy activities in the Horn of Africa could provide one more case for establishing an issue-led 
agenda. Safeguarding the sea-lanes of the MENA region is a vital security concern shared by Japan 
and Europe alike. Certainly, piracy exerts serious detrimental effects on all the states dependant on 
the sea-lanes encompassing the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean. 
Yet, Japan and Europe’s interests are particularly at risk. Some of the most dreadful hot spots of 
piracy activities are located around the Bal-el-Mandeb strait, which is considerably relevant for 
Japanese and European maritime interests. The Strait -located north of Somalia, between Yemen, 
Djibouti and Eritrea- is a strategic link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea as well 
as a privileged target of piracy activities. It is calculated that 1.8 million barrels of all traded oil (i.e. 
3.2 million oil barrels) passing through this strait is destined for the European market. 
Approximately half of the world’s container traffic also passes through the Bab-el-Mandeb. About 
80 per cent of this traffic consists of Europe-Asia trade. Accordingly, Somali piracy imposes 
particularly high human security consequences and economic costs on Japan and Europe. These 
include ransom payments, naval costs, re-routing expenses, insurance premiums, security equipment 
purchases and prosecutions. Against this background, the Japan-EU Navfor cooperation can be

26 See, Tsuneo Akaha, “Japan’s Response to the Threats of Shipping Disruptions in Southeast Asia and the Middle 
27 Hook, Jilson, Hughes, Dobson, Japan’s International Relations, p. 275.
28 Nogami Takayuki, “Chūtō Kita Afurika jōsei to sekuyu mondai” [Middle East, North Africa and the Oil Problem], 
29 See Martin N. Murphy, “Somali Piracy. Why Should we care?”, The Rusi Journal, vol. 156, no. 6 (December 
considered a de facto evidence of Japan and EU’s common concern and a promising test of issue-led cooperation.\(^{30}\)

In the third place, a strengthened bilateral dialogue on MENA region related issues could be favoured by a common vision of action, based on shared values. This is particularly evident if one considers the issue of the Arab spring. Indeed, the final outcome of the turmoil that begun in Tunisia more than two years ago is far from being well-defined. The popular demonstrations that swept through the Arab world since December 2010 produced mixed expectations. Whilst the quick demise of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt inspired optimistic previsions on the democratization process, the subsequent developments (civil war in Syria, fragility of the newly established governments in Egypt and Libya) induced more cautious assessments on the future of the region.\(^{31}\) Yet, historical precedents provide interesting insights to identify the potential lines of Japan and EU endeavours in the region.

It has been remarked that the main difference between the transition to democracy triggered by the upheavals in the Arab world and the political transformation in Eastern Europe in 1989 is the lack of a “sponsor”.\(^{32}\) One of the key reasons of the success of the post-1989 transformation in Eastern Europe was the support of EU, OECD, and other institutions, as well as Japan’s decisive engagement in economic dialogue with the countries involved in the transition, through bilateral frameworks and institutions, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.\(^{33}\) A rather different scenario is unfolding in the MENA region. The instability of the political and security environment is exacerbated by the conflicting stances of the outside powers, as the Syrian case sadly confirms. Yet, Europe and Japan are in the position to play a joint and influential role in the future, because of their peculiar political identity. To borrow an argument from Wæver,\(^{34}\) in the second half of the twentieth century both actors came to see their past history of war and rivalry as “the Other” against which to build the new Self. This move led both Japan and the European countries to implement a desecuritization process fraught with long-lasting consequences. Not coincidentally, the normative foundation of the EEC/EU came to coincide with the very base of the Yoshida doctrine –that is, antimilitarism. The shared values underpinning this political identity make easier for Japan and Europe to jointly tackle the specific issues arising from the MENA area. Indeed, the “like-mindedness” -often recalled in Japan-EU joint press statements- is real and could turn into an effective policy instrument.

Finally, Japan and the EU’s role vis-à-vis the Arab spring and the MENA area cannot be fully understood without exploring the implications of the severe identity crises that the two actors are experiencing. For the EU, the timing of the Arab spring almost overlapped with the crucial stages of the debt crisis. In January 2010, an EU report condemning “severe irregularities” in Greek accounting procedures was released, officially marking the beginning of the EU debt crisis.\(^{35}\)

\(^{30}\) On this point, see also Hook, Jilson, Hughes, Dobson, Japan’s International Relations, p. 303.
\(^{33}\) Hook, Jilson, Hughes, Dobson, Japan’s International Relations, p. 287.
Eleven months later, in Tunisia, a man burnt himself to death to protest against the police, igniting the pan-Arab revolt that came to be known as “Arab spring”. In the very same period that the Middle East unrest gradually spread from Tunisia to Egypt and then to Yemen, Bahrain and Libya, the debt crisis progressively reached the Republic of Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy. The EU response to this unprecedented crisis lead to a harsh confrontation between European leaders. The debate concerned which policy was best to tackle the financial crisis and bail out the weaker economies. In fact, the issues at stake ultimately regarding the identity of the European Union. Europe’s quest to resolve the debt crisis called into question one of the basic assumptions supporting the Union: the idea that a functionalistic cooperation among European countries could be more convenient than a divisive coexistence based on a win-lose approach.

On the other hand, for Japan, the break out and the subsequent expansion of the Arab spring coincided with the “national crisis” (kokunan) triggered by the 3/11 triple catastrophe. Some analysts have suggested that this impressive calamity will produce a shift from “post-war” (sengo) to “post-catastrophe” (saigo), resulting into a rediscovery of the “nation” (kokka). Others have voiced expectations for a change leading to “much needed reforms”. 36 Indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that 3/11 will not just produce short-term changes, because of the vast size of the cataclysm and because of the massive impact that this unprecedented event is going to exert on collective identity. Most likely, the catastrophe will become the preliminary stage of a long-term transformation. It may be presumed that, this long-standing process will bring to an end the “systemic crisis” 37, that unfolded in the aftermath of the Cold war. This system-wide breakdown was the result of the end of bipolarism and of the coinciding bursting of the bubble. The combined effect of these two momentous changes probed the viability of the institutions that shaped Japanese domestic and foreign policy as well as economics during the Cold War years. Devoid of the legitimization provided by durable economic prosperity, the political system based on the hegemony of the Liberal Democratic Party (“the 1955 system”), cracked. Without the bipolar structure, the low-profile diplomacy postulating the centrality of the relationship with the United States (the Yoshida doctrine) was divested of its strategic relevance. As for the growth model that had granted post-war Japan’s economic miracle, the global market liberalization challenged its basic mechanisms. Overall, Japan was called to rethink the key normative assumptions of its political identity.

“Today, one often bumps into the word ‘crisis’ whenever he/she opens the newspaper. The term conveys insecurity, sorrow, uncertainty and it alludes at an uncertain future whose assumptions cannot be satisfactorily clarified”. Commenting on this definition included in a French political dictionary (published in 1840), the German historian Reinhart Koselleck bitterly stated: “Today things are not different”.38 Kosellech’s observation was formulated in 1985, but it is relevant more than ever today. In fact, not only this comment, but also the historian’s reflections on the term “crisis” prove extremely useful, when attempting to grasp the changes in European identity and its
implications for the EU’s external relations. Ultimately, the profound transformations, that Europe and Japan have been confronted with when the Arab spring broke out, are but “crises” in the sense that has been theorized by Kosellech. Surveying the evolution of the term “crisis” (from ancient Greek to the twentieth century), the historian emphasizes how the gradual spread of the term—that came to be widely used in different disciplines of the social sciences—gave rise to a semantic ambiguity. The overuse of the word crisis produced an inescapable “ambivalence”, clashing with the clarity associated with the technical use of the Greek word κρίσις (crisis) in the realm of law, medicine, and theology. As a result of this, the original connotation of separation, fight, final discernment, has been gradually sidelined (and sometimes obscured) by new, overlapping connotations.  

The ultimate meaning of the European and Japanese crises becomes more understandable in the light of the semantic evolution described by Kosellech. More specifically, the Greek etymon of the word provides an interesting clue to grasp the essence of the structural changes Japan and Europe are grappling with. Both crises imply crucial decisions about vital identity issues, that is, a conclusive judgement, as postulated by the original denotation of the term. In Japan’s case, the judgement regards the fundamental questions underpinning the “systemic crisis” the country was confronted with in the 1990s. What will be the foundations of Japanese political identity? What kind of international role does Japan envisage for itself? What grand strategy will replace the Yoshida doctrine?

In a similar vein, the eurozone crisis implies a decisive judgement as it questions one of the basic prerequisites of the integration: the convergence between the member-states’ national interests and the European project. Fundamental changes in the international structure urged a redefinition of the member-states attitudes towards the future of the Union, similar to what occurred after the end of the Cold war.  

With much of the region on the brink of recession and the relatively strong economies opposed to recurrent bailouts of the weaker member-states, the debate on the fiscal union and the future of the single currency depended on a judgement over the fundamental dilemmas of the Union: what’s the meaning of the euro currency? Is it the first stage toward a broader economic union or the final frontier of the EU deepening process? What defines the European identity? What kind of international actor does the EU aspire to be? To what extent is European integration a top priority for member-states?

“Structural change—Wendt argues—occurs when actors redefine who they are and what they want”. This implies a change in the “relative expected utility of the normative vs. deviant behaviour”. It is too early to assess whether Japan and the EU are moving toward a “structural change” in the Wendtian sense of the term. Yet, the common challenges the two countries are grappling with (systemic crises, piracy activities) suggest that the MENA area could become a ground for establishing a new bilateral agenda.

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39 Kosellech, *Crisi. Per un lessico della modernità*, pp. 31-93.
40 Sakai Kazunari, “Yōroppa tōgō no yukue” [The Future of European Integration], Sakai Kazunari (ed.), *Yōroppa tōgō no kokusai kankei ron* [European integration in International Relations], Tokyo, 2007, Ashi shobō, pp. 335-362.
Concluding remarks

Kazunari Sakai

In recent years the European Union has experienced many big changes in political, economic and social dimensions; the Arab spring at first occurred in Tunisia in the end of 2010 and following influx of refugees from north Africa, serious events concerning Islamism in Norway or France, provoking discussions about immigrant policy and Schengen framework, and inside the EU Euro and financial crisis, bringing about changes of government in Italy, Spain, Greece and France.

In the circumstances, do EU countries maintain the Union itself as their top priority, or shut themselves in state sovereignty? And what change has been made in the European identity? It is often heard discussions on withdrawal of Greece and recently that of the UK where Prime minister Cameron showed his intention to do referendum soon after the next general election in 2015 asking whether the UK remains in the EU or not.

Then, we put focus in this workshop on especially the situation of the European identity in this context, on regarding impact by the Arab spring to the EU and roles of social media in the EU and influences of the changes around the Union to its external relations especially with the Mediterranean and also Japan.

1) Prof. Kolja Raube (University of Leuven) “From Crisis to Integration? – European Diversity and Identity, Transnationalism, and Institutional Change”

This is a sort of keynote speech for today’s workshop, supplying important views on essence and future of European integration. Here it is analysed how Europeans define today’s situation as starting-point for future integration rather than crisis; it does matter on one hand transnational interactions and interdependence and on the other diversity and difference embedded in a communicative linkage.

2) Prof. Saito Tsuyoshi (Kobe University) “Political Change in North Africa and Its Influence on Europe”

Prof. Saito, anthropologist specializing Moroccan culture and society, analysed how Arab spring has caused change of Europeans’ recognition about North Africa and through it their recognition about themselves; what is important is to reconsider the mode of configuration of collective identities having views on international, national and local contexts, especially the locality, a local identity based on ethnicity which has been marginalized politically. This seems to be a lesson both to North Africa and Europe as well to build and keep a stable and peaceful society established by a democratic way.

3) Prof. Murao Hajime (Kobe University) “Evaluating the City Characteristics through Geo-Tagged Tweets”

Prof. Murao’s contribution gave us a suggestion about how to investigate change of European identity through Twitter and/or other SNS. It seems to me interesting if we try to research on attitude of each national towards European crisis from inside and outside focusing on words such as “democracy”, “immigration”, “austerity” etc. Data on SNS may tell us what matters for Europeans.
4) Prof. Noemi Lanna (Università degli Studi di Napoli L'Orientale) “What crisis? Japan, EU and Political Change in the Middle East and North Africa”

Prof. Lanna treats an overused word “crisis” critically and shows a need to consider it in a sense of a decisive judgement for the future. Here it refers in detail to Japanese and the European Union’s future identity. What do they want, what do they want to be? These are very important questions if we consider the EU’s identity and Japan-EU relations as well; and she suggests we have to recognize that MENA region where the Arab spring occurred and its consequences have been in progress are common and crucial both for the EU and Japan.

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Through each presentation and discussion, we could recognize that vis-à-vis “crises” inside and outside in which direction the Europeans’ identity formation has developed and how Europe will be able to overcome the “crises” politically and socio-culturally.

To do that, the EU has to tackle the reality in North Africa from local point of view, that is to say it is necessary to relativize the Nation-State centered view, looking at local cultures, ethnicity and identities, and also rethink about dichotomy authoritarianism – democracy, religious – secular, and consider further the significance of emergence of coexistence religion (particularly Islam) – democracy. And a distribution of such kind of values in Europe geographically and/or socially (age, gender, etc. if possible) may produce a base of political culture and can function to establish a nation as socio-cultural foundation. So SNS can be used for the investigation of the value distribution that may function in European identity formation in such a changing environment.

In my view, it is important to distinguish value distribution in flow and stock. Data provided by SNS usage may be able to show the trend in society (i.e. flow), but also it is necessary to pay attention to culture and history as stock. Both of them must be indispensable to form one’s identity and to understand what is going in Europe actually.

And Japan-EU relations have become close in recent years in political and strategic perspectives and North Africa or MENA region is just the place where interests of both parties coincide. For Japan and the EU, changing situations in MENA region may be chances for the future for their cooperation, rather than crises.

From a point of view of political values, it may be useful to investigate Europeans’ eager attachment to values such as liberal democracy, rule of law and respect of human rights for their own society and also for neighbouring region, such as North Africa, so as to make clear how the EU will progress further or on the contrary stagnate inside each nation-state in this big changing situations, say “crises” by SNS ways and also humanities and social sciences' approach.
プログラム

日時：2013年2月7日（木）
場所：神戸大学ブリュッセルオフィス

●第一部（13:00-17:00）(企画・運営責任者：三田順)
研究発表
(1) 松井真之介（神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科メディア文化研究センター）
「ベルギーのアルメニア人コミュニティ」
(2) 村中由美子（東京大学大学院仏文研究室博士課程）
「見出されたフランドル―ユルスナール『黒の過程』 (1968)における絵画をめぐって―」
(3) 角本摩衣子（神戸大学人文学研究科博士課程／ブリュッセル自由大学客員研究員）
「炭鉱からみる近代―マニフェスタ9と文化・資源としての＜炭鉱＞展を中心に」
(4) Freek Adriaens（ヘント大学講師）

●第二部（18:00-21:00）（企画・運営責任者：正木裕子）
場所：ブリュッセル王立音楽院別館＜Chene＞
Conservatoire royal de Bruxelles, Annexe « Chêne »
Rue du Chêne 17 1000 Bruxelles（地下鉄「中央駅 Gare Centrale」）
Classé 024（受付、講演 18:00-18:30）
Classé 010（演奏会 18:30-19:45）
Classé 024（ディスカッション 19:45-）

講演
三田順（学術振興会特別研究員／神戸大学大学院国際文化学研究科）
"Belgian Francophone Literature at the End of the 19th Century"

演奏会
“Belgian Art Songs”
ブリュッセル王立音楽院声楽科学生（講師 正木裕子）
Works of : G. Lekeu, J. Jongen, F. de Bourguignon, J. Abisil and other’s
Poetry of : A. Hardy, Norge, M. Carême, M. Maeterlinck, E. Verhaeren, G. Rodenbach and other’s
Pianist : Laurence Verna（Conservatoire royal de Bruxelles）
ベルギーのアルメニア人コミュニティ

松井真之介

【発表要旨】
本発表では、古来より存在するベルギーのアルメニア人コミュニティの特徴と現状を、アルメニア人とその歴史、文化についての概要をはさみつつ総括的に紹介する。
14世紀から始まるベルギーのアルメニア人コミュニティは、ブルッヘにおいて絨毯を中心とする東西貿易の仲介商人と聖職者、知識人を中心に始まる。その後19世紀末から20世紀初頭にかけて、アルメニア人は絨毯貿易に加え、ベルギーのタバコ産業およびアントウェルペンのダイヤモンド産業の重要な一角を牛耳るまでになる。
商人中心のアルメニア人コミュニティの構成は1920年代に大きく変化する。1915年のオスマン帝国によるアルメニア人大虐殺からの避難民の流入によって、コミュニティはあらゆる年齢・社会階層を含むものとなる。それ以降も中東および旧ソ連の政治変動によってアルメニア人はベルギーに流入し現在に至る。
現在のベルギーのコミュニティは、ヨーロッパの政治経済センターとしての地の利を生かした活動が特徴的である。それほど大きくないコミュニティにもかかわらず、「ジェノサイド認知」活動の中心であり、コミュニティは非常に活発な様相を見せている。また、「小さくて活発な」コミュニティだろうか、2010年ごろから始まったアルメニア教会の分裂の余波も猛烈に受けているのも、このコミュニティの特徴としてあげられるだろう。

【発表内容】
アルメニアの概要
・アルメニアはどこにある？
・変わり続ける「アルメニア」

ディアスポラからアルメニアを見る
歴史的に形成されたアルメニア人ディアスポラ
① 被害者ディアスポラとして
・被征服・侵略の歴史
・中世のキリキア・アルメニア王国(1196-1375)
  → 国そのものがディアスポラ
・1894-96年、1915年、オスマン帝国でのアルメニア人虐殺 ←これが最大
・第2次世界大戦後の度重なる中東政変
  →1950年代以降のトルコ共和国におけるアルメニア人迫害、1979年のイラン革命など
・ソビエト崩壊による新たなディアスポラ
  →旧ソ連、特にアルメニア共和国から
② 交易ディアスポラとして
・離散の地で活発な商業活動
・言語(学校)・宗教(教会)・自治組織(互助会やギルドなど)を求心力にする。

＜図＞アルメニアディアスポラの世界的分布
＜図＞アルメニア商人
最初の在白（ベルギー）アルメニア人コミュニティ
4世紀には聖職者や商人、知識人来白
・トンヘレンの聖セルヴェ（アルメニア人宣教師）の存在
・11世紀初頭のヘントにアルメニア人伝道師の存在
中世ブルッヘのアルメニア商人
・14世紀初頭（1340）から16世紀に東西貿易で活躍
・主に織物、その他の絹製品、スパイス、香料などを扱う
・1345年にブルッヘ大聖堂の外で絨毯販売が許可される
・1478年にはアルメニア人設立の養護院があった

近代の在白アルメニア人コミュニティ
細々と続くアルメニア商人の貿易 → 中心地はアムステルダムへ
アルメニア商人が得意とする3つの分野
①絨毯 ②タバコ ③ダイヤモンド
②19世紀末～20世紀初頭におけるベルギータバコ産業の独占状態
・タバコ販売の自由
・Davros, Arax, Marouf, Enfiなどのブランド
・Missirian家、Tchamkerzian家、Matossian家、Enfiadjian家による独占
※同時期のエジプトもアルメニア人の独占下
＜図＞Maroufブランドの広告（ヘント）
・現在はアルメニア人の手を離れている
③アントウェルペンのダイヤモンド産業の一角を担うアルメニア人
・1920年にベルギーダイヤモンドクラブの会長となったBarsamian家
・ほぼコンスタンティノポリス出身のアルメニア人で占められる
・Tcherkezian家、Ipekjian家、Hampartsoumian家などのトップメーカー
①再び絨毯産業
・現在も続くアントウェルペンのKarakehian家

●近代までは商人中心のコミュニティだった。

20世紀のアルメニア人コミュニティ
1920年代にアルメニア人急増
・1915年の「アルメニア人大虐殺」からの避難民
1922年に「ベルギー・アルメニア人委員会」創設
・今でもベルギーのアルメニア人コミュニティの中核・統合機関（ベルギー政府公認）
第2次世界大戦後：中東からの移民
・トルコ、レバノン、シリア、イラク ←前述の中東政変からの避難民
・東トルコのクルドの2村から1,500人の難民受け入れ事例
1990年代以降：旧ソ連、特にアルメニア共和国からの移民

●年齢層、職業・社会階層雑多な構成に
現在の在日アルメニア人コミュニティ
現在 11,000 人存在すると言われている
1 つのアルメニア使徒教会と 2 つのアルメニア・プロテスタント教会
・アルメニア人の 90%は使徒教会の成員、残り 5% ずつがアルメニア・カトリックとアルメニア・プロテスタント
・1990 年、ブリュッセルのカンデルマンス通り Rue Kindermens にアルメニア使徒教会会堂完成
● アルメニア人の中でもマイノリティであるプロテスタントが比較的目立つ
小さいながら緊密で活発なコミュニティ活動
コミュニティ誌 "Hay" の存在
・「ベルギー・アルメニア人委員会」発行
・"Hay" とはアルメニア人の自称
※「アルメニア」：ハヤスダン Hayasdan、「アルメニア人」：ハイ Hay
＜図＞ ブリュッセルのアルメニア教会

ベルギーのアルメニア人コミュニティの特徴
「小さいながらも活発」と言われている
活発な「ジェノサイド認知活動」
・1915 年のオスマン帝国で起きたアルメニア人大虐殺を、「オスマン帝国による組織的なアルメニア人ジェノサイド」であると国際的およびトルコ共和国に認知させるアルメニア人ディアスポラの活動
・トルコ共和国は一貫して「否認主義」Nagationisme をとっている
・国際機関 (EU など) が集中するブリュッセルという地の利を生かした活動
・ヨーロッパのアルメニア人コミュニティの出先機関的役割
● 1998 年 3 月 26 日：ベルギー上院がアルメニア人大虐殺を「ジェノサイド」と認知
・2002 年 12 月：ベルギー政府が公式認知
・2005 年以来、議会で「ジェノサイド否定禁止法案」が審議されている
・「アルメニア人ジェノサイド認知」はフランスをはじめとする、欧米の潮流となっている
＜図＞ アルメニア人「ジェノサイド」祈念碑

cf.) アルメニア人大虐殺問題
1894-96 年の虐殺、1909 年アダナでの虐殺
●1915 年の大虐殺
・虐殺、追放、強制改宗などで 100 万人前後の「犠牲者」
・アルメニア人側は「150 万人」とする
・生存者とその子孫が現代のアルメニア人ディアスポラの大半を占める
・トルコ共和国の否認主義「組織的ではない」
VS 欧米諸国の認知主義「ジェノサイドだ」
●アルメニア人の「場外でのにらみ合い」か
マルグリット・ユルスナール（1903-1987）は、フランス人の父とベルギー人（フランス語系）の母を持つ、ブリュッセル生まれの作家である。しかし、生涯の大部分を旅に費やし、1950年に居を定めたアメリカ・メイン州のマウント・デザート島で多くの作品を執筆したため、むしろコスモポリタン性を彼女の特徴と考えるのが一般的である。本発表では、ユルスナール作品においてこのコスモポリタン性と対照的に見出すことができる、リージョナルな要素としてのフランドル性に焦点を当てる。具体的には、代表作の一つである『黒の過程』（1968）のなかに間接的に描かれているフランドル絵画が、この作家の文学創作においてどのような意味を持っていたかについて考察する。さらに、コスモポリタン性とフランドル性という一見相反する要素が、ユルスナール作品において有機的な結びつきを持っていることを明らかにしたい。
炭鉱からみる近代
—マニフェスタ9と‘文化’資源としての〈炭鉱〉展を中心に

角本摩衣子

昨年、ベルギーの北東部リンブルフ州のヘンクで9度目の欧州現代美術ビエンナーレ（以下、マニフェスタ）が開催された。世界中でさまざまな国際展が乱立する今、1996年の初回以来、隔年ごとにヨーロッパの異なる都市で開催されるという点で、このマニフェスタは異彩を放っている。更に、“The Deep of the Modern／近代の深遠”というテーマを掲げ、実際に使用されていた炭鉱施設を舞台に、炭鉱に関連した近代から現代までの美術作品を取り上げた今展（以下、マニフェスタ9）は、「いわゆる現代美術展のベーシックな展覧会モデルからの切り離しを故意に行った」とキュレーター・チームが自負する内容となっていた。本発表においては、同じく炭鉱を通して近代を捉えようとした「‘文化’資源としての〈炭鉱〉」展（目黒区美術館、2009年）とマニフェスタ9との比較を試み、炭鉱を通した両国の近代化の一端を紹介したい。

Freek Adriaens

In *Belgium: a history without a country* (Rolf Falter) presents an overview of the history of Belgium from the Roman period until 2011. His focuses are one on politics, conflicts and people. His ambition was to write an alternative and neutral history of Belgium.

In this lecture, I would like to summarize three theses on nationalism and national identity in Falter’s book. First, according to Falter, Flanders was the origin of Western capitalism. —“Flanders” was an empty space until the Middle Ages. Before the Middle Ages, the eastern part of the Southern Netherlands were the most important players.

Second, Falter presents Belgium as a success story in the nineteenth century. The foundation of the kingdom in 1830 marked the end of an era of chaos from the Roman period until the battle of Waterloo (except from brief more peaceful periods, e.g. forty years during the Austrian rule), turning into one of the richest nations in the world at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Last but not least, Belgium was one of the creators of the Flemish identity. It stimulated Flemish nationalism because of its lack of national identity. Falter’s point is that Flemish nationalism therefore is as little —“nationalist” as Belgian nationalism, and refers in a few recent interviews to the Belgian political crisis, which will be dealt with in this lecture as well.
Introduction

This essay briefly considers the situation and characteristics of Belgian francophone literature at the end of the 19th century. This period, also called fin-de-siècle, is a glorious and meaningful phase in the cultural history of Belgium. This period is especially coloured by an artistic movement “Symbolism” which originated in France, but this aesthetic found a bigger success in Belgium. Belgium produced writers and artists who had an impact abroad for the first time. In this essay, I try to sketch out in particular the background of this movement taking a look at the origin of Belgian francophone literature.

Linguistic Background

When we talk about the literature of Belgium, we should not avoid taking account of its linguistic situation. There are at present three official languages in Belgium: Dutch, French and German. Among them, German speakers form the smallest group which consists of only 0.7% of the population. Since the area of today’s German-speaking community was ceded to Belgium after the First World War, the German language was not a big issue at the end of the 19th century, but it should be remembered that the Belgian royal family was originally from Germany.

Belgium declared her independence from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands after the revolution in 1830. On the one hand, it was a religious conflict. Catholic Belgian provinces were against the Protestant Netherlands. On the other hand, the pillar of the revolution was the aristocracy, who were French-speaking. Therefore, the French language was the only official language in Belgium till 1898. This linguistic politic had a definitive effect on the development of Belgian francophone literature. Even though there were a lot of Dutch-speaking people in Flanders, education was only provided in French for a long time. As a result, the intellectual class in Belgium became in principle French-speaking. It did not matter if they were from Flanders. And it is interesting to point out that the leading figures of Belgian francophone literature during the 19th century were mostly French-speaking Flemish writers.

Search for the Identity of Belgian Francophone Literature

In this context, Belgian writers tried to find an identity in national literature of the brand new state. But it was not an easy task, because the identity of “Belgium” itself was not evident. Moreover, there were not an inconsiderable number of people who said that Belgian literature could not exist. The point at issue was above all the relationship with the literature in France, which was a cultural centre at that time. As long as Belgian authors wrote in French, their literature could be absorbed into French literature so that their literature could not have autonomy. Furthermore, there were also many writers who preferred to be a part of French literature.
The question was whether their literature would be “French literature in Belgium” or “Belgian literature in the French language”. The former regards it as a periphery of French literature and the latter insists on the autonomy of Belgian national literature.

Because of this struggle for identity, Belgian francophone literature came to be developed quite late, in fact, much later than Dutch-speaking literature in Belgium.

As a pioneer of Belgian francophone literature, Charles De Coster (1827–1879) is to be mentioned in the first place. He published in 1867 a historical novel *La Légende et les Aventures héroïques, joyeuses et glorieuses d’Ulenspiegel et de Lamme Goedzak au pays de Flandres et ailleurs*, which is based on a medieval folklore in the German-speaking area. De Coster, who had a Flemish father and a Walloon mother, set the story in Flanders as the title suggests and he proposed with his literary works to define Belgian francophone literature as “Flemish-like literature in French”.

Belgian Symbolism and the Significance of Flemish Imagination

This literary identity was widely accepted during the 19th century. But it depended on the specific situation of the cultural scene in Belgium. From De Coster on, most of the writers of Belgian francophone literature were French-speaking Flemish; therefore, they had no obstacle to represent Belgian literature as “Flemish-like literature in French”.

Since the independence of Belgium, the centre of the French-speaking cultural centre has been Brussels. Brussels is nowadays a bilingual area of both French and Dutch, and the majority of the population is French-speaking. However the population of Brussels was initially mostly Dutch-speaking, because Brussels was situated historically in Flanders. During the 19th century, Brussels gradually became a French-speaking city as the capital of Belgium whose official language was only French until 1898.

Belgian Symbolism came up in this context at the end of the 19th century. Symbolism, when it first appeared in France, was not related to such national or racial feelings, but this movement was characterised by a deeply aesthetic concept, known as “Art for art’s sake”, in French “l’art pour l’art”. On the other hand, Belgian francophone literature was still about to establish its own identity so that it would be involved with national ideas. Consequently, some great writers came out of Belgian Symbolism so that the presence of Belgian francophone literature was approved internationally.

As Belgian symbolists, we can identify three writers in particular. They are Georges Rodenbach (1855-1898), Émile Verhaeren (1855-1916) and Maurice Maeterlinck (1862-1949). It is very interesting to point out that all of them are not only French-speaking Flemish but also they all grew up in the same Flemish city, Ghent. Ghent has been a centre of Flemish culture and Ghent University is the first Dutch-speaking university in Belgium. On the other hand, there were many citizens of the French-speaking middle-class, and during the 19th century, Ghent was also an important cultural centre for French-speakers.

Owing to this background, Belgian symbolist literature in French had a lot to do with Flemish culture, and it is well known that it owed its international success to the “Flemish character” which worked abroad, particularly in France, as “exotic”.

For example, poet and novelist, Georges Rodenbach is one of the first Belgian writers who was
appreciated in France. His first and biggest success was brought by the novel *Bruges-la-Morte* (1892). In this novel, he depicted Bruges as a medieval and decadent city which was melancholic and forgotten by history. Rodenbach accentuates Flemish and “northern” characters of Bruges by describing its gloomy weather and referring to its cultural heritage, in particular the art of Flemish painting in the 15th century, known as Flemish Primitives.

After the success of this novel, Rodenbach continued to write similar works always about Bruges. In his whole work, Rodenbach exaggerated the particularity of Bruges as an exotic dead city so much that he provoked the bitter antipathy of its citizens. They were against his fake image of Bruges, because this city was actually not so dead but was modernising at that time with the construction of a new port and canals. After the death of Rodenbach, his friends wanted to put his monument in Bruges, however, the monument was finally built in Ghent because of the protest of the citizens of Bruges.

Émile Verhaeren was born near Antwerp and went to school with Rodenbach who was his classmate. Besides being an active art critic, Verhaeren was a famous poet widely known in Europe. His early poetry was strongly inspired by his home country Flanders. He describes the nature and people in the countryside in a sensual way which associates with Flemish Baroque painters like Jacob Jordaens (1593-1678). Flemish Baroque art was produced from the 16th to 17th century around Antwerp and was also represented by the other Flemish painters Anthony van Dyke (1599-1641) and Peter Paul Rubens (1577-1640). Flanders possesses historically a rich heritage of paintings and it had a significant role for the making of Belgian cultural identity and inspired artists deeply at that time.

Maurice Maeterlinck, who is the only Belgian winner of the Nobel Prize in literature (1911), also owed his inspiration to Flemish heritage. His first prose work “Massacre of the Innocents” refers to the picture by Pieter Bruegel the Elder (ca. 1525-1569) who is a prominent Flemish painter of the 16th century. In his literary works, Maeterlinck did not describe Flanders as directly as Rodenbach and Verhaeren, however, he was connected to Flanders in another way.

He was appreciated above all for his symbolist poetic drama which attempted to describe the spiritual sense of inner life. Maeterlinck started to be interested in this subject since he got to know Flemish mysticism in the Middle Ages which had a significant influence on his drama. The main figure of this mysticism is Jan van Ruusbroek (1293–1391) from Brussels whose work Maeterlinck even translated from Old Dutch to French. Owing to his translation (1891), Flemish mysticism was “discovered” in Europe, then, Maeterlinck’s dramas were also regarded as “mystic”.

His most famous drama, *Pelléas et Mélisande* (1892), was made into an opera in this period with the music of Claude Debussy (1862-1918). Furthermore, many other composed for this oeuvre, such as Gabriel Fauré (1845-1924) and Arnold Schönberg (1874-1951). In this drama, Maeterlinck inserted a few poems which Maeterlinck later said were inspired by Flemish old songs which his mother sang in his childhood.

While French symbolists, like Stéphane Mallarmé (1842-1898), Paul Verlaine (1844-1896), Arthur Rimbaud (1854-1891), stayed exclusively in the genre of poetry, Belgian symbolism flourished also in novels and drama which is one reason of their success, in addition, Flemish imagination played not a small role here to enrich the attraction of their francophone literature.
Reaction from Wallonia and the New Identity of Belgian Francophone Literature

As mentioned above, Flemish character played a prominent role in Belgian francophone Literature till the end of the 19th century. But the identity as “Flemish-like literature in French” could not be accepted by writers in Wallonia who were not “Germanic” as Flemish but “Latin” race.

The end of the 19th century was a turning point for Belgian francophone literature to the next phase. Owing to the Flemish movement, the status of Dutch language had much more presence. It became an official language in Belgium and secondary education in Dutch was spread slowly in Flanders.

Walloon people started to have a feeling that they were threatened by Dutch speakers, but, at the same time, with the diffusion of education in Dutch, there were less and less French-speaking Flemish writers, who were the pillar of Belgian francophone literature during the 19th century. Instead, Walloon writers have been representing Belgian francophone literature since this period.

Walloon writers became conscious of Walloon identity, and to make a difference from Flemish writers, they accentuated that they were Latin, furthermore, closer to “French”. Then, at the beginning of the 20th century, Belgian writers had to redefine the identity of their literature. The new generation denied the regional, in fact, “Flemish” character of Belgian francophone literature, and they intended to create a new identity of Belgian francophone literature, that was, “French literature in Belgium”.

References


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